La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle
John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la...
- Autores:
-
Giromi, José
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad de Caldas
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio U. de Caldas
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/15465
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6
https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15465
- Palabra clave:
- Social ontology
normativity
John Searle
philosophy of mind
pragmatism
Ontología social
normatividad
John Searle
filosofía de la mente
pragmatismo
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Derechos de autor 2020 Discusiones Filosóficas
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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The impotence of representations: a criticism of John Searle's social ontology |
| title |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle Social ontology normativity John Searle philosophy of mind pragmatism Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo |
| title_short |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| title_full |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| title_fullStr |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| title_full_unstemmed |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Giromi, José |
| dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv |
Giromi, José |
| dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Social ontology normativity John Searle philosophy of mind pragmatism |
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Social ontology normativity John Searle philosophy of mind pragmatism Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo |
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Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo |
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John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entrereconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que losfundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales. |
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2020 |
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2020-01-01 00:00:00 2021-02-04T14:54:57Z |
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2020-01-01 |
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Sección Artículos Artículo de revista |
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Journal Article |
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Discusiones Filosóficas |
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Bratman, Michael. “Shared Intention”. Ethics. Oct. 104 (1). 1993: 97-113. Print. Brandom, Robert. “A hegelian model of legal concept determination: the normative fine structure of the judge’s chain novel”. Hubbs, Graham y Lind, Douglas (Eds.) Pragmatism, law and language. New York: Routledge. 2014. Print. ______. “Some pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism”. Tales of the mighty dead (pp. 210-234). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002. Print. ______. Making it explicit: reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1994. Print. Chant, Sara, Hindriks, Frank & Preyer, Gerhard. (eds.) From individual to collective Intentionality: New Essays, Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Gilbert, Margaret. “Acting together”. Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Hornsby, Jennifer. (1997). “Collectives and intentionality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57 (2). 1997: pp. 429-434. Print. Kukla, Rebecca & Lance, Mark. Yo and Lo: The pragmatic topography of the space of reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2009. Print. Lawson, Tony. “Comparing conceptions of social ontology: emergent social entities and/or institutional facts?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Dec. 46 (4). 2016: 359-399. Print. ______. “A conception of social ontology”. Pratten, Stephen (Ed.). Social ontology and modern economics. New York: Routledge. 2015. Print. Malinowski, Bronislaw. Crimen y costumbre en la sociedad salvaje. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini. 1985. Impreso. Rouse, Joseph. “Social practices and normativity”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Mar. 37 (1). 2007: pp.1-11. Print. ______. How scientific practices matter: reclaiming philosophical naturalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2002. Print. Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio. “A behavioural critique of Searle’s theory of institutions”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. Searle, John, Ferraris, Maurizio & Condello, Angela. Money, social ontology and law. Nueva York: Routledge. 2019. Print. ______. Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Print. ______. “Responses to critics of The Construction of Social Reality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57(2). 1997: pp. 449-458. Print. ______. The construction of social reality. Nueva York: The Free Press. 1995. Print. Smith, Barry. “John Searle: From speech acts to social reality”. Smith, B. (ed.) John Searle. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (2003) Print. Vicari, Giuseppe. “Collective intentionality, language and normativity: a problem and a possible solution for the analysis of cooperation”. Epkeina. 5 (1). 2015: 183-207. Wilson, Robert. “Social reality and institutional facts”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. Zimmermann, Stephan. “Is society built on collective intentions? A response to John Searle”. Rivista di estetica. 57. 2014: pp. 121-141. Print. |
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Giromi, Joséef76933ce044a643a0ef97ec865ca6023002020-01-01 00:00:002021-02-04T14:54:57Z2020-01-01 00:00:002021-02-04T14:54:57Z2020-01-010124-6127https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/1546510.17151/difil.2020.21.36.62462-9596John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entrereconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que losfundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales.John Searle has advocated an intentionalist approach to the social, namely the idea that social reality is created and maintained by certain mental states and speech acts. In this work, we first present a detailed version of Searle’s intentionalist founding arguments based on the connection between collective recognition and language. In the second place, we offer a critique of these arguments, suggesting that they lead us to admit that the foundationsof social reality are more practical than representational.application/pdfspaUniversidad de CaldasDerechos de autor 2020 Discusiones Filosóficashttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2535Social ontologynormativityJohn Searlephilosophy of mindpragmatismOntología socialnormatividadJohn Searlefilosofía de la mentepragmatismoLa impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John SearleThe impotence of representations: a criticism of John Searle's social ontologySección ArtículosArtículo de revistaJournal Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85104367921Discusiones FilosóficasBratman, Michael. “Shared Intention”. Ethics. Oct. 104 (1). 1993: 97-113. Print.Brandom, Robert. “A hegelian model of legal concept determination: the normative fine structure of the judge’s chain novel”. Hubbs, Graham y Lind, Douglas (Eds.) Pragmatism, law and language. New York: Routledge. 2014. Print.______. “Some pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism”. Tales of the mighty dead (pp. 210-234). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002. Print.______. Making it explicit: reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1994. Print.Chant, Sara, Hindriks, Frank & Preyer, Gerhard. (eds.) From individual to collective Intentionality: New Essays, Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print.Gilbert, Margaret. “Acting together”. Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print.Hornsby, Jennifer. (1997). “Collectives and intentionality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57 (2). 1997: pp. 429-434. Print.Kukla, Rebecca & Lance, Mark. Yo and Lo: The pragmatic topography of the space of reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2009. Print.Lawson, Tony. “Comparing conceptions of social ontology: emergent social entities and/or institutional facts?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Dec. 46 (4). 2016: 359-399. Print.______. “A conception of social ontology”. Pratten, Stephen (Ed.). Social ontology and modern economics. New York: Routledge. 2015. Print.Malinowski, Bronislaw. Crimen y costumbre en la sociedad salvaje. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini. 1985. Impreso.Rouse, Joseph. “Social practices and normativity”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Mar. 37 (1). 2007: pp.1-11. Print.______. How scientific practices matter: reclaiming philosophical naturalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2002. Print.Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio. “A behavioural critique of Searle’s theory of institutions”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print.Searle, John, Ferraris, Maurizio & Condello, Angela. Money, social ontology and law. Nueva York: Routledge. 2019. Print.______. Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Print.______. “Responses to critics of The Construction of Social Reality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57(2). 1997: pp. 449-458. Print.______. The construction of social reality. Nueva York: The Free Press. 1995. Print.Smith, Barry. “John Searle: From speech acts to social reality”. Smith, B. (ed.) John Searle. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (2003) Print.Vicari, Giuseppe. “Collective intentionality, language and normativity: a problem and a possible solution for the analysis of cooperation”. Epkeina. 5 (1). 2015: 183-207.Wilson, Robert. “Social reality and institutional facts”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print.Zimmermann, Stephan. “Is society built on collective intentions? A response to John Searle”. Rivista di estetica. 57. 2014: pp. 121-141. Print.Núm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Juniohttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2535/2345OREORE.xmltext/xml2636https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/bitstream/ucaldas/15465/1/ORE.xml6f4ac485878e508c030fa8c865007bceMD51ucaldas/15465oai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/154652021-02-04 14:54:57.503Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Caldasbdigital@metabiblioteca.com |