Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have be...
- Autores:
-
Diner, Isaac
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2010
- Institución:
- Universidad de Antioquia
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio UdeA
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/7908
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908
- Palabra clave:
- Tráfico de cocaína
Carteles de cocaína
Cocaína - Aspectos económicos
Illegal Monopolies
Law Enforcement
Simulation
Cocaine Market
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
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|
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
title |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
spellingShingle |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels Tráfico de cocaína Carteles de cocaína Cocaína - Aspectos económicos Illegal Monopolies Law Enforcement Simulation Cocaine Market |
title_short |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
title_full |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
title_fullStr |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
title_full_unstemmed |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
title_sort |
Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Diner, Isaac |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Diner, Isaac |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Tráfico de cocaína Carteles de cocaína Cocaína - Aspectos económicos Illegal Monopolies Law Enforcement Simulation Cocaine Market |
topic |
Tráfico de cocaína Carteles de cocaína Cocaína - Aspectos económicos Illegal Monopolies Law Enforcement Simulation Cocaine Market |
description |
ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar geted by Colombian and American law en forcement agencies. Our work argues that such policy has had a counter-intuitive effect which contributes to increases coca farming and reductions in cocaine prices. This paper hypothesizes that such situation was the consequence of the way that drug cartels were dismantled – thus the Colombian paradox. The consequences of the war against cartels may be assessed with the support of a dynamic theor etical framework and SD. Effective policy may consider alternative actions before dismantling drug cartels. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2010 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-08-10T15:06:13Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-08-10T15:06:13Z |
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a86 http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART |
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo de investigación |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.identifier.citation.spa.fl_str_mv |
Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134. |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1657-7663 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908 |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1909-0056 |
identifier_str_mv |
Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134. 1657-7663 1909-0056 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofjournalabbrev.spa.fl_str_mv |
Avances en Sistemas e Informática |
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv |
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia |
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ |
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.creativecommons.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv |
7 |
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
dc.publisher.group.spa.fl_str_mv |
INCAS-Innovación y Gestión de Cadenas de Abastecimiento |
dc.publisher.place.spa.fl_str_mv |
Bogotá, Colombia |
institution |
Universidad de Antioquia |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
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Diner, Isaac2017-08-10T15:06:13Z2017-08-10T15:06:13Z2010Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134.1657-7663http://hdl.handle.net/10495/79081909-0056ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar geted by Colombian and American law en forcement agencies. Our work argues that such policy has had a counter-intuitive effect which contributes to increases coca farming and reductions in cocaine prices. This paper hypothesizes that such situation was the consequence of the way that drug cartels were dismantled – thus the Colombian paradox. The consequences of the war against cartels may be assessed with the support of a dynamic theor etical framework and SD. Effective policy may consider alternative actions before dismantling drug cartels.7application/pdfengUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaINCAS-Innovación y Gestión de Cadenas de AbastecimientoBogotá, Colombiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTArtículo de investigaciónhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a86http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Tráfico de cocaínaCarteles de cocaínaCocaína - Aspectos económicosIllegal MonopoliesLaw EnforcementSimulationCocaine MarketCounter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartelsAvances en Sistemas e InformáticaRevista Avances en Sistemas e Informática12713473CC-LICENSElicense_urllicense_urltext/plain; charset=utf-849http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/2/license_url4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2fMD52license_textlicense_texttext/html; charset=utf-80http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/3/license_textd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427eMD53license_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-80http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/4/license_rdfd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427eMD54LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/5/license.txt8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD55ORIGINALJaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdfJaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdfArtículo de investigaciónapplication/pdf441388http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/1/JaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdf219b93e607fd595fc88786dc9315914bMD5110495/7908oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/79082021-05-29 13:22:24.922Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Antioquiaandres.perez@udea.edu.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 |