Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación
El fenómeno de la intencionalidad original adquiere gran interés e importancia debido a que está directamente relacionado con problemas prácticos sobre cómo debemos actuar, pensar, sentir, percibir, etc., a los cuales nos vemos enfrentados en la vida diaria. El presente proyecto es un análisis sobre...
- Autores:
-
Burgos Arevalo, Jorge Alexander
- Tipo de recurso:
- Doctoral thesis
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2024
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/86635
- Palabra clave:
- 110 - Metafísica
160 - Lógica
120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad
100 - Filosofía y Psicología
170 - Ética (Filosofía moral)
190 - Filosofía moderna occidental
INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA)
AUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA)
FILOSOFIA DE LA MENTE
TEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTO
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Autonomy (Psychology)
Philosophy of mind
Knowledge, Theory of
Intencionalidad original
Normatividad
Autonomía
Auto-constitución
Auto-transformación
Original intentionality
Normativity
Autonomy
Selfconstitution
Self-transformation
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv |
Original Intentionality, Self-Constitution and Reflexivity: An analysis of the conditions of possibility of our self-transformation |
title |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
spellingShingle |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación 110 - Metafísica 160 - Lógica 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad 100 - Filosofía y Psicología 170 - Ética (Filosofía moral) 190 - Filosofía moderna occidental INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) AUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA) FILOSOFIA DE LA MENTE TEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTO Intentionality (Philosophy) Autonomy (Psychology) Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Intencionalidad original Normatividad Autonomía Auto-constitución Auto-transformación Original intentionality Normativity Autonomy Selfconstitution Self-transformation |
title_short |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
title_full |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
title_fullStr |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
title_full_unstemmed |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
title_sort |
Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Burgos Arevalo, Jorge Alexander |
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv |
Cussins, Adrian |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Burgos Arevalo, Jorge Alexander |
dc.subject.ddc.spa.fl_str_mv |
110 - Metafísica 160 - Lógica 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad 100 - Filosofía y Psicología 170 - Ética (Filosofía moral) 190 - Filosofía moderna occidental |
topic |
110 - Metafísica 160 - Lógica 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad 100 - Filosofía y Psicología 170 - Ética (Filosofía moral) 190 - Filosofía moderna occidental INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) AUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA) FILOSOFIA DE LA MENTE TEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTO Intentionality (Philosophy) Autonomy (Psychology) Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Intencionalidad original Normatividad Autonomía Auto-constitución Auto-transformación Original intentionality Normativity Autonomy Selfconstitution Self-transformation |
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv |
INTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA) AUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA) FILOSOFIA DE LA MENTE TEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTO |
dc.subject.lemb.eng.fl_str_mv |
Intentionality (Philosophy) Autonomy (Psychology) Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of |
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv |
Intencionalidad original Normatividad Autonomía Auto-constitución Auto-transformación |
dc.subject.proposal.eng.fl_str_mv |
Original intentionality Normativity Autonomy Selfconstitution Self-transformation |
description |
El fenómeno de la intencionalidad original adquiere gran interés e importancia debido a que está directamente relacionado con problemas prácticos sobre cómo debemos actuar, pensar, sentir, percibir, etc., a los cuales nos vemos enfrentados en la vida diaria. El presente proyecto es un análisis sobre la intencionalidad original y consiste en, primero, argüir que la pregunta acerca de cómo es posible el fenómeno de la intencionalidad original genera una indagación sobre la fuente y autoridad de los criterios normativos que guían y justifican los fenómenos intencionales. Segundo, que tal indagación nos lleva a estudiar el fenómeno intrínsecamente relacionado, este es, el fenómeno de la autonomía, y a examinar varias de sus características centrales y particularidades (mediante una investigación lógico-normativa trascendental y estudios empíricos). Y tercero, que las particularidades de la estructura lógico-normativa (metafísica) que hacen posible el fenómeno de la autonomía tiene consecuencias importantes para una teoría del conocimiento, la agencia, el auto-conocimiento y la autoconstitución, desde donde podremos entender y dar una lectura sobre: (i) la crisis existencial actual de la humanidad y, en virtud de ello, (ii) comprender la importancia de nuestra auto-transformación o autoconstitución profunda mediante un tipo particular de compromiso, este es; el compromiso existencial o auténtico. Y así el presente proyecto es un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra autotransformación o intencionalidad original genuina, y su importancia y 5 premura debido a la crisis existencial a la que nos vemos enfrentados actualmente como humanidad (Texto tomado de la fuente). |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-07-29T14:49:18Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-07-29T14:49:18Z |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2024 |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
