Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014

This paper aims to detect the presence of political budget cycles (PBuCs) around presidential elections in four large Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) over the 1982-2014 period, in the framework of democratic regimes. Extended autoregressive models are estimated for...

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Autores:
Mejía-Reyes, Pablo
Reyes-Hernández, Marlen Rocío
Riguzzi, Paolo
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad Católica de Colombia
Repositorio:
RIUCaC - Repositorio U. Católica
Idioma:
eng
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oai:repository.ucatolica.edu.co:10983/25671
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/10983/25671
Palabra clave:
POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
GASTO PÚBLICO
LATINOAMÉRICA
CICLO POLÍTICO PRESUPUESTAL
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openAccess
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Copyright, Universidad Católica de Colombia, 2020
id UCATOLICA2_744dc4a106a43f72a4c781dcbcfe408b
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.ucatolica.edu.co:10983/25671
network_acronym_str UCATOLICA2
network_name_str RIUCaC - Repositorio U. Católica
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
dc.title.alternative.spa.fl_str_mv Ciclos políticos presupuestales en América Latina, 1982-2014
title Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
spellingShingle Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
GASTO PÚBLICO
LATINOAMÉRICA
CICLO POLÍTICO PRESUPUESTAL
title_short Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
title_full Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
title_fullStr Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
title_full_unstemmed Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
title_sort Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Mejía-Reyes, Pablo
Reyes-Hernández, Marlen Rocío
Riguzzi, Paolo
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Mejía-Reyes, Pablo
Reyes-Hernández, Marlen Rocío
Riguzzi, Paolo
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
topic POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
GASTO PÚBLICO
LATINOAMÉRICA
CICLO POLÍTICO PRESUPUESTAL
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv GASTO PÚBLICO
LATINOAMÉRICA
CICLO POLÍTICO PRESUPUESTAL
description This paper aims to detect the presence of political budget cycles (PBuCs) around presidential elections in four large Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) over the 1982-2014 period, in the framework of democratic regimes. Extended autoregressive models are estimated for total public expenditure and their chief components, considering the effect of economic fluctuations. Among the most important findings, weak evidence of PBuCs was found in the case of Argentina and Chile, while in the case of Mexico and Colombia, post-electoral adjustments in budget items sensitive to political manipulation were found, such as subsidies and public works, along with pre-electoral increases in total expenditure in the former one, and in goods and services in the latter.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2020-01
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2021-03-09T16:20:29Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2021-03-09T16:20:29Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv Text
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dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv Mejía-Reyes, P., Reyes-Hernández, M. R., & Riguzzi, P. (2020). Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014. Revista de Finanzas y Política Económica, 12(1), 237-271.
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 2248-6046
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10983/25671
identifier_str_mv Mejía-Reyes, P., Reyes-Hernández, M. R., & Riguzzi, P. (2020). Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014. Revista de Finanzas y Política Económica, 12(1), 237-271.
2248-6046
url https://hdl.handle.net/10983/25671
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationendpage.spa.fl_str_mv 271
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv 1
dc.relation.citationstartpage.spa.fl_str_mv 237
dc.relation.citationvolume.spa.fl_str_mv 12
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv Revista Finanzas y Política Económica
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Aboal, D., Lorenzo, F., & Oddone G. (2001). The Political Economy of Budget Deficits in Uruguay. LACEA: Annual Conference, Montevideo.
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(3), 651-678.
Alesina, A. (1989). Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies. Economic Policy, 4(8), 57-98.
Alesina, A., & Sachs, J. (1988). Political parties and the business cycle in the United States, 1948-1984. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 20(1), 63-82.
Barberia, L.G., & Avelino, G. (2011). Do Political Budget Cycles Differ in Latin American Democracies? Economía, 11(2), 101-134.
Borsani, H. (2003). Elecciones, gobiernos mayoritarios y resultados macroeconómicos en América Latina (1979-1998). Desarrollo Económico, 43(171), 389-412.
Botero, F., Hoskin, G. W., & Pachón, M. (2010). Sobre forma y sustancia: una evaluación de la democracia electoral en Colombia. Revista de Ciencia Política, 30(1), 41-64.
Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2003). Where does the political budget cycle really come from? CEPR Discussion Paper no. 4049.
Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2005). Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295.
Camou, A. (1995). Democracia y reforma económica en Argentina (1983-1995): ¿doce años no es nada? América Latina Hoy, 11(12), 97-104.
