Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism

My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the h...

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Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad Industrial de Santander
Repositorio:
Repositorio UIS
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/10778
Acceso en línea:
https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684
https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10778
Palabra clave:
Hume
moral emotivism
moral rationalism
neuroethics
positivism
Hume
emotivismo moral
racionalismo moral
neuroética
positivismo
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openAccess
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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
id UISANTADR2_84f1092d68a20bd4fd72d355a7598639
oai_identifier_str oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/10778
network_acronym_str UISANTADR2
network_name_str Repositorio UIS
repository_id_str
spelling Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)Derechos de autor 2017 Revista Filosofía UISinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)2017-09-112022-06-07T15:41:15Z2022-06-07T15:41:15Zhttps://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/668410.18273/revfil.v16n1-2017004https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10778My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the human moral nature, from a neuronal point of view, seem to fit the most basic presuppositions of both theories, without their compatibility being total. For this I will use an example: the murder of a subject and the subsequent statement of witnesses.Me propongo, en este trabajo, hacer una breve exposición de la teoría moral de Hume y sobre el emotivismo moral positivista. Presentaré algunas de las objeciones más fuertes a dichas teorías, las que por poco las dejan fuera de combate; y, por último, intentaré mostrar que los hallazgos que dan cuenta del Funcionamiento de la naturaleza moral humana, desde un punto de vista neuronal, parecen ajustarse a los presupuestos más básicos de ambas teorías, sin que su compatibilidad sea total. Para ello me valdré de un ejemplo: el asesinato de un  sujeto y la posterior declaración de los testigos.application/pdftext/htmltext/xmlspaUniversidad Industrial de Santanderhttps://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/6989https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/11800https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/205Revista Filosofía UIS; Vol. 16 Núm. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-92Revista Filosofía UIS; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-92REVISTA FILOSOFIA UIS; v. 16 n. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-922145-85291692-2484Humemoral emotivismmoral rationalismneuroethicspositivismHumeemotivismo moralracionalismo moralneuroéticapositivismoHume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivismLa venganza de Hume. Una defensa del emotivismo moralinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Sepúlveda-Betancurth, Camilo20.500.14071/10778oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/107782022-06-07 10:41:15.63metadata.onlyhttps://noesis.uis.edu.coDSpace at UISnoesis@uis.edu.co
dc.title.en-US.fl_str_mv Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
dc.title.es-ES.fl_str_mv La venganza de Hume. Una defensa del emotivismo moral
title Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
spellingShingle Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
Hume
moral emotivism
moral rationalism
neuroethics
positivism
Hume
emotivismo moral
racionalismo moral
neuroética
positivismo
title_short Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
title_full Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
title_fullStr Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
title_full_unstemmed Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
title_sort Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
dc.subject.en-US.fl_str_mv Hume
moral emotivism
moral rationalism
neuroethics
positivism
topic Hume
moral emotivism
moral rationalism
neuroethics
positivism
Hume
emotivismo moral
racionalismo moral
neuroética
positivismo
dc.subject.es-ES.fl_str_mv Hume
emotivismo moral
racionalismo moral
neuroética
positivismo
description My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the human moral nature, from a neuronal point of view, seem to fit the most basic presuppositions of both theories, without their compatibility being total. For this I will use an example: the murder of a subject and the subsequent statement of witnesses.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2022-06-07T15:41:15Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2022-06-07T15:41:15Z
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-09-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684
10.18273/revfil.v16n1-2017004
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10778
url https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684
https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10778
identifier_str_mv 10.18273/revfil.v16n1-2017004
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/6989
https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/11800
https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684/205
dc.rights.es-ES.fl_str_mv Derechos de autor 2017 Revista Filosofía UIS
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.creativecommons.none.fl_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
Derechos de autor 2017 Revista Filosofía UIS
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
text/html
text/xml
dc.publisher.es-ES.fl_str_mv Universidad Industrial de Santander
dc.source.es-ES.fl_str_mv Revista Filosofía UIS; Vol. 16 Núm. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-92
dc.source.en-US.fl_str_mv Revista Filosofía UIS; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-92
dc.source.pt-BR.fl_str_mv REVISTA FILOSOFIA UIS; v. 16 n. 1 (2017): Revista Filosofía UIS; 80-92
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv 2145-8529
1692-2484
institution Universidad Industrial de Santander
repository.name.fl_str_mv DSpace at UIS
repository.mail.fl_str_mv noesis@uis.edu.co
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