Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment
Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment...
- Autores:
-
Del Corral de Felipe, Miranda
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/62606
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/62606
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/61765/
- Palabra clave:
- 33 Economía / Economics
compromiso estratégico
racionalidad económica
pro‑socialidad
cooperación
dilemas sociales.
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
| Summary: | Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions. |
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