Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world

Epistemology is, at first glance, a specific field on the realm of sciences. Nevertheless, at the same time, epistemology is a general theory of what humans are doing right or wrong in all sciences. Actually, epistemology is about what are we doing right or wrong rationally in all those different fi...

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Autores:
Fonseca Martínez, Miguel Antonio
Tipo de recurso:
Doctoral thesis
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad Santo Tomás
Repositorio:
Repositorio Institucional USTA
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/20569
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/11634/20569
Palabra clave:
Ranking Theory
Social Sciences
Formal Epistemology
Ciencias sociales
(Análisis) Filosofía
Teoría del conocimiento
Teoría del Ranquín
Ciencias Sociales
Epistemología formal
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openAccess
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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/20569
network_acronym_str SANTTOMAS2
network_name_str Repositorio Institucional USTA
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
title Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
spellingShingle Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
Ranking Theory
Social Sciences
Formal Epistemology
Ciencias sociales
(Análisis) Filosofía
Teoría del conocimiento
Teoría del Ranquín
Ciencias Sociales
Epistemología formal
title_short Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
title_full Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
title_fullStr Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
title_full_unstemmed Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
title_sort Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Fonseca Martínez, Miguel Antonio
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Moreno Ortiz, Juan Carlos
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Fonseca Martínez, Miguel Antonio
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4759-4398
dc.contributor.googlescholar.spa.fl_str_mv https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=CAsvIusAAAAJ&hl=es
dc.contributor.cvlac.spa.fl_str_mv http://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000250171
dc.contributor.cvlac.none.fl_str_mv https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000774758
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Ranking Theory
Social Sciences
Formal Epistemology
topic Ranking Theory
Social Sciences
Formal Epistemology
Ciencias sociales
(Análisis) Filosofía
Teoría del conocimiento
Teoría del Ranquín
Ciencias Sociales
Epistemología formal
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv Ciencias sociales
(Análisis) Filosofía
Teoría del conocimiento
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv Teoría del Ranquín
Ciencias Sociales
Epistemología formal
description Epistemology is, at first glance, a specific field on the realm of sciences. Nevertheless, at the same time, epistemology is a general theory of what humans are doing right or wrong in all sciences. Actually, epistemology is about what are we doing right or wrong rationally in all those different fields of science. In this sense, it is a field devoted to achieving knowledge following certain rational justified principles and models. The key question is thus: why ought to follow such principles and models? And, given this, how to establish better, clear, precise and justified models of reasoning to fulfill this normativity task and challenge? The present dissertation is thus devoted to answering such questions in the realm of social sciences. The main goal is to establish an ideal model, a methodological tool-box, for the internal or epistemic normativity of the social sciences thanks to this normative reflection. Following the legacy of Wolfgang Spohn (2011), the dissertation wants to study the epistemic normativity of the social sciences, as a central criterion of its identity and demarcation. The epistemic normativity that subjects follow to the precise understanding of social phenomena, is the core of this specific kind of scientific knowledge, and goes beyond the account of empirical methodologies that appeal to an external normativity that is not exclusive used to the treatment of objects and problems relative to the social sciences.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-01-16T18:43:40Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-01-16T18:43:40Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2020-01-16
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv doctoral thesis
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Tesis doctoral
dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.category.spa.fl_str_mv Formación de Recurso Humano para la Ctel: Tesis de Doctorado
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06
dc.type.drive.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.spa.fl_str_mv Fonseca Martínez, M. A. (2020). Das flussbett making rankimg theory useful for the social world. (Tesis doctoral). Universidad Santo Tomás. Bogotá, Colombia
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11634/20569
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifier.repourl.spa.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repository.usta.edu.co
identifier_str_mv Fonseca Martínez, M. A. (2020). Das flussbett making rankimg theory useful for the social world. (Tesis doctoral). Universidad Santo Tomás. Bogotá, Colombia
