Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia

ilustraciones, diagramas

Autores:
Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Repositorio:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/85627
Acceso en línea:
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/
Palabra clave:
Competition
Interindustry competition
Competition
Competencia industrial
Competencia comercial
Competencia económica
Ley de competencia
Análisis económico del derecho
Cartel
Carteles empresariales
Ley 1340 de 2009
Competition law
Economic analysis of law
Business cartels
Law 1340 of 2009
Rights
openAccess
License
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
id UNACIONAL2_324ea51cf74071354a150ffdba82e05c
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/85627
network_acronym_str UNACIONAL2
network_name_str Universidad Nacional de Colombia
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv Economic analysis of the competition regime in Colombia
title Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
spellingShingle Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
Competition
Interindustry competition
Competition
Competencia industrial
Competencia comercial
Competencia económica
Ley de competencia
Análisis económico del derecho
Cartel
Carteles empresariales
Ley 1340 de 2009
Competition law
Economic analysis of law
Business cartels
Law 1340 of 2009
title_short Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
title_full Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
title_fullStr Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
title_full_unstemmed Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
title_sort Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Herrera Saavedra, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola
dc.subject.lemb.eng.fl_str_mv Competition
Interindustry competition
Competition
topic Competition
Interindustry competition
Competition
Competencia industrial
Competencia comercial
Competencia económica
Ley de competencia
Análisis económico del derecho
Cartel
Carteles empresariales
Ley 1340 de 2009
Competition law
Economic analysis of law
Business cartels
Law 1340 of 2009
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv Competencia industrial
Competencia comercial
Competencia económica
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv Ley de competencia
Análisis económico del derecho
Cartel
Carteles empresariales
Ley 1340 de 2009
dc.subject.proposal.eng.fl_str_mv Competition law
Economic analysis of law
Business cartels
Law 1340 of 2009
description ilustraciones, diagramas
publishDate 2023
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2023-08
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-02-05T20:49:22Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-02-05T20:49:22Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Trabajo de grado - Maestría
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type.version.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv Text
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status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/
url https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/
identifier_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009). The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 20-32. http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51205/1/563419822.pdf
Ahn, S. (2002). Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence. OECD Economics Working Paper No. 317. http://ssrn.com/abstract=318059.
Allain, M, Boyer, M., Kotchoni, R., Ponssard, J.P. (2011). The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases The Myth of Underdeterrence. https://hal.science/hal-00631432
Auriol, E., Hjelmeng, E. Søreide, T. (2016). Deterring corruption and cartels : in search of a coherent approach. https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/deterring-corruption-and-cartels-search-coherent-approach
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico. (2009). Derecho y Política de la Competencia en Colombia. Examen interpares. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44111213.pdf
Banco Mundial (2023, julio 03). PIB (US$ a precios actuales). https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
Becker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.
Boyer, M. & Kotchoni, R. (2015). ¿How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?. Review of Industrial Organization, 47(2), 119-153. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44735447
Boyer, M., Ross, T. W., & Winter, R. A. (2017). The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique, 50(5), 1489–1524. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45172466
Bradford, Anu & Chilton, Adam S. (2018). Competition Law around the world from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 393–432. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhy011
Broos, S., Gautier, A., Ramos, J. & Petit, N. (2016). Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014). Revue économique, 67, 79-94. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.hs01.0079
Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2011). Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the competition policy indexes. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 165–204, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq021
Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013). Competition policy and productivity growth: an empirical assessment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1324-1336. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00304#.U75kjvmSyVM
Combe, E. & Monnier, C. (2012). Les cartels en Europe, une analyse empirique. Revue française d'économie, XXVII, 187-226. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.122.0187
Connor, John M. (2010). Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610262
Crafts, N. (2012). British relative economic decline revisited: The role of competition. Explorations in Economic History, 49(1), 17-29. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498311000295
Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., (2010). The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law. Intellectual property, competition law and economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189
Gutmann, J., & Voigt, S. (2014). Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws. Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (February 8, 2014). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392780
Hutin, Anatole & Monnier Constance. (2016). Les cartels en France: Analyse économique de leurs caractéristiques et de leurs sanctions. Concurrences 2, pp. 45-61.
Hylton, Keith N. & Deng, Fei (2007). Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their effects. Antitrust Law Journal, 74 https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/852
Jurczyk, Zbigniew. (2017). The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 10(16). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160504
Kaplow, L., & S. Shavell (2001). Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle, Journal of Political Economy 109, 281–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319553
Kathuria, V. (2015). A conceptual framework to identify dynamic efficiency. European Competition Journal, 11(2–3), 319–339, https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1060006.
