Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia
ilustraciones, diagramas
- Autores:
-
Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2023
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/85627
- Palabra clave:
- Competition
Interindustry competition
Competition
Competencia industrial
Competencia comercial
Competencia económica
Ley de competencia
Análisis económico del derecho
Cartel
Carteles empresariales
Ley 1340 de 2009
Competition law
Economic analysis of law
Business cartels
Law 1340 of 2009
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
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Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv |
Economic analysis of the competition regime in Colombia |
| title |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| spellingShingle |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia Competition Interindustry competition Competition Competencia industrial Competencia comercial Competencia económica Ley de competencia Análisis económico del derecho Cartel Carteles empresariales Ley 1340 de 2009 Competition law Economic analysis of law Business cartels Law 1340 of 2009 |
| title_short |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| title_full |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| title_fullStr |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| title_sort |
Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola |
| dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv |
Herrera Saavedra, Juan Pablo |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola |
| dc.subject.lemb.eng.fl_str_mv |
Competition Interindustry competition Competition |
| topic |
Competition Interindustry competition Competition Competencia industrial Competencia comercial Competencia económica Ley de competencia Análisis económico del derecho Cartel Carteles empresariales Ley 1340 de 2009 Competition law Economic analysis of law Business cartels Law 1340 of 2009 |
| dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv |
Competencia industrial Competencia comercial Competencia económica |
| dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv |
Ley de competencia Análisis económico del derecho Cartel Carteles empresariales Ley 1340 de 2009 |
| dc.subject.proposal.eng.fl_str_mv |
Competition law Economic analysis of law Business cartels Law 1340 of 2009 |
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ilustraciones, diagramas |
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2023 |
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2023-08 |
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2024-02-05T20:49:22Z |
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Trabajo de grado - Maestría |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009). The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 20-32. http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51205/1/563419822.pdf Ahn, S. (2002). Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence. OECD Economics Working Paper No. 317. http://ssrn.com/abstract=318059. Allain, M, Boyer, M., Kotchoni, R., Ponssard, J.P. (2011). The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases The Myth of Underdeterrence. https://hal.science/hal-00631432 Auriol, E., Hjelmeng, E. Søreide, T. (2016). Deterring corruption and cartels : in search of a coherent approach. https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/deterring-corruption-and-cartels-search-coherent-approach Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico. (2009). Derecho y Política de la Competencia en Colombia. Examen interpares. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44111213.pdf Banco Mundial (2023, julio 03). PIB (US$ a precios actuales). https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD Becker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217. Boyer, M. & Kotchoni, R. (2015). ¿How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?. Review of Industrial Organization, 47(2), 119-153. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44735447 Boyer, M., Ross, T. W., & Winter, R. A. (2017). The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique, 50(5), 1489–1524. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45172466 Bradford, Anu & Chilton, Adam S. (2018). Competition Law around the world from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 393–432. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhy011 Broos, S., Gautier, A., Ramos, J. & Petit, N. (2016). Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014). Revue économique, 67, 79-94. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.hs01.0079 Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2011). Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the competition policy indexes. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 165–204, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq021 Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013). Competition policy and productivity growth: an empirical assessment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1324-1336. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00304#.U75kjvmSyVM Combe, E. & Monnier, C. (2012). Les cartels en Europe, une analyse empirique. Revue française d'économie, XXVII, 187-226. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.122.0187 Connor, John M. (2010). Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610262 Crafts, N. (2012). British relative economic decline revisited: The role of competition. Explorations in Economic History, 49(1), 17-29. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498311000295 Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., (2010). The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law. Intellectual property, competition law and economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189 Gutmann, J., & Voigt, S. (2014). Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws. Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (February 8, 2014). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392780 Hutin, Anatole & Monnier Constance. (2016). Les cartels en France: Analyse économique de leurs caractéristiques et de leurs sanctions. Concurrences 2, pp. 45-61. Hylton, Keith N. & Deng, Fei (2007). Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their effects. Antitrust Law Journal, 74 https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/852 Jurczyk, Zbigniew. (2017). The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 10(16). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160504 Kaplow, L., & S. Shavell (2001). Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle, Journal of Political Economy 109, 281–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319553 Kathuria, V. (2015). A conceptual framework to identify dynamic efficiency. European Competition Journal, 11(2–3), 319–339, https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1060006. Landes, W.H. (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations. University of Chicago Law Review 50, pp. 652-678.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2543&context=journal_articles Selten, R. (1973). A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal of Game Theory 2, pp. 141–201. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098575 |
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73 páginas |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
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Bogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias Económicas |
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas |
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Bogotá, Colombia |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá |
