Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental

Autores:
Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro
Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2022
Institución:
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
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RiUPTC: Repositorio Institucional UPTC
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https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/18630
https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496
Palabra clave:
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
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openAccess
License
Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez - 2022
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dc.title.es-ES.fl_str_mv Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
spellingShingle Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
title_short Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title_full Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title_fullStr Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title_full_unstemmed Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title_sort Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro
Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro
Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
topic Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
publishDate 2022
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02-22 00:00:00
2026-04-16T17:10:32Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02-22 00:00:00
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02-22
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.type.local.eng.fl_str_mv Journal article
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dc.type.content.none.fl_str_mv Text
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dc.relation.ispartofjournal.eng.fl_str_mv Apuntes del Cenes
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dc.relation.citationedition.eng.fl_str_mv Núm. 73 , Año 2022 : Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022)
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez - 2022
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spelling Palacio Garcia, Luis AlejandroDíaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider2022-02-22 00:00:002026-04-16T17:10:32Z2022-02-22 00:00:002022-02-220120-3053https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/1863010.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.134962256-5779https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496application/pdftext/htmltext/xmlUniversidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de ColombiaLuis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez - 2022http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociaciónteoría de la confrontaciónamenazaspoder de negociaciónresolución de conflictoscompromiso creíbleGame Theory and Bargaining TheoryMatching Theorythreatsbargaining powerconflict resolutioncredible commitmentComunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimentalArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1info:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Aumann, R. 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Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis. Experimental Economics, 1(3), 257-281. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009911411418 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009951108693Bornstein, G., Budescu, D., & Zamir, S. (1997). Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 384-406. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041003003Bosman, R., & Van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment. The Economic Journal, 112(476), 147-169. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j677Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Experimental Economics, 2(3), 227-238. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009962612354Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2003). Truth or Consequences: An Experiment. Management Science, 49(1), 116-130. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.116.12755Cabrales, A., Charness, G., & Villeval, M. C. (2011). 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