Trabajo de grado - Doctorado |
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
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https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/86635 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ |
url |
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/86635 https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ |
identifier_str_mv |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv |
● Aristotle. (1984) The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ● Brandom, R. (2005). “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel. Comparing Empirical and Logical concepts”. Internationales Jarbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 3: 131 – 61. ● Brandom, R. (2014). A Spirit of Trust: A Semantic Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology. http:// www.pitt .edu / ~brandom /spirit of trust 2014 .html. ● Brooks, R. (1987). Intelligence wihtout representations. MIT Artificial Intelligence Labotatory, Cambridge. ● Colombetti, G. (2010). Enaction, sense-making and emotion. Originally published in Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E. (2010)(eds). Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science (pp.145-164). Cambridge MA: MIT Press. ● Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptativity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science 4: 429-52. ● Dennett, D. (1989). Intentional Stance. The MIT Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. ● Dennett, D. (1997). True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In Mind Design II. Philosophy, Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. ● Dennett, D. (2003). Who’s On First? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 9–10, pp. 19–30. ● Dretske, F. (1981). Concepts and Meaning. In Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press. ● Dreyfus, H. (1979). What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence. ● Dummett, M. (1993). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd. ● DeVries, W. (1993). Hegel’s Logic and Philosophy of Mind. In The Age of German Idealism, ed. R. Solomon and K. Higgins. New York: Routledge. ● Evans, Gareth. The varieties of Reference. Clarendon Press Oxford: 1982. ● Gibson, J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ● Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ● Fodor, J. (1987). Introduction: The Persistence of Attitudes. In Psychosemantics. ● Fodor, J. (1987). Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. ● Haugeland, J. (1997). What is a Mind Design? In Mind Design II. Philosophy, Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. ● Haugeland, J. (1998). The Intentionality All-stars. In Having Thought. Essay in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (1998). Objective Perception. In Having Thought. Essay in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (1998). Understanding: Dennett and Searle. In Having Thought. Essay in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (1998). Truth and Following Rule. In Having Thought. Essay in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (2013). Authentic Intentionality. In Dasein Disclosed. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (2013). Heidegger on Being a Person. In Dasein Disclosed. Harvard University Press. ● Haugeland, J. (2013). Social Cartesianism. In Dasein Disclosed. Harvard University Press. ● Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Faith and Knowledge. Trad. Walter Cerf y H.S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York Press. ● Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology of Spirit. Trad. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ● Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic. Trad. T. F. Geraest, W. A. Suchting y H.S. Harris. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. ● Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). Science of Logic. Trad. A. V. Miller. London: George Allen & Unwin. ● Henry, A. (1983). Kant´s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. ● Heinrich, D. (1966). Fichtes ursprünliche Einsicht. En Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Frankfurt, Klostrmann, pp. 188-232. ● Hume, David. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd edition edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ● Kant, I. (2002). Fundamentación para una Metafísica de las Costumbres. Alianza Ed. ● Kant, I. (2007). Crítica de la Razón Pura. Prólogo de Mario Caimi. Buenos Aires: Colihue. ● Korsgaard, C. (1996). Morality as Freedom. En Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press. ● Korsgaard, C. (1996). The Normative Question. In The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press. ● Korsgard, C. (2008). Self-constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant. In The Constitution of Agency. Oxford University Press Inc., New York. ● Korsgaard, C. (2009). Agency and Identity. In Self-constitution. Agency, Identity and Integrity. Oxford University Press Inc., New York. ● Korsgaard, C. (2009). The Metaphysics of Normativity. In Self-constitution. Agency, Identity and Integrity. Oxford University Press Inc., New York. ● Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press. ● Kusch, M. (2006). Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Defending Knipe’s Wittgenstein. Acumen Publishing Limited. ● Longuenesse, B. (1998). Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Princenton University Press. ● McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World. Cambridge Harvard University Press. ● McDowell, J. (2002). Wittgenstein On Following Rule. In Rule-Following and Meaning Cap. 4 (Mcgill-Queen´s University Press) Eds. Alexander Miller y Crispin Wright. ● McDowell, J. (2009a). Hegel´s Idealism as Radicalization of Kant. En Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England. ● McDowell, J. (2009b). Self-determining Subjectivity and External Constraint. En Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England. ● Moran, R. (2001) Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on elf-Knowledge. Princeton University Press. ● Paton, H. J. (1935). Kant´s Metaphysic of Experience. New York: Macmillan. ● Paton, H. J. (1971). The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. University of Pennsylvania Press. ● Pippin, R. (1982). Kant´s Theory of Form: An Essay on the “Critique of the Pure Reason”. New Haven: Yale University Press. ● Pippin, R. (1987). Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Volumen 17, número 2, junio, pp. 449-476. ● Pippin, R. (1989). Hegel´s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-consciousness. Cambridge University Press. ● Pippin, R. (2000). Fichte’s Alleged One-Side, Subjective, Psychological Idealism. En The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 147-70. ● Pippin, R. (2019). Hegel’s Realm of Shadows. Logic as Metaphysics in The Science of Logic. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. ● Pinkard, T. (2002). The Revolution in Philosophy (I): human spontaneity and natural order. In The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge University Press. ● Pinkard, T. (2002). The Revolution in Philosophy (II): autonomy and the moral order. In The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge University Press. ● Ponty, M. (1953). La Estructura del Comportamiento. Librería Hachette S. A., Buenos Aires. ● Proust, J. (2006). Metacognition and animal rationality. En Rational Animals. Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds, editors. Oxford University Press. ● Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of "meaning”. In Language, Mind and Knowledge. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 131-193. ● Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First-person Perspective and other Essays. Cambridge University Press. ● Searle, J. (2002). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. In Conciousness and Language. Cambridge University Press. ● Searle, J. (2004). Intentionality. In Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press, Inc. ● Sedgwick, S. (2008). Kant´s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press. ● Sedgwick, S. (2012). Hegel´s Critique of Kant. From Dichotomy to Identity. Oxford University Press. ● Sellars, W. (1954). Some Reflections on Language Games. En Philosophy of Science, 21: 204–228. ● Sellars, W. (1963). Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind. En Science, Perception, and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ● Sterelney, K. (2003). Thought in a Hostile World: The evolution of human cognition. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ● Sterelney, K. (2012). The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. ● Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2009). Animation: The Fundamental, Essential, and Properly Descriptive Concept. Cont Philos Rev 42:375–400. ● Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011). The Primacy of Movement. University of Oregon. John Benjamins Publishing Company. ● Strawson, P. F. Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Routledge Library, 2003. ● Weber, A. and Varela, F. J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97–125. ● Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations. Basil Backwell. Traducción por G. E. M. Anscombe. |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Cussins, Adriancebfd4842907ce47f98311f85b70bdc7Burgos Arevalo, Jorge Alexander8fd252c04c48a5dd1cfedfbd854597a22024-07-29T14:49:18Z2024-07-29T14:49:18Z2024https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/86635Universidad Nacional de ColombiaRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/El fenómeno de la intencionalidad original adquiere gran interés e importancia debido a que está directamente relacionado con problemas prácticos sobre cómo debemos actuar, pensar, sentir, percibir, etc., a los cuales nos vemos enfrentados en la vida diaria. El presente proyecto es un análisis sobre la intencionalidad original y consiste en, primero, argüir que la pregunta acerca de cómo es posible el fenómeno de la intencionalidad original genera una indagación sobre la fuente y autoridad de los criterios normativos que guían y justifican los fenómenos intencionales. Segundo, que tal indagación nos lleva a estudiar el fenómeno intrínsecamente relacionado, este es, el fenómeno de la autonomía, y a examinar varias de sus características centrales y