Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi)
During the last decade, several models and strategies of coordination in supply chains have been developed, one of which is known as the Vendor Managed Inventory model (VMI). Despite the coordination efforts between the actors, sometimes it turns out that each one retains its restrictions and intere...
- Autores:
-
Villa Marulanda, Marcela
Torres Delgado, José Fidel
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2014
- Institución:
- Universidad Santo Tomás
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Institucional USTA
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/45042
- Acceso en línea:
- http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/2748
http://hdl.handle.net/11634/45042
- Palabra clave:
- Rights
- License
- Copyright (c) 2012 ITECKNE
id |
SANTTOMAS2_00844fd17288c3dcd439dffab628942c |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/45042 |
network_acronym_str |
SANTTOMAS2 |
network_name_str |
Repositorio Institucional USTA |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Villa Marulanda, MarcelaTorres Delgado, José Fidel2022-06-15T21:55:28Z2022-06-15T21:55:28Z2014-11-26http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/274810.15332/iteckne.v9i1.2748http://hdl.handle.net/11634/45042During the last decade, several models and strategies of coordination in supply chains have been developed, one of which is known as the Vendor Managed Inventory model (VMI). Despite the coordination efforts between the actors, sometimes it turns out that each one retains its restrictions and interests, which would preclude an integral implementation of the coordination strategy or agreement. A game theory based analysis approach is proposed for a supply chain comprising a producer (with a finite production rate) and a buyer (with known and constant demand), who have a VMI strategy, under two scenarios: Cooperative VMI and Non Cooperative VMI. A negotiation model where the one who gets more benefits can stimulate to the other agent who loses with agreement is proposed as well. A sensitivity analysis of the models has been performed in order to find the benefits to be gained in terms of savings in inventory costs and how these are distributed among the agents. The study results showed that under certain conditions and parameters, the VMI Cooperative model always favored the producer which did not happen with the buyer. However, the buyer may benefit from the VMI Cooperative model in its optimal point or by means of the economic incentive provided by the producer as a set in a bargaining model.Durante la última década se han desarrollado una gran diversidad de modelos y estrategias de coordinación en cadenas de suministro, una de las cuales se denomina Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Pese a los esfuerzos por lograr una coordinación entre los actores, en algunas ocasiones sucede que cada uno conserva sus intereses o restricciones, lo que impediría la implementación de un acuerdo o estrategia integral de coordinación. Se analiza mediante teoría de juegos una cadena de suministros, compuesta por un productor (con tasa finita de producción) y un comprador (cuya demanda es una constante conocida), quienes han acordado una estrategia VMI bajo dos escenarios: VMI Cooperativo y VMI No Cooperativo. Se propone un modelo de negociación para el que el agente que gana en la negociación pueda incentivar económicamente al otro, quien pierde con el acuerdo, con el fin de que pueda adoptarlo. Se realiza un análisis de sensibilidad de los modelos planteados con el propósito de hallar los beneficios que los agentes pueden obtener en términos de ahorros en costos de inventarios y cómo son distribuidos entre dichos agentes. Los resultados del estudio mostraron que, bajo las condiciones y los parámetros establecidos, el modelo VMI Cooperativo siempre favoreció al productor, lo que no sucedió con el comprador. No obstante, fue posible que el comprador ganara con el modelo VMI Cooperativo en su punto óptimo o mediante el incentivo económico que proporciona el modelo de negociación.application/pdfspaUniversidad Santo Tomás. Seccional Bucaramangahttp://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/2748/2005ITECKNE; Vol 9 No 1 (2012); 67-82ITECKNE; Vol 9 No 1 (2012); 67-822339-34831692-1798Copyright (c) 2012 ITECKNEhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi)Game theory analysis of a producer-buyer supply chain under Vendor Managed Inventory (Vmi) Agreementinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb111634/45042oai:repository.usta.edu.co:11634/450422023-07-14 15:28:39.554metadata only accessRepositorio Universidad Santo Tomásnoreply@usta.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv |
Game theory analysis of a producer-buyer supply chain under Vendor Managed Inventory (Vmi) Agreement |
title |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
spellingShingle |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
title_short |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
title_full |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
title_fullStr |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
title_full_unstemmed |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
title_sort |
Análisis de teoría de juegos en cadenas de suministros de dos niveles, productor-comprador, bajo esquema vendor managed inventory (vmi) |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Villa Marulanda, Marcela Torres Delgado, José Fidel |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Villa Marulanda, Marcela Torres Delgado, José Fidel |
description |
During the last decade, several models and strategies of coordination in supply chains have been developed, one of which is known as the Vendor Managed Inventory model (VMI). Despite the coordination efforts between the actors, sometimes it turns out that each one retains its restrictions and interests, which would preclude an integral implementation of the coordination strategy or agreement. A game theory based analysis approach is proposed for a supply chain comprising a producer (with a finite production rate) and a buyer (with known and constant demand), who have a VMI strategy, under two scenarios: Cooperative VMI and Non Cooperative VMI. A negotiation model where the one who gets more benefits can stimulate to the other agent who loses with agreement is proposed as well. A sensitivity analysis of the models has been performed in order to find the benefits to be gained in terms of savings in inventory costs and how these are distributed among the agents. The study results showed that under certain conditions and parameters, the VMI Cooperative model always favored the producer which did not happen with the buyer. However, the buyer may benefit from the VMI Cooperative model in its optimal point or by means of the economic incentive provided by the producer as a set in a bargaining model. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-11-26 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-06-15T21:55:28Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-06-15T21:55:28Z |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.drive.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/2748 10.15332/iteckne.v9i1.2748 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11634/45042 |
url |
http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/2748 http://hdl.handle.net/11634/45042 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.15332/iteckne.v9i1.2748 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/ITECKNE/article/view/2748/2005 |
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv |
ITECKNE; Vol 9 No 1 (2012); 67-82 |
dc.relation.citationissue.eng.fl_str_mv |
ITECKNE; Vol 9 No 1 (2012); 67-82 |
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv |
2339-3483 1692-1798 |
dc.rights.eng.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 ITECKNE |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 ITECKNE http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.eng.fl_str_mv |
Universidad Santo Tomás. Seccional Bucaramanga |
institution |
Universidad Santo Tomás |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Universidad Santo Tomás |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
noreply@usta.edu.co |
_version_ |
1782026119394885632 |