Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana
Ilustraciones
- Autores:
-
Delgado Jimenez, Michelle
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/80133
- Palabra clave:
- 690 - Construcción de edificios
Project management
Administración de proyectos
Construction industry
Industria de la construcción
Housing projects
Proyectos de vivienda
Asimetrías de la información
Proyectos de edificaciones
Teoría de la agencia
Selección adversa
Riesgo moral
Gestión de riesgos
Information asymmetries
Building projects
Agency theory
Adverse selection
Moral hazard
Risk management
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional
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Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv |
Information asymmetries in the contracting process of the preliminary stage of a Colombian construction company building projects |
| title |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| spellingShingle |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana 690 - Construcción de edificios Project management Administración de proyectos Construction industry Industria de la construcción Housing projects Proyectos de vivienda Asimetrías de la información Proyectos de edificaciones Teoría de la agencia Selección adversa Riesgo moral Gestión de riesgos Information asymmetries Building projects Agency theory Adverse selection Moral hazard Risk management |
| title_short |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| title_full |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| title_fullStr |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| title_sort |
Asimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombiana |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Delgado Jimenez, Michelle |
| dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv |
Herrera Jiménez, Alfonso |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Delgado Jimenez, Michelle |
| dc.subject.ddc.spa.fl_str_mv |
690 - Construcción de edificios |
| topic |
690 - Construcción de edificios Project management Administración de proyectos Construction industry Industria de la construcción Housing projects Proyectos de vivienda Asimetrías de la información Proyectos de edificaciones Teoría de la agencia Selección adversa Riesgo moral Gestión de riesgos Information asymmetries Building projects Agency theory Adverse selection Moral hazard Risk management |
| dc.subject.lemb.none.fl_str_mv |
Project management Administración de proyectos Construction industry Industria de la construcción Housing projects Proyectos de vivienda |
| dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv |
Asimetrías de la información Proyectos de edificaciones Teoría de la agencia Selección adversa Riesgo moral Gestión de riesgos |
| dc.subject.proposal.eng.fl_str_mv |
Information asymmetries Building projects Agency theory Adverse selection Moral hazard Risk management |
| description |
Ilustraciones |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2020 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-08T14:57:57Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-08T14:57:57Z |
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Trabajo de grado - Maestría |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
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Text |
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http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TM |
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https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/80133 |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ |
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https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/80133 https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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spa |
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spa |
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Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Herrera Jiménez, Alfonso335deea8e7e510bd271c224d74be654dDelgado Jimenez, Michellee806d029f32a45640633358f47203ad82021-09-08T14:57:57Z2021-09-08T14:57:57Z2020https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/80133Universidad Nacional de ColombiaRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/IlustracionesEn el presente estudio se recopilan las principales asimetrías de la información y sus causas en la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones, mediante un estudio de caso cualitativo a una empresa constructora del sector privado, con el fin de proponer alternativas para su gestión y contribuir con el cumplimiento de los objetivos de costo, plazo y calidad. Además, contribuir a la percepción de servicio al cliente de la empresa, que es uno de los principales indicadores en su gestión de proyectos, pero que se ve afectado por los atrasos, la calidad y la pérdida de utilidad que generan la selección adversa y el riesgo moral en las diversas fases. Bajo la mirada de la teoría de la agencia se formuló un instrumento de entrevista cualitativa, dirigido a los gerentes de proyectos de la empresa, que se consideran intermediarios fundamentales entre los agentes externos y los proyectos de la empresa, con lo cual se recopilaron las principales asimetrías de la información, que generalmente se presentan en la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones y en el proceso de negociación y validación de señales para la selección de los agentes externos. Así mismo, se propone una guía que contribuya al manejo de asimetrías y mitigue sus efectos. Con el adecuado manejo de señales en el proceso preliminar de las obras, que incluye la validación de la experiencia y capacidad de los agentes externos y la implementación de buenas prácticas, como el juicio de expertos y la revisión de lecciones aprendidas, se puede minimizar el problema de selección adversa en la etapa de inicio y de riesgo moral en la etapa de ejecución; adicionalmente, lograr el óptimo cumplimiento de los objetivos empresariales y de los proyectos de edificaciones. (Texto tomado de la fuente).In this study, the main asymmetries of information in the preliminary stage of building projects are collected; as well as their causes. A qualitative case study of a construction company in the private sector is conducted to propose alternatives for their management strategies and contribute to the fulfillment of cost, time, and quality objectives. In addition, this study aims to improve the perception of the company's customer service, which is one of the main indicators of its project management performance. However, the image of customer service is affected by circumstances, such as delays, quality and loss of profit. These conditions are generated by adverse selection and moral hazard in the different phases of a project. Under the gaze of agency theory, a qualitative interview focused on the company’s project managers is to be formulated. Project managers are considered fundamental intermediaries between external agents and the company's projects, with whom the main information asymmetries lie. These asymmetries generally appear in the preliminary stage of building projects and in the process of negotiation and validation of signals for the selection of external agents. Likewise, a guide is proposed that contributes to the management of asymmetries and mitigates their effects. With the proper handling of signals in the preliminary process of construction projects the adverse selection problem in the initial stage and moral hazard in the execution stage can be minimized. Approaches to manage signals include the validation of the experience and capacity of the external agents; and the implementation of good practices, such as the application of experts’ judgment and review of learned lessons. In addition, it enables achieving optimal compliance with business objectives and building projects.MaestríaMagíster en AdministraciónGestión de Proyectosx, 128 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en AdministraciónEscuela de Administración y Contaduría PúblicaFacultad de Ciencias EconómicasBogotá, ColombiaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá690 - Construcción de edificiosProject managementAdministración de proyectosConstruction industryIndustria de la construcciónHousing projectsProyectos de viviendaAsimetrías de la informaciónProyectos de edificacionesTeoría de la agenciaSelección adversaRiesgo moralGestión de riesgosInformation asymmetriesBuilding projectsAgency theoryAdverse selectionMoral hazardRisk managementAsimetrías de la información en el proceso de contratación de la etapa preliminar de los proyectos de edificaciones de una empresa constructora colombianaInformation asymmetries in the contracting process of the preliminary stage of a Colombian construction company building projectsTrabajo de grado - Maestríainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMAdeleke, A. 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Engineering Economics, 25(5), 558-567. https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ee.25.5.3733Público generalLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-83964https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/80133/1/license.txtcccfe52f796b7c63423298c2d3365fc6MD51ORIGINAL1014215154.2020 (2).pdf1014215154.2020 (2).pdfTesis de Maestría en Administraciónapplication/pdf2487130https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/80133/2/1014215154.2020%20%282%29.pdf0b7815aa83fa45d39f509f14c42796b3MD52THUMBNAIL1014215154.2020 (2).pdf.jpg1014215154.2020 (2).pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg5178https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/80133/3/1014215154.2020%20%282%29.pdf.jpg71bdfeb9bbb98715ac2585542601dda1MD53unal/80133oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/801332024-07-28 23:59:58.121Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de 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