Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels

ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have be...

Full description

Autores:
Diner, Isaac
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2010
Institución:
Universidad de Antioquia
Repositorio:
Repositorio UdeA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/7908
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908
Palabra clave:
Tráfico de cocaína
Carteles de cocaína
Cocaína - Aspectos económicos
Illegal Monopolies
Law Enforcement
Simulation
Cocaine Market
Rights
openAccess
License
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
id UDEA2_616dce8c50cadff9d0111c1f9019a1e8
oai_identifier_str oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/7908
network_acronym_str UDEA2
network_name_str Repositorio UdeA
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
title Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
spellingShingle Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
Tráfico de cocaína
Carteles de cocaína
Cocaína - Aspectos económicos
Illegal Monopolies
Law Enforcement
Simulation
Cocaine Market
title_short Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
title_full Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
title_fullStr Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
title_full_unstemmed Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
title_sort Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Diner, Isaac
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Diner, Isaac
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Tráfico de cocaína
Carteles de cocaína
Cocaína - Aspectos económicos
Illegal Monopolies
Law Enforcement
Simulation
Cocaine Market
topic Tráfico de cocaína
Carteles de cocaína
Cocaína - Aspectos económicos
Illegal Monopolies
Law Enforcement
Simulation
Cocaine Market
description ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar geted by Colombian and American law en forcement agencies. Our work argues that such policy has had a counter-intuitive effect which contributes to increases coca farming and reductions in cocaine prices. This paper hypothesizes that such situation was the consequence of the way that drug cartels were dismantled – thus the Colombian paradox. The consequences of the war against cartels may be assessed with the support of a dynamic theor etical framework and SD. Effective policy may consider alternative actions before dismantling drug cartels.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2010
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2017-08-10T15:06:13Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2017-08-10T15:06:13Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.citation.spa.fl_str_mv Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134.
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7663
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1909-0056
identifier_str_mv Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134.
1657-7663
1909-0056
url http://hdl.handle.net/10495/7908
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofjournalabbrev.spa.fl_str_mv Avances en Sistemas e Informática
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
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rights_invalid_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
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dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 7
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dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.publisher.group.spa.fl_str_mv INCAS-Innovación y Gestión de Cadenas de Abastecimiento
dc.publisher.place.spa.fl_str_mv Bogotá, Colombia
institution Universidad de Antioquia
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spelling Diner, Isaac2017-08-10T15:06:13Z2017-08-10T15:06:13Z2010Jaén, S., & Dyner, I. (2010). Counter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartels. Avances en Sistemas e Informática, 7 (3), 127-134.1657-7663http://hdl.handle.net/10495/79081909-0056ABSTRACT: The coca far ming dynamics seems to partially follow the patterns of a long war against organized crime in Colombian. Since the early 80s, the cocaine market in the US and the rest of the world has been mainly supplied by Colombian cartels. Consequently, these illegal organizations have been tar geted by Colombian and American law en forcement agencies. Our work argues that such policy has had a counter-intuitive effect which contributes to increases coca farming and reductions in cocaine prices. This paper hypothesizes that such situation was the consequence of the way that drug cartels were dismantled – thus the Colombian paradox. The consequences of the war against cartels may be assessed with the support of a dynamic theor etical framework and SD. Effective policy may consider alternative actions before dismantling drug cartels.7application/pdfengUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaINCAS-Innovación y Gestión de Cadenas de AbastecimientoBogotá, Colombiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTArtículo de investigaciónhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a86http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Tráfico de cocaínaCarteles de cocaínaCocaína - Aspectos económicosIllegal MonopoliesLaw EnforcementSimulationCocaine MarketCounter-intuitive policy against cocaine cartelsAvances en Sistemas e InformáticaRevista Avances en Sistemas e Informática12713473CC-LICENSElicense_urllicense_urltext/plain; charset=utf-849http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/2/license_url4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2fMD52license_textlicense_texttext/html; charset=utf-80http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/3/license_textd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427eMD53license_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-80http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/4/license_rdfd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427eMD54LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/5/license.txt8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD55ORIGINALJaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdfJaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdfArtículo de investigaciónapplication/pdf441388http://bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co/bitstream/10495/7908/1/JaenJuan_2010_CounterIntuitivePolicyCocaine.pdf219b93e607fd595fc88786dc9315914bMD5110495/7908oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/79082021-05-29 13:22:24.922Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Antioquiaandres.perez@udea.edu.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