Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro

220 páginas

Autores:: Vega Mejía, Germán Ricardo

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:: 2019

Institución:: Universidad de la Sabana

Repositorio:: Repositorio Universidad de la Sabana

Idioma:: spa

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dc.title.es_CO.fl_str_mv	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
title	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
spellingShingle	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro Magíster en Gerencia Estratégica Administración de la producción Logística en los negocios Canales de comercialización Proveedores Materias primas
title_short	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
title_full	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
title_fullStr	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
title_full_unstemmed	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
title_sort	Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Vega Mejía, Germán Ricardo
author	Magíster en Gerencia Estratégica
author_facet	Magíster en Gerencia Estratégica
author_role	author
dc.contributor.advisor.none.fl_str_mv	Martínez Avela, Mario Ernesto Vega Mejía, Carlos Alberto
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv	Vega Mejía, Germán Ricardo
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv	Magíster en Gerencia Estratégica
dc.subject.es_CO.fl_str_mv	Administración de la producción Logística en los negocios Canales de comercialización Proveedores Materias primas
topic	Administración de la producción Logística en los negocios Canales de comercialización Proveedores Materias primas
description	220 páginas
publishDate	2019
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2019-05-02T15:57:27Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2019-05-02T15:57:27Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2019-03-02
dc.type.es_CO.fl_str_mv	masterThesis
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dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv	Bhattacharyya, K., & Guiffrida, A. L. (2015). An optimization framework for improving supplier delivery performance. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 39, 3771-3783. Cao, E., Ma, Y., Wan, C., & Lai, M. (2013). Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain. Operations Research Letters, 410-414. Cueto, D. (2013). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America. International Review of Economics and Finance, 25, 310 -325. Dai, Y., & Chao, X. (2016). Price delegation and sales force contract design with asymmetric risk aversion coefficient of sales agents. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 31-42. Ducassy, I., & Guyot, A. (2017). Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: The French context. Research in International Business and Finance, 39, 291-306. García Alcaraz, J. L., Alvarado Iniesta, A., & Maldonado Macías, A. A. (2013). Selección de proveedores basada en análisis dimensional. Contaduría y Administración, 58(3), 249- 278 Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 319-414 Liu, K., & Song, H. (2017). Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 270-283. Norouzi, N., & Amalnick, M. S. (2016). Modified particle swarm optimization in a timedependent vehicle routing problem: minimizing fuel consumption. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 121-134. Rai, V.-K., & Kim, D.-H. (2002). Principal–agent problem: a cognitive map approach. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 1, 174-192. Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of Agent: the Principal's Problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54 Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54. Skinner, W. (2000). Manufacturing - missing link in corporate strategy. Hardvard Business Review, 136-145 Su, Y., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2014). Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 1-7 Vafa Arani, H., Rabbani, M., & Rafiei, H. (2016). A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 42–56. Wang, G. W., & Pallis, A. A. (2014). Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements. Transportation Research Part E, 162-174. Wang, X., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2017). Supply chain contract mechanism under bilateral information asymmetry. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 356-368. Xiao-ning, G., & Jun, T. (2018). Multi-period incentive contract design in the agent emergency supplies reservation strategy with asymmetric information. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 94-102. Xu, W. Y., Zhang, Z. J., & Gong, D. Q. (2014). Cooperative Supply Chain Management under Asymmetric Information. School of Economics and Management, 12, 182-191. Yang, J., & Qi, X. (2009). On the design of coordinating contracts. Int. J. Production Economics, 122, 581-594 Yoo, S. H., Kim, D., & Park, M.-S. (2015). Pricing and return policy under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain. International Journal of Production Research, 53(1), 106-126. Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220. Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220. Zhang, Y., & Li, C. (2006). A Principal-Agent Approach to Incentive Mechanisms in Supply Chains. IEEE, 358-363 Varian, H. R. (1992). Information. In Microeconomic Analysis (3rd ed., pp. 440–472). New York, NY: Norton Samuelson, W. F., & Marks, S. G. (2015). Managerial Economics (8th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts (2nd ed.). London: MIT Press. Macho-Stadler, I., & Pérez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Banarjee, R., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Ray, S. (2013). Applications of agency theory in B2B marketing: Review and future directions. In G. L. Lilien & R. Grewal (Eds.), ISBM Handbook of Business to Business Marketing (1st ed., pp. 41–53)