Landes, W.H. (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations. University of Chicago Law Review 50, pp. 652-678.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2543&context=journal_articles
Selten, R. (1973). A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal of Game Theory 2, pp. 141–201. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098575
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.license.spa.fl_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights.uri.spa.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 73 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.publisher.program.spa.fl_str_mv Bogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias Económicas
dc.publisher.faculty.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
dc.publisher.place.spa.fl_str_mv Bogotá, Colombia
dc.publisher.branch.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
institution Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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spelling Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Herrera Saavedra, Juan Pabloa4fab310b3e6663538379f2c535a9cb0Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola8a0426d80d74f0c3231bbcbf083d17302024-02-05T20:49:22Z2024-02-05T20:49:22Z2023-08https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627Universidad Nacional de ColombiaRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ilustraciones, diagramasLa investigación presenta un análisis económico de la ley de competencia en Colombia. Para ello, en primer lugar, y con fin de definir el panorama regional y cómo se ubica la ley de competencia colombiana a nivel latinoamericano, se desarrolló el índice propuesto por Bradford y Chilton (2018) con el fin de actualizar los datos, dadas las múltiples reformas realizadas en la región a las leyes de competencia en la última década, para así, determinar la adopción de las mejores prácticas antimonopolio reconocidas internacionalmente. En segundo lugar, se presenta una caracterización de los carteles que han sido sancionados en Colombia por la realización de acuerdos restrictivos de la competencia, y que han sido sancionados por la Ley 1340 de 2009 actualmente vigente, identificando el mercado afectado, su dimensión, el número de agentes de mercado participantes, etc., el cual nos permitirá contar con un panorama fáctico para plantear una mejor política de competencia en el país. Finalmente, se analiza el modelo de competencia perfecta, de monopolio y un modelo mixto, donde participan empresas que compiten y empresas que coluden, con el fin de analizar el precio del producto y las cantidades producidas en cada escenario. (Texto tomado de la fuente)The research presents an economic analysis of competition law in Colombia. First of all to define the regional landscape and how Colombian competition law is located within the Latin American context, the index proposed by Bradford and Chilton (2018) was developed to track the various competition law reforms carried out in the region over the last decade, in order to determine the best, internationally recognized antitrust practices to adopt. Secondly, a characterization assessment of the cartels was carried out on the result of restricting competition agreements, which have been sanctioned in Colombia by Law 1340 in 2009 and is currently still in force, identifying the affected market, its size, the number of participating market agents, etc. This will allow us to have a factual overview in order to propose a better competition policy in the Country. Finally, the perfect competition model, monopoly and a mixed model are analyzed, where competing companies and colluding companies participate, in order to analyze the price of the product and the quantities produced in each scenarioMaestríaTeoría y política económicaTeoría y política económica73 páginasapplication/pdfUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias EconómicasFacultad de Ciencias EconómicasBogotá, ColombiaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede BogotáAnálisis económico del régimen de competencia en ColombiaEconomic analysis of the competition regime in ColombiaTrabajo de grado - Maestríainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMAghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009). The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 20-32. http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51205/1/563419822.pdfAhn, S. (2002). Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence. OECD Economics Working Paper No. 317. http://ssrn.com/abstract=318059.Allain, M, Boyer, M., Kotchoni, R., Ponssard, J.P. (2011). The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases The Myth of Underdeterrence. https://hal.science/hal-00631432Auriol, E., Hjelmeng, E. Søreide, T. (2016). Deterring corruption and cartels : in search of a coherent approach. https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/deterring-corruption-and-cartels-search-coherent-approachBanco Interamericano de Desarrollo y Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico. (2009). Derecho y Política de la Competencia en Colombia. Examen interpares. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44111213.pdfBanco Mundial (2023, julio 03). PIB (US$ a precios actuales). https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CDBecker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.Boyer, M. & Kotchoni, R. (2015). ¿How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?. Review of Industrial Organization, 47(2), 119-153. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44735447Boyer, M., Ross, T. W., & Winter, R. A. (2017). The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique, 50(5), 1489–1524. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45172466Bradford, Anu & Chilton, Adam S. (2018). Competition Law around the world from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 393–432. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhy011Broos, S., Gautier, A., Ramos, J. & Petit, N. (2016). Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014). Revue économique, 67, 79-94. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.hs01.0079Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2011). Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the competition policy indexes. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 165–204, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq021Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013). Competition policy and productivity growth: an empirical assessment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1324-1336. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00304#.U75kjvmSyVMCombe, E. & Monnier, C. (2012). Les cartels en Europe, une analyse empirique. Revue française d'économie, XXVII, 187-226. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.122.0187Connor, John M. (2010). Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610262Crafts, N. (2012). British relative economic decline revisited: The role of competition. Explorations in Economic History, 49(1), 17-29. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498311000295Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., (2010). The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law. Intellectual property, competition law and economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189Gutmann, J., & Voigt, S. (2014). Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws. Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (February 8, 2014). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392780Hutin, Anatole & Monnier Constance. (2016). Les cartels en France: Analyse économique de leurs caractéristiques et de leurs sanctions. Concurrences 2, pp. 45-61.Hylton, Keith N. & Deng, Fei (2007). Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their effects. Antitrust Law Journal, 74 https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/852Jurczyk, Zbigniew. (2017). The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 10(16). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160504Kaplow, L., & S. Shavell (2001). Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle, Journal of Political Economy 109, 281–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319553Kathuria, V. (2015). A conceptual framework to identify dynamic efficiency. European Competition Journal, 11(2–3), 319–339, https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1060006.Landes, W.H. (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations. University of Chicago Law Review 50, pp. 652-678.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2543&context=journal_articlesSelten, R. (1973). A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal of Game Theory 2, pp. 141–201. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098575CompetitionInterindustry competitionCompetitionCompetencia industrialCompetencia comercialCompetencia económicaLey de competenciaAnálisis económico del derechoCartelCarteles empresarialesLey 1340 de 2009Competition lawEconomic analysis of lawBusiness cartelsLaw 1340 of 2009EstudiantesInvestigadoresMaestrosMedios de comunicaciónPúblico generalResponsables políticosLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-85879https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85627/1/license.txteb34b1cf90b7e1103fc9dfd26be24b4aMD51ORIGINAL105239609.2023.pdf105239609.2023.pdfTesis de Maestría en Ciencias Económicasapplication/pdf838762https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85627/2/105239609.2023.pdf4ad3e2125909795541fc8c887ad71a68MD52THUMBNAIL105239609.2023.pdf.jpg105239609.2023.pdf.jpgGenerated 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