La vida de la voluntad

With my work I would like to sketch out a part of the roots of Husserlian Krisis. I would like to show if there is really a continuity in the definition of practical and logical reason worked out by Husserl between his first and latest works. Indeed, in Krisis Husserl marks out a meaning of reason which is far from that elaborated in his first ethical and logical writings. Thus, to attend my purpose, I will focus on the definition of practical and logical reason as they come out in ethical lectures of 1914 and genetic studies of 1920. I will use these two works, because I believe that through the introduction of the genetic method and the development of the ethical analysis, the inquiry on reason is improved and also the relationship between logical and practical reason has been modified. Following Husserlian writings, I believe that the “life” of will or the structure of practical reason becomes the core of every activity of reason over the years.

• Fecha de publicación: 2009
• Institución: Universidad Industrial de Santander
• Repositorio: Repositorio UIS
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/10562
• Acceso en línea: https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/199; https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10562
• Palabra clave: Husserl; fenomenología; interés; atención; voluntad; Husserl; phenomenology; interest; attention; will
• Rights: openAccess
• License: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)