Bio-semantics, ecology and content ascription

Advocates of bio-semantics propose that the content of representations be fixed with reference to their biological function. A legitimate plurality of etiological functions for a given representation, however, stands in the way of fixing content. Attempts to overcome this problem for content ascript...

Full description

Autores:
Rosas, Alejandro
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2011
Institución:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Repositorio:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/49285
Acceso en línea:
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/49285
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/42742/
Palabra clave:
Bio-semantics
Content
Etiological functions
Ecology
Neander
Representations
Rights
openAccess
License
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
Description
Summary:Advocates of bio-semantics propose that the content of representations be fixed with reference to their biological function. A legitimate plurality of etiological functions for a given representation, however, stands in the way of fixing content. Attempts to overcome this problem for content ascription with a counterfactual argument have been accused of misusing the selection for/selection of distinction. I reconstruct the counterfactual argument in the context of the constraints on evolutionary design that underlie an ecological theory of selection pressures. I then argue that these constraints assign a modest role to etiological function in a method for content ascription. But it requires abandoning the claim that a priori thinking in terms of etiological function will solve content ascription; in particular, it cannot replace cognitive theory and experimentation. As behavioural ecologists have warned, biological functions should not be too quickly translated into proximate, in particular perceptual, mechanisms.