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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Herrera Saavedra, Juan Pabloa4fab310b3e6663538379f2c535a9cb0Rubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola8a0426d80d74f0c3231bbcbf083d17302024-02-05T20:49:22Z2024-02-05T20:49:22Z2023-08https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627Universidad Nacional de ColombiaRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ilustraciones, diagramasLa investigación presenta un análisis económico de la ley de competencia en Colombia. Para ello, en primer lugar, y con fin de definir el panorama regional y cómo se ubica la ley de competencia colombiana a nivel latinoamericano, se desarrolló el índice propuesto por Bradford y Chilton (2018) con el fin de actualizar los datos, dadas las múltiples reformas realizadas en la región a las leyes de competencia en la última década, para así, determinar la adopción de las mejores prácticas antimonopolio reconocidas internacionalmente. En segundo lugar, se presenta una caracterización de los carteles que han sido sancionados en Colombia por la realización de acuerdos restrictivos de la competencia, y que han sido sancionados por la Ley 1340 de 2009 actualmente vigente, identificando el mercado afectado, su dimensión, el número de agentes de mercado participantes, etc., el cual nos permitirá contar con un panorama fáctico para plantear una mejor política de competencia en el país. Finalmente, se analiza el modelo de competencia perfecta, de monopolio y un modelo mixto, donde participan empresas que compiten y empresas que coluden, con el fin de analizar el precio del producto y las cantidades producidas en cada escenario. (Texto tomado de la fuente)The research presents an economic analysis of competition law in Colombia. First of all to define the regional landscape and how Colombian competition law is located within the Latin American context, the index proposed by Bradford and Chilton (2018) was developed to track the various competition law reforms carried out in the region over the last decade, in order to determine the best, internationally recognized antitrust practices to adopt. Secondly, a characterization assessment of the cartels was carried out on the result of restricting competition agreements, which have been sanctioned in Colombia by Law 1340 in 2009 and is currently still in force, identifying the affected market, its size, the number of participating market agents, etc. This will allow us to have a factual overview in order to propose a better competition policy in the Country. Finally, the perfect competition model, monopoly and a mixed model are analyzed, where competing companies and colluding companies participate, in order to analyze the price of the product and the quantities produced in each scenarioMaestríaTeoría y política económicaTeoría y política económica73 páginasapplication/pdfUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias EconómicasFacultad de Ciencias EconómicasBogotá, ColombiaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede BogotáAnálisis económico del régimen de competencia en ColombiaEconomic analysis of the competition regime in ColombiaTrabajo de grado - Maestríainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMAghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009). The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 20-32. http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51205/1/563419822.pdfAhn, S. (2002). Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence. OECD Economics Working Paper No. 317. http://ssrn.com/abstract=318059.Allain, M, Boyer, M., Kotchoni, R., Ponssard, J.P. (2011). The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases The Myth of Underdeterrence. https://hal.science/hal-00631432Auriol, E., Hjelmeng, E. Søreide, T. (2016). Deterring corruption and cartels : in search of a coherent approach. https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/deterring-corruption-and-cartels-search-coherent-approachBanco Interamericano de Desarrollo y Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico. (2009). Derecho y Política de la Competencia en Colombia. Examen interpares. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44111213.pdfBanco Mundial (2023, julio 03). PIB (US$ a precios actuales). https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CDBecker, Gary S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.Boyer, M. & Kotchoni, R. (2015). ¿How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?. Review of Industrial Organization, 47(2), 119-153. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44735447Boyer, M., Ross, T. W., & Winter, R. A. (2017). The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique, 50(5), 1489–1524. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45172466Bradford, Anu & Chilton, Adam S. (2018). Competition Law around the world from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 393–432. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhy011Broos, S., Gautier, A., Ramos, J. & Petit, N. (2016). Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014). Revue économique, 67, 79-94. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.hs01.0079Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2011). Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the competition policy indexes. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 165–204, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq021Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013). Competition policy and productivity growth: an empirical assessment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1324-1336. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00304#.U75kjvmSyVMCombe, E. & Monnier, C. (2012). Les cartels en Europe, une analyse empirique. Revue française d'économie, XXVII, 187-226. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.122.0187Connor, John M. (2010). Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610262Crafts, N. (2012). British relative economic decline revisited: The role of competition. Explorations in Economic History, 49(1), 17-29. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498311000295Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., (2010). The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law. Intellectual property, competition law and economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189Gutmann, J., & Voigt, S. (2014). Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws. Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (February 8, 2014). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392780Hutin, Anatole & Monnier Constance. (2016). Les cartels en France: Analyse économique de leurs caractéristiques et de leurs sanctions. Concurrences 2, pp. 45-61.Hylton, Keith N. & Deng, Fei (2007). Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their effects. Antitrust Law Journal, 74 https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/852Jurczyk, Zbigniew. (2017). The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 10(16). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160504Kaplow, L., & S. Shavell (2001). Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle, Journal of Political Economy 109, 281–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319553Kathuria, V. (2015). A conceptual framework to identify dynamic efficiency. European Competition Journal, 11(2–3), 319–339, https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1060006.Landes, W.H. (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations. University of Chicago Law Review 50, pp. 652-678.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2543&context=journal_articlesSelten, R. (1973). A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal of Game Theory 2, pp. 141–201. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098575CompetitionInterindustry competitionCompetitionCompetencia industrialCompetencia comercialCompetencia económicaLey de competenciaAnálisis económico del derechoCartelCarteles empresarialesLey 1340 de 2009Competition lawEconomic analysis of lawBusiness cartelsLaw 1340 of 2009EstudiantesInvestigadoresMaestrosMedios de comunicaciónPúblico generalResponsables políticosLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-85879https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85627/1/license.txteb34b1cf90b7e1103fc9dfd26be24b4aMD51ORIGINAL105239609.2023.pdf105239609.2023.pdfTesis de Maestría en Ciencias Económicasapplication/pdf838762https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/85627/2/105239609.2023.pdf4ad3e2125909795541fc8c887ad71a68MD52THUMBNAIL105239609.2023.pdf.jpg105239609.2023.pdf.jpgGenerated 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