Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico

Modern legal thought has tried to approach the study of juridical matters with an exclusively theoretical view; that is, attempting to make a description of the legal phenomenon while devising a system as appropriate as possible to explain that phenomenon, just as natural sciences choose a sector of...

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Autores:
Suárez Rodríquez, José Julian
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2007
Institución:
Universidad de la Sabana
Repositorio:
Repositorio Universidad de la Sabana
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:intellectum.unisabana.edu.co:10818/13483
Acceso en línea:
http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377
http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377/1513
http://hdl.handle.net/10818/13483
Palabra clave:
Realidad
Razón teórica
Ciencias naturales
Objeto jurídico
Rights
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
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network_name_str Repositorio Universidad de la Sabana
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dc.title.es_CO.fl_str_mv Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
title Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
spellingShingle Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
Realidad
Razón teórica
Ciencias naturales
Objeto jurídico
title_short Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
title_full Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
title_fullStr Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
title_full_unstemmed Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
title_sort Hacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídico
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Suárez Rodríquez, José Julian
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Suárez Rodríquez, José Julian
dc.subject.es_CO.fl_str_mv Realidad
topic Realidad
Razón teórica
Ciencias naturales
Objeto jurídico
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Razón teórica
Ciencias naturales
Objeto jurídico
description Modern legal thought has tried to approach the study of juridical matters with an exclusively theoretical view; that is, attempting to make a description of the legal phenomenon while devising a system as appropriate as possible to explain that phenomenon, just as natural sciences choose a sector of reality to describe it by preparing a model serving to through light on them as best as possible. This manner of approaching things of juridical nature originates in the influence of modern rationalist philosophy, the boom experienced by the physical sciences since Newton’s Prinicipia mathematica, and the will to assimilate every science to the sciences of nature that, according to the modern thinkers, gave the best and most effective results. The consequence of this phenomenon was denial of the complexity of reality. The distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason loses all its sense, and law loses its nature as a practical and prudential science. This is why recovering the prudential level of legal science is necessary for it to respond more properly to the nature of its object: if juridical reality is a practical one in search of the resolution of specific cases, a method has to be found, to fit in with this object’s nature of the object, instead of insisting in adapting the method of theoretical sciences to the juridical object.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2007
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2007
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2015-02-02T09:24:24Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2015-02-02T09:24:24Z
dc.type.es_CO.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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dc.type.hasVersion.es_CO.fl_str_mv publishedVersion
dc.identifier.other.es_CO.fl_str_mv http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377
http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377/1513
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10818/13483
url http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377
http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377/1513
http://hdl.handle.net/10818/13483
dc.language.iso.es_CO.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Díkaion; Vol 16 (2007)
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.source.es_CO.fl_str_mv Universidad de La Sabana
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de La Sabana
institution Universidad de la Sabana
repository.name.fl_str_mv Intellectum Universidad de la Sabana
repository.mail.fl_str_mv contactointellectum@unisabana.edu.co
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spelling Suárez Rodríquez, José Julian2015-02-02T09:24:24Z2015-02-02T09:24:24Z20072007http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/view/1377/1513http://hdl.handle.net/10818/13483Modern legal thought has tried to approach the study of juridical matters with an exclusively theoretical view; that is, attempting to make a description of the legal phenomenon while devising a system as appropriate as possible to explain that phenomenon, just as natural sciences choose a sector of reality to describe it by preparing a model serving to through light on them as best as possible. This manner of approaching things of juridical nature originates in the influence of modern rationalist philosophy, the boom experienced by the physical sciences since Newton’s Prinicipia mathematica, and the will to assimilate every science to the sciences of nature that, according to the modern thinkers, gave the best and most effective results. The consequence of this phenomenon was denial of the complexity of reality. The distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason loses all its sense, and law loses its nature as a practical and prudential science. This is why recovering the prudential level of legal science is necessary for it to respond more properly to the nature of its object: if juridical reality is a practical one in search of the resolution of specific cases, a method has to be found, to fit in with this object’s nature of the object, instead of insisting in adapting the method of theoretical sciences to the juridical object.El pensamiento jurídico moderno ha intentado abordar el estudio de lo jurídico con una mirada exclusivamente teórica, es decir, ha intentado hacer una descripción del fenómeno jurídico y elaborar un sistema lo más adecuado posible para explicar dicho fenómeno, a la manera como las ciencias naturales escogen un sector de la realidad para describirla, elaborando un modelo que la explique de la mejor manera posible. Esta forma de abordar lo jurídico tiene como origen la influencia de la moderna filosofía racionalista, el auge que las ciencias físicas toman a partir de los Principia mathemáthica de Newton, y el querer asimilar toda ciencia a las ciencias de la naturaleza que daban, según los modernos, mejores y más efectivos resultados. La consecuencia de este fenómeno fue la negación de lo complejo de la realidad; la distinción entre razón teórica y razón práctica pierde todo su sentido, y el derecho pierde su carácter de ciencia práctica y prudencial. Por ello se hace necesario recuperar el nivel prudencial de la ciencia jurídica para que responda de manera más adecuada a la naturaleza de su objeto: si la realidad jurídica es una realidad práctica, que busca la resolución de casos concretos, debe buscarse un método que se adecue a esta naturaleza del objeto, y no seguir queriendo adaptar el método de las ciencias teóricas al objeto jurídico.spaDíkaion; Vol 16 (2007)This journal and its contents are the property of Universidad de La Sabana and, therefore, may be accessed solely for reading or printing, as a personal copy, but not for profit. Prior authorization from Universidad de La Sabana is required for any other use, such as the reproduction, transformation, public communication or distribution of said material for a profit.The names and email addresses included in Aquichán shall be used solely for the declared purposes of this journal and shall not be made available for any other purpose or to any other person.The articles published in this journal represent the opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Universidad de La Sabana.A presente revista e seu conteúdo são propriedade da Universidade da Sabana e, consequentemente, só poderá se aceder a ela para leitura ou impressão, como cópia pessoal e sem fins lucrativos. Qualquer outra forma de utilização como reprodução, transformação, comunicação pública ou distribuição, com fins lucrativos, requer a autorização prévia da Universidade da Sabana.Os nomes e endereços de e-mail introduzidos nesta revista se usarão exclusivamente para os fins declarados e não estarão disponíveis para nenhum outro propósito ou outra pessoa.Os artigos que esta revista contém representam a opinião de seus autores e não constituem necessariamente a opinião da Universidade da Sabana.http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Universidad de La SabanaRepositorio Institucional de la Universidad de La SabanaRealidadRazón teóricaCiencias naturalesObjeto jurídicoHacia una nueva forma de comprensión de lo jurídicoarticlepublishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_650110818/13483oai:intellectum.unisabana.edu.co:10818/134832017-11-29 13:10:39.011Intellectum Universidad de la Sabanacontactointellectum@unisabana.edu.co