Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal

Este artículo evalúa críticamente el rol de las instituciones internacionales, bajo la visión de los neo-gramscianos y los institucionalistas liberales. Los neo-gramscianos argumentan que el propósito de las instituciones internacionales es mantener el poder hegemónico. Y para lograr este propósito,...

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Autores:: Gil, Juan Manuel
Aguilera, Andrés

Tipo de recurso:: Trabajo de grado de pregrado

Fecha de publicación:: 2017

Institución:: Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga - UNAB

Repositorio:: Repositorio UNAB

Idioma:: spa

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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv	International Institutions: For better or worst
title	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
spellingShingle	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberales Instituciones Internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial Neo-Gramscians Liberal institutionalists International institutions WTO IMF World Bank Legal and political sciences Right Research Legislation Ciencias jurídicas y políticas Derecho Investigaciones Legislación Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberals Instituciones internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial
title_short	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
title_full	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
title_fullStr	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
title_full_unstemmed	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
title_sort	Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Gil, Juan Manuel Aguilera, Andrés
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv	Gil, Juan Manuel Aguilera, Andrés
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv	Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberales Instituciones Internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial
topic	Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberales Instituciones Internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial Neo-Gramscians Liberal institutionalists International institutions WTO IMF World Bank Legal and political sciences Right Research Legislation Ciencias jurídicas y políticas Derecho Investigaciones Legislación Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberals Instituciones internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial
dc.subject.keywords.eng.fl_str_mv	Neo-Gramscians Liberal institutionalists International institutions WTO IMF World Bank Legal and political sciences Right Research Legislation
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv	Ciencias jurídicas y políticas Derecho Investigaciones Legislación
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv	Neo-gramscianos Institucionalistas liberals Instituciones internacionales OMC FMI Banco Mundial
description	Este artículo evalúa críticamente el rol de las instituciones internacionales, bajo la visión de los neo-gramscianos y los institucionalistas liberales. Los neo-gramscianos argumentan que el propósito de las instituciones internacionales es mantener el poder hegemónico. Y para lograr este propósito, el sistema capitalista se ha extendido a través de las políticas de libre comercio de la OMC y condicionesen los préstamos del FMI y del Banco Mundial. Por su parte, los institucionalistasliberales sostienen que las instituciones internacionales han permitido la cooperación y facilitado la consecución de objetivos comunes, disminuyendo lainfluencia del poder hegemónico.
publishDate	2017
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2017-06-30
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2020-10-27T15:12:19Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2020-10-27T15:12:19Z
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv	https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/2747/2321
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dc.relation.references.none.fl_str_mv	Bates, T. R. (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 353. Bhagwati, J. & Srinivasan, T. N. (2002). Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 2002), American Economic Association. pp. 182. Bieler, A. & Morton, A. D. (2004). A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. Capital & Class. SAGE. pp 103. Carroll, W. K. (2006). Hegemony, Counterhegemony, Anti-hegemony. Socialist Studies / Études socialistes, Vol 2, No 2. Pp. 27. Chan, S. (1985). The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems. Orbis 29(2). Pp. 403-434. Cairns, E. (1997). A safer future: Reducing the Human Cost of War. Oxford U.K. Oxfam Publications. Quoted in Collier, Paul (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Pp. 14. Calomiris, C. W. (2000). When Will Economics Guide IMF and World Bank Reforms? Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1. Cato Institute. Pp. 88. Collier, P. (1999). On the economic consequences of civil war. Oxford Economics papers 51. Oxford University Press. Pp. 168-169. Collier, P. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Pp. 13. Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations. Theory+Millennium 10 ~2!:126–55 Cox, R. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. Journal of International Studies. Millennium. pp.162 - 175. Cox, R. (1992). Multilateralism and World Order. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 173. Cox, R. (1999). Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order. Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-28. Dieter, H. (2000). Monetary Regionalism: Regional Integration without financial crisis. Institute for Development and Peace. Duisburg University. pp 2. Dinan, D. (2005). Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Lynne Rienner Publishers Third edition. pp. 3. Dollar, D. (2001). Globalization, Inequality and Poverty Since 1980. Background paper, World Bank, Washington, DC pp. 17. Dreher, A. (2002). The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality. Hamburg: HWWA Discussion Paper 165. Ehrenberg, J. (1999). Civil society: the critical history of an idea. New York University Press. pp 209. Elster, J. (1986). An introduction to Karl Marx. Cambridge University Press. pp. 161. Engel, S. (2006). Where to Neoliberalism? The 13 4 More information can be found on http://ndb.int/about-us.php 5 More information can be found on http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/introduction/aiib/?show=0 World Bank and the Post-Washington, Consensus in Indonesia and Vietnam. 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong 26 June - 29 June 2006. pp. 4. Gill, S. (1986). Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism. Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 205-222. Gramsci A. (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated & Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. International Publishers, New York. Pp. 1- 572 Global Governance Group (2001). Global Governance: Report to the Bishops of COMECE. A Report to the Bishops of COMECE. Retrieved April, 2016, from http:/info.wordbank.org/etools/docs/libra ry/57440/camdessus.pdf Gould, E.R. (2001). The changing activities of international organizations: The case of the international monetary fund. Paper presented at the APSA 2001 conference. Unpublished manuscript. Pp. 6. Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3. The MIT Press. Pp. 487. Harvey, D. (2007). Neo-liberalism as creative destruction. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 610 no. 1. Pp. 123. Hibou, B. (2000). The Political Economy of the World Bank's Discourse: from Economic Catechism to Missionary Deeds and Misdeeds. Paris. Etudes du CERI, 39. Translate from French by Janet Roitman. CNRS, Paris. Pp. 3. Hunt, A. (1990). Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990). Blackwell Publishing pp. 309-328. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010). IMF Conditionality. Retrieved April, 2016, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ facts/conditio.htm Irwin, D. A. (2009). Free trade under fire. Princeton University Press. 3rd ed. pp. 44. Kahler, M. (1995). International institutions and the political economy of integration. The brookings Institution. pp. Preface. Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. pp. 243 – 250. Keohane, R.. & Grant, R. W. (2005). Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1. American Political Science Association. pp. 33. Krasner, S. (1991). Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics, Vol. 43, 3 pp. 336-366. Kumar, K. (1993). Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing. pp. 382. Leech, D. (2002). Voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. Annals of Operations Research. Vol 109, 1, Pp. 375-397. Mayne, R. (2002). The global NGO campaign on patents and access to medicines: An Oxfam perspective. in Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne, editors, Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge Access and Development. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, Pp. 244–258. Marx, K. (1978). The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Pp. 70- 86. Milner, H. V. (1998). International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability. Foreign Policy, No. 110. Washingtonpost. Newsweek Interactive, LLC. Pp 116. N u r u z z a m a n , M . ( 2 0 0 8 ) . L i b e r a l Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001. International Studies 45. Pp. 195. Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate. International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. The MIT Press. Pp. 330. Puchala, D. J. (2005). World Hegemony and the United Nations. International Studies Review, 7 Pp. 571-584. Ricardo, D. (1817). Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. In London: John Murray , published in 1821. Rodrik D. (1994). The rush to free trade in the developing world. Why so late? Why now? Will it last? In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. S Haggard, S Webb, New York. Oxford Univ. Press pp. 62. Roger, S. (1991). Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction. Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, London, pp. 24 – 26. Rupert, M. (2010). Marxism and critical theory. in Dunne, Tim. Kurki, Milja and Smith 14 Juan Manuel Gil, Andrés Aguilera / Instituciones Internacionales: Para bien o para mal Steve, International Relations Theories, Discipline and diversity, Second Edition, Oxford University Press. Pp. 161. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. In London: Routledge; New York: E. P. Dutton. Sterling-Folker, J.r (2010). Neoliberalism. In Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University nd Press. 2 Ed. Pp.117-134. Tabb, W. K. (2004) Economic governance in the age of globalization. Columbia University Press. Pp. 1-510. Walt, S. M. (1998) One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge. Washington post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC. Pp. 29-46. Woods, N. (2006) The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Cornell University Press. Pp. 15. World Bank (2016). About Us. Retrieved April, 2 0 1 6 , f r o m , f r o m http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTE RNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:206 53660~menuPK:72312~pagePK:511236 44~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.h tml World Economic Forum (2010). Global Redesign: Strengthening International Cooperationin a More Interdependent World. Edited by Richard Samans, Klaus Schwab and Mark Malloch-Brown. pp 1- 452. World Social Forum (WSF) (2016). What the World Social Forum is Retrieved April, 2 0 1 6 , f r o m , f r o m http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/m ain.php?id_menu=19&cd_language=2 World Trade Organization (WTO) (2016). What is the WTO? Retrieved April, 2016, from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/what is_e/whatis_e.htm/