particularidades (mediante una investigación lógico-normativa trascendental y estudios empíricos). Y tercero, que las particularidades de la estructura lógico-normativa (metafísica) que hacen posible el fenómeno de la autonomía tiene consecuencias importantes para una teoría del conocimiento, la agencia, el auto-conocimiento y la autoconstitución, desde donde podremos entender y dar una lectura sobre: (i) la crisis existencial actual de la humanidad y, en virtud de ello, (ii) comprender la importancia de nuestra auto-transformación o autoconstitución profunda mediante un tipo particular de compromiso, este es; el compromiso existencial o auténtico. Y así el presente proyecto es un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra autotransformación o intencionalidad original genuina, y su importancia y 5 premura debido a la crisis existencial a la que nos vemos enfrentados actualmente como humanidad (Texto tomado de la fuente).The phenomenon of original intentionality is of great interest and importance because it is directly related to practical problems of how we should act, think, feel, perceive, etc., which we face in our daily lives. The present project is an analysis of original intentionality and consists of, first, arguing that the question of how the phenomenon of original intentionality is possible generates an inquiry into the source and authority of the normative criteria that guide and justify intentional phenomena. Second, that such an inquiry leads us to study the intrinsically related phenomenon, that is, the phenomenon of autonomy, and to examine several of its central characteristics and particularities (through transcendental normative-logical research and empirical studies). And third, that the particularities of the logicalnormative (metaphysical) structure that make the phenomenon of autonomy possible have important consequences for a theory of knowledge, agency, self-knowledge and self-constitution, from which we will be able to understand and give a reading on: (i) the current existential crisis of humanity and, by virtue of it, (ii) understand the importance of our self-transformation or deep self-constitution through a particular type of commitment, that is; the existential or authentic commitment. And so the present project is an analysis of the conditions of possibility of our self-transformation or genuine original intentionality, and its importance and urgency due to the existential crisis that we are currently facing as humanity.DoctoradoDoctor en Filosofía306 páginasapplication/pdfspaUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Doctorado en FilosofíaFacultad de Ciencias HumanasBogotá, ColombiaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá110 - Metafísica160 - Lógica120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad100 - Filosofía y Psicología170 - Ética (Filosofía moral)190 - Filosofía moderna occidentalINTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA)AUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA)FILOSOFIA DE LA MENTETEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTOIntentionality (Philosophy)Autonomy (Psychology)Philosophy of mindKnowledge, Theory ofIntencionalidad originalNormatividadAutonomíaAuto-constituciónAuto-transformaciónOriginal intentionalityNormativityAutonomySelfconstitutionSelf-transformationIntencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformaciónOriginal Intentionality, Self-Constitution and Reflexivity: An analysis of the conditions of possibility of our self-transformationTrabajo de grado - Doctoradoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TD● Aristotle. (1984) The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.● Brandom, R. (2005). “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel. Comparing Empirical and Logical concepts”. Internationales Jarbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 3: 131 – 61.● Brandom, R. (2014). A Spirit of Trust: A Semantic Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology. http:// www.pitt .edu / ~brandom /spirit of trust 2014 .html.● Brooks, R. (1987). Intelligence wihtout representations. MIT Artificial Intelligence Labotatory, Cambridge.● Colombetti, G. (2010). Enaction, sense-making and emotion. Originally published in Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E. (2010)(eds). Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science (pp.145-164). Cambridge MA: MIT Press.● Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptativity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science 4: 429-52.● Dennett, D. (1989). Intentional Stance. The MIT Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.● Dennett, D. (1997). True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In Mind Design II. Philosophy, Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.● Dennett, D. (2003). Who’s On First? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 9–10, pp. 19–30.● Dretske, F. (1981). Concepts and Meaning. In Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.● Dreyfus, H. (1979). What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence.● Dummett, M. (1993). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd.● DeVries, W. (1993). Hegel’s Logic and Philosophy of Mind. In The Age of German Idealism, ed. R. Solomon and K. Higgins. New York: Routledge.● Evans, Gareth. The varieties of Reference. Clarendon Press Oxford: 1982.● Gibson, J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.● Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). 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