Canes-Wrone, B., & Ponce de León, C. (2015). Electoral Cycles and Democratic Development. Submitted.
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Cuadra, G. (2008). Hechos estilizados del ciclo económico en México. Banco de México, Documento de investigación, núm. 2008-14, 1-54.
Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986). A positive theory of discretionary policy, the cost of a democratic government, and the benefits of a constitution. Economic Inquiry, 24(3), 367-388.
Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2003). The political business cycle in Colombia on the National and Regional level. Archivos de Economía. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Dirección de Estudios Económicos. Núm. 215.
Drazen, A. (2001). The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years. In Bernanke, B. S., & Rogoff, K. (Eds.). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 (pp. 75-138), Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Dubois, E. (2016). Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus. Public Choice, 166(1-2), 235-259.
Flores, D. (2007). Elecciones y ciclos económicos en México. El Trimestre Económico, 74(2), 467-474.
Franzese, R. J., & Jusko, K. L. (2008). Political-Economic Cycles. In Wittman, D. A., & Weingast, B. R. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 546-565), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gavin, M., & Perotti, R. (1997). Fiscal Policy in Latin America. In Bernanke, B., & Rotemberg, J. (Eds.). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997 (pp. 11-72), Cambridge: MIT Press.
González, M. A. (2002). Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico. Review of Development Economics, 6(2), 204-224.
Grier, K. G. (1987). Presidential Elections and Federal Reserve Policy: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal, 54(2), 475-486.
Hermelin, M. (2005). Desastres de origen natural en Colombia 1979-2004, Medellin: EAFIT.
Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.
Hibbs, D. A. (2006). Voting and the Macroeconomy. In Wittman, D. A., & Weingast, B. R. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 565-586), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hodrick, R. J., & Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(1), 1-16.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
Instituto Nacional Electoral. (2016). Estadísticas y Resultados Electorales. Retrieved from http://www.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/Historico_de_ Resultados_Electorales/ (consulted on January 20th, 2016).
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spelling Mejía-Reyes, Pabloc46cc4c2-90db-476a-8e51-f8473baa5e02-1Reyes-Hernández, Marlen Rocíof771950c-15c7-4064-b9ef-79c02f9b51d5-1Riguzzi, Paolo8c840041-2f5d-418e-9fe7-ecca47de9497-12021-03-09T16:20:29Z2021-03-09T16:20:29Z2020-01This paper aims to detect the presence of political budget cycles (PBuCs) around presidential elections in four large Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) over the 1982-2014 period, in the framework of democratic regimes. Extended autoregressive models are estimated for total public expenditure and their chief components, considering the effect of economic fluctuations. Among the most important findings, weak evidence of PBuCs was found in the case of Argentina and Chile, while in the case of Mexico and Colombia, post-electoral adjustments in budget items sensitive to political manipulation were found, such as subsidies and public works, along with pre-electoral increases in total expenditure in the former one, and in goods and services in the latter.Resumen: el objetivo de este artículo es detectar la presencia de ciclos políticos presupuestales (CPP) en torno a las elecciones presidenciales de cuatro grandes países latinoamericanos (Argentina, Chile, Colombia y México) durante el periodo 1982-2014, en el contexto de regímenes democráticos. Para ello, se estiman modelos autorregresivos extendidos para gasto público total y sus componentes principales, considerando el efecto de las fluctuaciones cíclicas. Entre los hallazgos más importantes está la evidencia débil de CPP en los casos de Argentina y Chile, mientras que en los casos de México y Colombia se encontraron ajustes postelectorales en partidas presupuestarias sensibles a la manipulación política, como subsidios y obras públicas, junto con aumentos preelectoralesen el gasto total en el primero, y en bienes y servicios en el segundo.35 páginasapplication/pdfMejía-Reyes, P., Reyes-Hernández, M. R., & Riguzzi, P. (2020). Political budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014. Revista de Finanzas y Política Económica, 12(1), 237-271.2248-6046https://hdl.handle.net/10983/25671engUniversidad Católica de Colombia. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y AdministrativasBogotá271123712Revista Finanzas y Política EconómicaAboal, D., Lorenzo, F., & Oddone G. (2001). The Political Economy of Budget Deficits in Uruguay. LACEA: Annual Conference, Montevideo.Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(3), 651-678.Alesina, A. (1989). Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies. Economic Policy, 4(8), 57-98.Alesina, A., & Sachs, J. (1988). Political parties and the business cycle in the United States, 1948-1984. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 20(1), 63-82.Barberia, L.G., & Avelino, G. (2011). Do Political Budget Cycles Differ in Latin American Democracies? Economía, 11(2), 101-134.Borsani, H. (2003). Elecciones, gobiernos mayoritarios y resultados macroeconómicos en América Latina (1979-1998). Desarrollo Económico, 43(171), 389-412.Botero, F., Hoskin, G. W., & Pachón, M. (2010). Sobre forma y sustancia: una evaluación de la democracia electoral en Colombia. Revista de Ciencia Política, 30(1), 41-64.Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2003). Where does the political budget cycle really come from? CEPR Discussion Paper no. 4049.Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2005). Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295.Camou, A. (1995). Democracia y reforma económica en Argentina (1983-1995): ¿doce años no es nada? América Latina Hoy, 11(12), 97-104.Canes-Wrone, B., & Ponce de León, C. (2015). Electoral Cycles and Democratic Development. Submitted.Centro Sismológico Nacional (CSN). (2016). Sismos Importantes y/o Destructivos (1570 a la fecha). Retrieved from www.sismologia.cl (consulted on January 21, 2016).CEPAL (2015). Estadísticas e Indicadores Económicos. Retrieved from http://www. cepal.org (consulted on August 25, 2015).Cuadra, G. (2008). Hechos estilizados del ciclo económico en México. Banco de México, Documento de investigación, núm. 2008-14, 1-54.Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986). A positive theory of discretionary policy, the cost of a democratic government, and the benefits of a constitution. Economic Inquiry, 24(3), 367-388.Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2003). The political business cycle in Colombia on the National and Regional level. Archivos de Economía. Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Dirección de Estudios Económicos. Núm. 215.Drazen, A. (2001). The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years. In Bernanke, B. S., & Rogoff, K. (Eds.). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 (pp. 75-138), Cambridge: The MIT Press.Dubois, E. (2016). Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus. Public Choice, 166(1-2), 235-259.Flores, D. (2007). Elecciones y ciclos económicos en México. El Trimestre Económico, 74(2), 467-474.Franzese, R. J., & Jusko, K. L. (2008). Political-Economic Cycles. In Wittman, D. A., & Weingast, B. R. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 546-565), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Gavin, M., & Perotti, R. (1997). Fiscal Policy in Latin America. In Bernanke, B., & Rotemberg, J. (Eds.). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997 (pp. 11-72), Cambridge: MIT Press.González, M. A. (2002). Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico. Review of Development Economics, 6(2), 204-224.Grier, K. G. (1987). Presidential Elections and Federal Reserve Policy: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal, 54(2), 475-486.Hermelin, M. (2005). Desastres de origen natural en Colombia 1979-2004, Medellin: EAFIT.Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.Hibbs, D. A. (2006). Voting and the Macroeconomy. In Wittman, D. A., & Weingast, B. R. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 565-586), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Hodrick, R. J., & Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(1), 1-16.Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.Instituto Nacional Electoral. (2016). Estadísticas y Resultados Electorales. 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Econometrica, 48, 817-838.Copyright, Universidad Católica de Colombia, 2020info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2POLÍTICA ECONÓMICAGASTO PÚBLICOLATINOAMÉRICACICLO POLÍTICO PRESUPUESTALPolitical budget cycles in Latin America, 1982-2014Ciclos políticos presupuestales en América Latina, 1982-2014Artículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85PublicationORIGINAL3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdf3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdfapplication/pdf622216https://repository.ucatolica.edu.co/bitstreams/e2aac967-5190-47d6-b5dc-0c6ad662861d/download6bf7710502eec337947106fd68706399MD51TEXT3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdf.txt3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain88606https://repository.ucatolica.edu.co/bitstreams/5990d4a5-6882-4094-bf9b-e9ba46630707/download44e102320642174439a5c2c710dded39MD52THUMBNAIL3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdf.jpg3061-Texto del artículo-23416-1-10-20200914.pdf.jpgRIUCACimage/jpeg20897https://repository.ucatolica.edu.co/bitstreams/47908fab-caa2-4cd3-bf41-34aec6900bad/download6c5f7c773f9d59b5fa4d3af7a45fad3dMD5310983/25671oai:repository.ucatolica.edu.co:10983/256712023-03-24 16:51:08.388https://repository.ucatolica.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad Católica de Colombia - RIUCaCbdigital@metabiblioteca.com

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