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dc.source.none.fl_str_mv	Reflexión Política; Vol. 19 No. 37 (2017): Reflexión Política (enero a junio); 6-15
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spelling	Gil, Juan Manuel1f2d7f53-5558-4309-86c2-6568450b9344-1Aguilera, Andrésb80dd51e-11ad-4241-b6ae-73d06ce30294-12020-10-27T15:12:19Z2020-10-27T15:12:19Z2017-06-302590-8669\|0124-0781http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/10809instname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNABrepourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co10.29375/01240781.2747Este artículo evalúa críticamente el rol de las instituciones internacionales, bajo la visión de los neo-gramscianos y los institucionalistas liberales. Los neo-gramscianos argumentan que el propósito de las instituciones internacionales es mantener el poder hegemónico. Y para lograr este propósito, el sistema capitalista se ha extendido a través de las políticas de libre comercio de la OMC y condicionesen los préstamos del FMI y del Banco Mundial. Por su parte, los institucionalistasliberales sostienen que las instituciones internacionales han permitido la cooperación y facilitado la consecución de objetivos comunes, disminuyendo lainfluencia del poder hegemónico.This article critically assess the role of international institutions according to the neo-Gramscians ' and Liberal Institutionalists ' view. Neo-Gramscians argue that the real aim of these institutions is to maintain the hegemony. By doing so, the capitalist system has been spread in the world system through free trade policies driven by the WTO and through conditional loans given by the IMF and the World Bank. Liberal Institutionalists argue that international institutions have make cooperation possible and have facilitated the path to achieve common objectives reducing the influence that the hegemon has exerted over them.application/pdfspaUNABInstituto de Estudios Políticos IEPhttps://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/2747/2321https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/2747Bates, T. R. (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 353.Bhagwati, J. & Srinivasan, T. N. (2002). Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 2002), American Economic Association. pp. 182.Bieler, A. & Morton, A. D. (2004). A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. Capital & Class. SAGE. pp 103.Carroll, W. K. (2006). Hegemony, Counterhegemony, Anti-hegemony. Socialist Studies / Études socialistes, Vol 2, No 2. Pp. 27.Chan, S. (1985). The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems. Orbis 29(2). Pp. 403-434.Cairns, E. (1997). A safer future: Reducing the Human Cost of War. Oxford U.K. Oxfam Publications. Quoted in Collier, Paul (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Pp. 14.Calomiris, C. W. (2000). When Will Economics Guide IMF and World Bank Reforms? Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1. Cato Institute. Pp. 88.Collier, P. (1999). On the economic consequences of civil war. Oxford Economics papers 51. Oxford University Press. Pp. 168-169.Collier, P. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Pp. 13.Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations. Theory+Millennium 10 ~2!:126–55Cox, R. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. Journal of International Studies. Millennium. pp.162 - 175.Cox, R. (1992). Multilateralism and World Order. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 173.Cox, R. (1999). Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order. Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-28.Dieter, H. (2000). Monetary Regionalism: Regional Integration without financial crisis. Institute for Development and Peace. Duisburg University. pp 2.Dinan, D. (2005). Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Lynne Rienner Publishers Third edition. pp. 3.Dollar, D. (2001). Globalization, Inequality and Poverty Since 1980. Background paper, World Bank, Washington, DC pp. 17.Dreher, A. (2002). The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality. Hamburg: HWWA Discussion Paper 165.Ehrenberg, J. (1999). Civil society: the critical history of an idea. New York University Press. pp 209.Elster, J. (1986). An introduction to Karl Marx. Cambridge University Press. pp. 161.Engel, S. (2006). Where to Neoliberalism? The 13 4 More information can be found on http://ndb.int/about-us.php 5 More information can be found on http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/introduction/aiib/?show=0 World Bank and the Post-Washington, Consensus in Indonesia and Vietnam. 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong 26 June - 29 June 2006. pp. 4.Gill, S. (1986). Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism. Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 205-222.Gramsci A. (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated & Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. International Publishers, New York. Pp. 1- 572Global Governance Group (2001). Global Governance: Report to the Bishops of COMECE. A Report to the Bishops of COMECE. Retrieved April, 2016, from http:/info.wordbank.org/etools/docs/libra ry/57440/camdessus.pdfGould, E.R. (2001). The changing activities of international organizations: The case of the international monetary fund. Paper presented at the APSA 2001 conference. Unpublished manuscript. Pp. 6.Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3. The MIT Press. Pp. 487.Harvey, D. (2007). Neo-liberalism as creative destruction. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 610 no. 1. Pp. 123.Hibou, B. (2000). The Political Economy of the World Bank's Discourse: from Economic Catechism to Missionary Deeds and Misdeeds. Paris. Etudes du CERI, 39. Translate from French by Janet Roitman. CNRS, Paris. Pp. 3.Hunt, A. (1990). Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990). Blackwell Publishing pp. 309-328.International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010). IMF Conditionality. Retrieved April, 2016, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ facts/conditio.htmIrwin, D. A. (2009). Free trade under fire. Princeton University Press. 3rd ed. pp. 44.Kahler, M. (1995). International institutions and the political economy of integration. The brookings Institution. pp. Preface.Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. pp. 243 – 250.Keohane, R.. & Grant, R. W. (2005). Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1. American Political Science Association. pp. 33.Krasner, S. (1991). Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics, Vol. 43, 3 pp. 336-366.Kumar, K. (1993). Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing. pp. 382.Leech, D. (2002). Voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. Annals of Operations Research. Vol 109, 1, Pp. 375-397.Mayne, R. (2002). The global NGO campaign on patents and access to medicines: An Oxfam perspective. in Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne, editors, Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge Access and Development. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, Pp. 244–258.Marx, K. (1978). The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Pp. 70- 86.Milner, H. V. (1998). International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability. Foreign Policy, No. 110. Washingtonpost. Newsweek Interactive, LLC. Pp 116.N u r u z z a m a n , M . ( 2 0 0 8 ) . L i b e r a l Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001. International Studies 45. Pp. 195.Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate. International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. The MIT Press. Pp. 330.Puchala, D. J. (2005). World Hegemony and the United Nations. International Studies Review, 7 Pp. 571-584.Ricardo, D. (1817). Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. In London: John Murray , published in 1821.Rodrik D. (1994). The rush to free trade in the developing world. Why so late? Why now? Will it last? In Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. S Haggard, S Webb, New York. Oxford Univ. Press pp. 62.Roger, S. (1991). Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction. Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, London, pp. 24 – 26.Rupert, M. (2010). Marxism and critical theory. in Dunne, Tim. Kurki, Milja and Smith 14 Juan Manuel Gil, Andrés Aguilera / Instituciones Internacionales: Para bien o para mal Steve, International Relations Theories, Discipline and diversity, Second Edition, Oxford University Press. Pp. 161.Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. In London: Routledge; New York: E. P. Dutton.Sterling-Folker, J.r (2010). Neoliberalism. In Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University nd Press. 2 Ed. Pp.117-134.Tabb, W. K. (2004) Economic governance in the age of globalization. Columbia University Press. Pp. 1-510.Walt, S. M. (1998) One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge. Washington post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC. Pp. 29-46.Woods, N. (2006) The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Cornell University Press. Pp. 15.World Bank (2016). About Us. Retrieved April, 2 0 1 6 , f r o m , f r o m http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTE RNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:206 53660~menuPK:72312~pagePK:511236 44~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.h tmlWorld Economic Forum (2010). Global Redesign: Strengthening International Cooperationin a More Interdependent World. Edited by Richard Samans, Klaus Schwab and Mark Malloch-Brown. pp 1- 452.World Social Forum (WSF) (2016). What the World Social Forum is Retrieved April, 2 0 1 6 , f r o m , f r o m http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/m ain.php?id_menu=19&cd_language=2World Trade Organization (WTO) (2016). What is the WTO? Retrieved April, 2016, from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/what is_e/whatis_e.htm/http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiahttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Reflexión Política; Vol. 19 No. 37 (2017): Reflexión Política (enero a junio); 6-15Neo-gramscianosInstitucionalistas liberalesInstituciones InternacionalesOMCFMIBanco MundialNeo-GramsciansLiberal institutionalistsInternational institutionsWTOIMFWorld BankLegal and political sciencesRightResearchLegislationCiencias jurídicas y políticasDerechoInvestigacionesLegislaciónNeo-gramscianosInstitucionalistas liberalsInstituciones internacionalesOMCFMIBanco MundialInstituciones internacionales: Para bien o para malInternational Institutions: For better or worstinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1fhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/CJournalArticlehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85ORIGINAL2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdf2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdfArtículoapplication/pdf811252https://repository.unab.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12749/10809/1/2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdfd9c68f806904538e6d8c783716fd5c36MD51open accessTHUMBNAIL2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdf.jpg2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg9071https://repository.unab.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12749/10809/2/2017_Articulo_Instituciones_internacionales.pdf.jpg414adae662257ff8e124d5e53e3453dbMD52open access20.500.12749/10809oai:repository.unab.edu.co:20.500.12749/108092023-05-31 22:00:43.76open accessRepositorio Institucional \| Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga - UNABrepositorio@unab.edu.co

Instituciones internacionales: Para bien o para mal

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