Probability-lowering causes and the connotations of causation
A common objection to probabilistic theories of causation is that there are prima facie causes that lower the probability of their effects. Among the many replies to this objection, little attention has been given to Mellor’s (1995) indirect strategy to deny that probability-lowering factors are bon...
- Autores:
-
Páez, Andrés
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/41435
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/41435
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/31532/
- Palabra clave:
- Filosofía
filosofía de la ciencia
epistemología
lógica
Probabilistic Causation
Evidence
Explanation
Mellor
Connotations of Causation
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | A common objection to probabilistic theories of causation is that there are prima facie causes that lower the probability of their effects. Among the many replies to this objection, little attention has been given to Mellor’s (1995) indirect strategy to deny that probability-lowering factors are bona fide causes. According to Mellor, such factors do not satisfy the evidential, explanatory, and instrumental connotations of causation. The paper argues that the evidential connotation only entails an epistemically relativized form of causal attribution, not causation itself, and that there are clear cases of explanation and instrumental reasoning that must appeal to negatively relevant factors. In the end, it suggests a more liberal interpretation of causation that restores its connotations. |
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