Practical reason, criminal law and nonhuman animals. On the legitimacy of the criminalization of animal abuse

This work offers a partial answer to the following question: is the criminalization of behaviors that cause harm to non-human animals legitimate? The partial answer is that, if only moral reasons can justify actions and decisions, then only those types of reasons can account for the justification of...

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Autores:: Reyes Aponte, Jorge Leonardo

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:: 2024

Institución:: Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Repositorio:: Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Idioma:: eng

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Summary:	This work offers a partial answer to the following question: is the criminalization of behaviors that cause harm to non-human animals legitimate? The partial answer is that, if only moral reasons can justify actions and decisions, then only those types of reasons can account for the justification of the legitimacy of the criminalization and punishment of animal abuse in a legal system. The argument to arrive at this answer consists of two parts. In the first, it is studied two issues. On the one hand, the semantics and ontology behind the categories used to formulate the question. And, on the other hand, the ontology and semantics of the categories used around that question in legal systems such as the Colombian one. To do this, three argumentative steps are followed. (1) A historical conception of biological taxa is defended. (2) Notions of animal welfare, sentience and abuse are examined. And (3) the constitutional status of non-human animals and animal abuse is examined within the framework of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia. From this, in the first part, it is argued in favor of two statements. On the one hand, the impossibility of sustaining from an essentialist position the radical distinction between human beings as the only beings with dignity and non-human animals as things and as sentient beings. And, on the other hand, the impossibility of rationally grounding the constitutional duty of animal protection on the notion of human dignity. In the second part, three categories are clarified, namely, “legal norm”, “legitimacy” and “practical reason”. Considering this, it is argued that, although there is no necessary conceptual relationship, there is a necessary justificatory relationship between law and morality. As a consequence of that, the justification or legitimacy of legal norms such as those through which a behavior is criminalized is found exclusively on moral reasons.

Practical reason, criminal law and nonhuman animals. On the legitimacy of the criminalization of animal abuse

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