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identifier_str_mv	Bhattacharyya, K., & Guiffrida, A. L. (2015). An optimization framework for improving supplier delivery performance. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 39, 3771-3783. Cao, E., Ma, Y., Wan, C., & Lai, M. (2013). Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain. Operations Research Letters, 410-414. Cueto, D. (2013). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America. International Review of Economics and Finance, 25, 310 -325. Dai, Y., & Chao, X. (2016). Price delegation and sales force contract design with asymmetric risk aversion coefficient of sales agents. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 31-42. Ducassy, I., & Guyot, A. (2017). Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: The French context. Research in International Business and Finance, 39, 291-306. García Alcaraz, J. L., Alvarado Iniesta, A., & Maldonado Macías, A. A. (2013). Selección de proveedores basada en análisis dimensional. Contaduría y Administración, 58(3), 249- 278 Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 319-414 Liu, K., & Song, H. (2017). Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 270-283. Norouzi, N., & Amalnick, M. S. (2016). Modified particle swarm optimization in a timedependent vehicle routing problem: minimizing fuel consumption. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 121-134. Rai, V.-K., & Kim, D.-H. (2002). Principal–agent problem: a cognitive map approach. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 1, 174-192. Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of Agent: the Principal's Problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54 Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54. Skinner, W. (2000). Manufacturing - missing link in corporate strategy. Hardvard Business Review, 136-145 Su, Y., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2014). Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 1-7 Vafa Arani, H., Rabbani, M., & Rafiei, H. (2016). A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 42–56. Wang, G. W., & Pallis, A. A. (2014). Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements. Transportation Research Part E, 162-174. Wang, X., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2017). Supply chain contract mechanism under bilateral information asymmetry. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 356-368. Xiao-ning, G., & Jun, T. (2018). Multi-period incentive contract design in the agent emergency supplies reservation strategy with asymmetric information. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 94-102. Xu, W. Y., Zhang, Z. J., & Gong, D. Q. (2014). Cooperative Supply Chain Management under Asymmetric Information. School of Economics and Management, 12, 182-191. Yang, J., & Qi, X. (2009). On the design of coordinating contracts. Int. J. Production Economics, 122, 581-594 Yoo, S. H., Kim, D., & Park, M.-S. (2015). Pricing and return policy under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain. International Journal of Production Research, 53(1), 106-126. Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220. Zhang, Y., & Li, C. (2006). A Principal-Agent Approach to Incentive Mechanisms in Supply Chains. IEEE, 358-363 Varian, H. R. (1992). Information. In Microeconomic Analysis (3rd ed., pp. 440–472). New York, NY: Norton Samuelson, W. F., & Marks, S. G. (2015). Managerial Economics (8th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts (2nd ed.). London: MIT Press. Macho-Stadler, I., & Pérez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Banarjee, R., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Ray, S. (2013). Applications of agency theory in B2B marketing: Review and future directions. In G. L. Lilien & R. Grewal (Eds.), ISBM Handbook of Business to Business Marketing (1st ed., pp. 41–53) 271435 TE10099
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spelling	Martínez Avela, Mario ErnestoVega Mejía, Carlos AlbertoVega Mejía, Germán RicardoMagíster en Gerencia Estratégica2019-05-02T15:57:27Z2019-05-02T15:57:27Z2019-03-02Bhattacharyya, K., & Guiffrida, A. L. (2015). An optimization framework for improving supplier delivery performance. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 39, 3771-3783.Cao, E., Ma, Y., Wan, C., & Lai, M. (2013). Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain. Operations Research Letters, 410-414.Cueto, D. (2013). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America. International Review of Economics and Finance, 25, 310 -325.Dai, Y., & Chao, X. (2016). Price delegation and sales force contract design with asymmetric risk aversion coefficient of sales agents. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 31-42.Ducassy, I., & Guyot, A. (2017). Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: The French context. Research in International Business and Finance, 39, 291-306.García Alcaraz, J. L., Alvarado Iniesta, A., & Maldonado Macías, A. A. (2013). Selección de proveedores basada en análisis dimensional. Contaduría y Administración, 58(3), 249- 278Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 319-414Liu, K., & Song, H. (2017). Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 270-283.Norouzi, N., & Amalnick, M. S. (2016). Modified particle swarm optimization in a timedependent vehicle routing problem: minimizing fuel consumption. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 121-134.Rai, V.-K., & Kim, D.-H. (2002). Principal–agent problem: a cognitive map approach. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 1, 174-192.Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of Agent: the Principal's Problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139.Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54.Skinner, W. (2000). Manufacturing - missing link in corporate strategy. Hardvard Business Review, 136-145Su, Y., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2014). Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 1-7Vafa Arani, H., Rabbani, M., & Rafiei, H. (2016). A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 42–56.Wang, G. W., & Pallis, A. A. (2014). Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port concession agreements. Transportation Research Part E, 162-174.Wang, X., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2017). Supply chain contract mechanism under bilateral information asymmetry. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 356-368.Xiao-ning, G., & Jun, T. (2018). Multi-period incentive contract design in the agent emergency supplies reservation strategy with asymmetric information. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 94-102.Xu, W. Y., Zhang, Z. J., & Gong, D. Q. (2014). Cooperative Supply Chain Management under Asymmetric Information. School of Economics and Management, 12, 182-191.Yang, J., & Qi, X. (2009). On the design of coordinating contracts. Int. J. Production Economics, 122, 581-594Yoo, S. H., Kim, D., & Park, M.-S. (2015). Pricing and return policy under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain. International Journal of Production Research, 53(1), 106-126.Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220.Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220.Zhang, Y., & Li, C. (2006). A Principal-Agent Approach to Incentive Mechanisms in Supply Chains. IEEE, 358-363Varian, H. R. (1992). Information. In Microeconomic Analysis (3rd ed., pp. 440–472). New York, NY: NortonSamuelson, W. F., & Marks, S. G. (2015). Managerial Economics (8th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts (2nd ed.). London: MIT Press.Macho-Stadler, I., & Pérez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Banarjee, R., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Ray, S. (2013). Applications of agency theory in B2B marketing: Review and future directions. In G. L. Lilien & R. Grewal (Eds.), ISBM Handbook of Business to Business Marketing (1st ed., pp. 41–53)http://hdl.handle.net/10818/35459271435TE10099220 páginasEste trabajo estudia el problema de coordinación de las compras entre un productor y sus proveedores, dentro de la cadena de suministro para un productor que tiene a una gama diversa de productos. La relación entre el productor y sus proveedores se ve como un problema de Principal-Agente, en donde el productor es el principal y los proveedores los agentes. El problema se define bajo condiciones de información asimétrica, generando un problema de selección adversa en donde los proveedores poseen más información que el productor. Para resolver esta situación se diseñó un mecanismo de gobierno (contrato con incentivos) para alinear los intereses de las partes involucradas utilizando un modelo de optimización. La solución del modelo propuesto determina las condiciones del contrato con incentivos, en términos de la combinación entre la cantidad de materias primas que el productor solicita a sus proveedores y el precio esperado que está dispuesto a pagar el productor.application/pdfspaUniversidad de La SabanaMaestría en Gerencia EstratégicaEscuela Internacional de Ciencias Económicas y AdministrativasAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Universidad de La SabanaIntellectum Repositorio Universidad de La SabanaAdministración de la producciónLogística en los negociosCanales de comercializaciónProveedoresMaterias primasDiseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministromasterThesispublishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccORIGINALTESIS MAESTRIA GERMAN VEGA.pdfTESIS MAESTRIA GERMAN VEGA.pdfVer documento en PDFapplication/pdf5071000https://intellectum.unisabana.edu.co/bitstream/10818/35459/1/TESIS%20MAESTRIA%20GERMAN%20VEGA.pdf0eb8f620094a0d33e7177ae9f62bc9cbMD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805https://intellectum.unisabana.edu.co/bitstream/10818/35459/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-8498https://intellectum.unisabana.edu.co/bitstream/10818/35459/3/license.txtf52a2cfd4df262e08e9b300d62c85cabMD53Autorizacion.pdfAutorizacion.pdfCartaapplication/pdf599675https://intellectum.unisabana.edu.co/bitstream/10818/35459/4/Autorizacion.pdfefe53730b5928b0df99bb04d73464afeMD54TEXTTESIS MAESTRIA GERMAN VEGA.pdf.txtTESIS MAESTRIA GERMAN VEGA.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain243952https://intellectum.unisabana.edu.co/bitstream/10818/35459/5/TESIS%20MAESTRIA%20GERMAN%20VEGA.pdf.txt6511f0378b5ba1c0e8fc195384dd5c9fMD5510818/35459oai:intellectum.unisabana.edu.co:10818/354592019-09-27 02:22:58.023Intellectum Universidad de la Sabanacontactointellectum@unisabana.edu.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

Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro

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