Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment

Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment...

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Autores:
Del Corral de Felipe, Miranda
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2015
Institución:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Repositorio:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/62606
Acceso en línea:
https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/62606
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/61765/
Palabra clave:
33 Economía / Economics
compromiso estratégico
racionalidad económica
pro‑socialidad
cooperación
dilemas sociales.
Rights
openAccess
License
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
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network_acronym_str UNACIONAL2
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repository_id_str
spelling Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 InternacionalDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombiahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Del Corral de Felipe, Mirandab0654a98-9aef-4b3e-8a9b-23b93d7a58f63002019-07-02T21:05:47Z2019-07-02T21:05:47Z2015-07-01ISSN: 2248-4337https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/62606http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/61765/Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions.application/pdfspaUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Escuela de Economíahttps://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ceconomia/article/view/40511Universidad Nacional de Colombia Revistas electrónicas UN Cuadernos de EconomíaCuadernos de EconomíaDel Corral de Felipe, Miranda (2015) Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment. Cuadernos de Economía, 34 (65). pp. 237-259. ISSN 2248-433733 Economía / Economicscompromiso estratégicoracionalidad económicapro‑socialidadcooperacióndilemas sociales.Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitmentArtículo de revistainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTORIGINAL40511-230630-2-PB.pdfapplication/pdf151572https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/62606/1/40511-230630-2-PB.pdf06c7e6e7c834f232a23ef81c88346460MD51THUMBNAIL40511-230630-2-PB.pdf.jpg40511-230630-2-PB.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg5509https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/bitstream/unal/62606/2/40511-230630-2-PB.pdf.jpg2e7be03ffbafdda1101b73f6bde135dbMD52unal/62606oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/626062024-04-25 00:05:21.639Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiarepositorio_nal@unal.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
title Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
spellingShingle Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
33 Economía / Economics
compromiso estratégico
racionalidad económica
pro‑socialidad
cooperación
dilemas sociales.
title_short Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
title_full Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
title_fullStr Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
title_full_unstemmed Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
title_sort Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Del Corral de Felipe, Miranda
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Del Corral de Felipe, Miranda
dc.subject.ddc.spa.fl_str_mv 33 Economía / Economics
topic 33 Economía / Economics
compromiso estratégico
racionalidad económica
pro‑socialidad
cooperación
dilemas sociales.
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv compromiso estratégico
racionalidad económica
pro‑socialidad
cooperación
dilemas sociales.
description Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.issued.spa.fl_str_mv 2015-07-01
dc.date.accessioned.spa.fl_str_mv 2019-07-02T21:05:47Z
dc.date.available.spa.fl_str_mv 2019-07-02T21:05:47Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.identifier.issn.spa.fl_str_mv ISSN: 2248-4337
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identifier_str_mv ISSN: 2248-4337
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dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia Revistas electrónicas UN Cuadernos de Economía
Cuadernos de Economía
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Del Corral de Felipe, Miranda (2015) Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment. Cuadernos de Economía, 34 (65). pp. 237-259. ISSN 2248-4337
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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dc.rights.license.spa.fl_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
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rights_invalid_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Escuela de Economía
institution Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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