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomás
instname:Universidad Santo Tomás
repourl:https://repository.usta.edu.co
url http://hdl.handle.net/11634/20569
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
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spelling Moreno Ortiz, Juan CarlosFonseca Martínez, Miguel Antoniohttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4759-4398https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=CAsvIusAAAAJ&hl=eshttp://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000250171https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=00007747582020-01-16T18:43:40Z2020-01-16T18:43:40Z2020-01-16Fonseca Martínez, M. A. (2020). Das flussbett making rankimg theory useful for the social world. (Tesis doctoral). Universidad Santo Tomás. Bogotá, Colombiahttp://hdl.handle.net/11634/20569reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomásinstname:Universidad Santo Tomásrepourl:https://repository.usta.edu.coEpistemology is, at first glance, a specific field on the realm of sciences. Nevertheless, at the same time, epistemology is a general theory of what humans are doing right or wrong in all sciences. Actually, epistemology is about what are we doing right or wrong rationally in all those different fields of science. In this sense, it is a field devoted to achieving knowledge following certain rational justified principles and models. The key question is thus: why ought to follow such principles and models? And, given this, how to establish better, clear, precise and justified models of reasoning to fulfill this normativity task and challenge? The present dissertation is thus devoted to answering such questions in the realm of social sciences. The main goal is to establish an ideal model, a methodological tool-box, for the internal or epistemic normativity of the social sciences thanks to this normative reflection. Following the legacy of Wolfgang Spohn (2011), the dissertation wants to study the epistemic normativity of the social sciences, as a central criterion of its identity and demarcation. The epistemic normativity that subjects follow to the precise understanding of social phenomena, is the core of this specific kind of scientific knowledge, and goes beyond the account of empirical methodologies that appeal to an external normativity that is not exclusive used to the treatment of objects and problems relative to the social sciences.Doctor en Filosofíahttp://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.coDoctoradoapplication/pdfspaUniversidad Santo TomásDoctorado en FilosofíaFacultad de Filosofía y LetrasAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/Abierto (Texto Completo)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social worlddoctoral thesisTesis doctoralinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionFormación de Recurso Humano para la Ctel: Tesis de Doctoradohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisRanking TheorySocial SciencesFormal EpistemologyCiencias sociales(Análisis) FilosofíaTeoría del conocimientoTeoría del RanquínCiencias SocialesEpistemología formalCRAI-USTA BogotáAlchourron, C., Gärdenfors, P. & Makinson, D. 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Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/holism-social/>.THUMBNAIL2020MiguelFonseca.pdf.jpg2020MiguelFonseca.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3894https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/6/2020MiguelFonseca.pdf.jpg67569014ed53d4ac8d7af97fe595007bMD56metadata only accessCarta de Facultad.pdf.jpgCarta de Facultad.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg6620https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/7/Carta%20de%20Facultad.pdf.jpgfc2f0be9eb81e1b31c3e4c6e3278fd9aMD57metadata only accessCarta de derechos de autor.pdf.jpgCarta de derechos de autor.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg7259https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/8/Carta%20de%20derechos%20de%20autor.pdf.jpg27091473767de29a17599de9a65de2f5MD58metadata only access2020miguelfonseca.pdf.jpg2020miguelfonseca.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3894https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/10/2020miguelfonseca.pdf.jpg67569014ed53d4ac8d7af97fe595007bMD510metadata only accessCC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8811https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/4/license_rdf217700a34da79ed616c2feb68d4c5e06MD54open accessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-8807https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/5/license.txtf6b8c5608fa6b2f649b2d63e10c5fa73MD55open accessORIGINAL2020miguelfonseca.pdf2020miguelfonseca.pdfapplication/pdf1620983https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/9/2020miguelfonseca.pdfc04090a119e9b139c4c24fc99cf9805dMD59metadata only accessCarta de Facultad.pdfCarta de Facultad.pdfapplication/pdf37035https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/2/Carta%20de%20Facultad.pdf4cee10aaf0caf67834514f898bf42779MD52metadata only accessCarta de derechos de autor.pdfCarta de derechos de autor.pdfapplication/pdf27205https://repository.usta.edu.co/bitstream/11634/20569/3/Carta%20de%20derechos%20de%20autor.pdfb4dff0e241091e34c0b4f24063db9f69MD53metadata only access11634/20569oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/205692023-07-19 18:04:37.478metadata only accessRepositorio Universidad Santo Tomásnoreply@usta.edu.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