Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the h...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad Industrial de Santander
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio UIS
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/10778
- Acceso en línea:
- https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/6684
https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10778
- Palabra clave:
- Hume
moral emotivism
moral rationalism
neuroethics
positivism
Hume
emotivismo moral
racionalismo moral
neuroética
positivismo
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
| Summary: | My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the human moral nature, from a neuronal point of view, seem to fit the most basic presuppositions of both theories, without their compatibility being total. For this I will use an example: the murder of a subject and the subsequent statement of witnesses. |
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