About “ethnocentrism” as a middle way between unconditional validity and non-cognitivism

This work will analyse Richard Rorty’s concept of “ethnocentrism,” which plays in his philosophy the role of a tertium between a theory of universal validity of beliefs, on the one hand, and a noncognitivist conception of their status, on the other hand. According to Rorty, there are certain beliefs which can not be justified on neutral grounds, and even though it renders them—as we will argue—unjustifiable simpliciter, he nonetheless regards them as unavoidable, inasmuch as “we” are conditioned to hold them due to “our” history and education. This tension will lead us in turn to deepen the interpretive key proposed by Michael Williams which brings together Rorty’s and David Hume’s theoretical approaches to the problem of certain beliefs.

• Fecha de publicación: 2012
• Institución: Universidad Industrial de Santander
• Repositorio: Repositorio UIS
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:noesis.uis.edu.co:20.500.14071/10632
• Acceso en línea: https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistafilosofiauis/article/view/3160; https://noesis.uis.edu.co/handle/20.500.14071/10632
• Palabra clave: Rorty; etnocentrismo; creencia; Hume; no-cognitivismo; Rorty; ethnocentrism; belief; Hume; noncognitivism
• Rights: openAccess
• License: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)