Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
- Autores:
-
Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro
Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2022
- Institución:
- Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- RiUPTC: Repositorio Institucional UPTC
- Idioma:
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/18630
- Acceso en línea:
- https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/18630
https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496
- Palabra clave:
- Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez - 2022
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Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| spellingShingle |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
| title_short |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title_full |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title_fullStr |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title_sort |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
| topic |
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
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2022-02-22 |
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Aumann, R. (1990). Nash-Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing. In J. Gabszewicz, J. F. Richard, & L. Wolsey (Eds.), Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimization (pp. 201-206). North-Holland. Baliga, S., & Sjöström, T. (2012). The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2897-2922. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.2897 Benard, S. (2013). Reputation Systems, Aggression, and Deterrence in Social Interaction. Social Science Research, 42(1), 230-245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.09.004 Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1985). Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study. American Economic Review, 75(5), 1178-1180. Blume, A., & Ortmann, A. (2007). The Effects of Costless Pre-Play Communication: Experimental Evidence from Games with Pareto-Ranked Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274-290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001 Bolton, G. (1998). Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis. Experimental Economics, 1(3), 257-281. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009911411418 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009951108693 Bornstein, G., Budescu, D., & Zamir, S. (1997). Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 384-406. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041003003 Bosman, R., & Van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment. The Economic Journal, 112(476), 147-169. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j677 Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Experimental Economics, 2(3), 227-238. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009962612354 Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2003). Truth or Consequences: An Experiment. Management Science, 49(1), 116-130. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.116.12755 Cabrales, A., Charness, G., & Villeval, M. C. (2011). 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Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk. Games and Economic Behavior, 39(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0892 Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004). Promises, Threats and Fairness. The Economic Journal, 114(495), 397-420. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.x Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2008). Anticipated Verbal Feedback Induces Altruistic Behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(2), 100-105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.001 Elster, J. (1996). Rationality and the Emotions. The Economic Journal, 106(438), 1386-1397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235530 Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 47-74. Embrey, M., Fréchette, G., & Lehrer, S. (2015). Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types. 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An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information. American Economic Review, 81(1), 253-278. Forsythe, R., Lundholm, R., & Rietz, T. (1999). Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence. The Review of Financial Studies, 12(3), 481-518. https://doi.org/10.1093/revfin/12.3.0481 Frank, R. (1988). Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions (p. 304). W. W. Norton & Company Inc. Frank, R. (1993). The Strategic Role of the Emotions: Reconciling Over-And Undersocialized Accounts of Behavior. Rationality and Society, 5(2), 160-184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463193005002003 Gintis, H., Smith, E., & Bowles, S. (2001). Costly Signaling and Cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 213(1), 103-119. https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 Glick, S., & Croson, R. (2001). Reputations in Negotiation. In S. J. Hoch, H. C. Kunreuther, & R. E. Gunther (Eds.), Wharton on Making Decisions (pp. 177-186). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Güth, W., Huck, S., & Rapoport, A. (1998). The Limitations of the Positional Order Effect: Can it Support Silent Threats and Non-Equilibrium Behavior? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(2), 313-325. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00057-7 Güth, W., Müller, W., & Spiegel, Y. (2006). Noisy Leadership: An Experimental Approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 57(1), 37-62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.004 Halevy, N., Weisel, O., & Bornstein, G. (2011). ''In-Group Love'' and ''Out-Group Hate'' in Repeated Interaction Between Groups. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(2), 188-195. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.726 Hirshleifer, J. (1987). On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises. In J. Dupré (Ed.), The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality (pp. 307-326). MIT Press. Hirshleifer, J. (2000). Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment. UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers 799. Hörtnagl, T., Kerschbamer, R., & Stracke, R. (2019). Competing for Market Shares: Does the Order of Moves Matter Even When It Shouldn't? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 346-365. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.005 Huck, S., & Müller, W. (2005). Burning Money and (Pseudo) First-Mover Advantages: An Experimental Study on Forward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 109-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.006 Klein, D., & O'Flaherty, B. (1993). A Game-Theoretic Rendering of Promises and Threats. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 21(3), 295-314. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90054-S Mago, S., Sheremeta, R., & Yates, A. (2013). Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic Versus Psychological Momentum. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 287-296. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.006 Myerson, R. (2009). 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Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game. American Sociological Review, 58(6), 787-800. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095951 Palacio, L., Cortés, A., & Muñoz-Herrera, M. (2015a). The Bargaining Power of Commitment: An Experiment of the Effects of Threats in the Sequential Hawk-Dove Game. Rationality and Society, 27(3), 283-308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463115592848 Palacio, L., Cortés, A., & Muñoz-Herrera, M. (2015b). The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication. Applied Mathematics, 11. https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/910614 Poulsen, A., & Roos, M. (2010). Do People Make Strategic Commitments? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance. Experimental Economics, 13(2), 206-225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9236-6 Poulsen, A., & Tan, J. (2007). Information Acquisition in the Ultimatum Game: An Experimental Study. Experimental Economics, 10(4), 391-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9143-z Rabin, M. (1990). Communication Between Rational Agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), 144-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-O Roth, A. E., Murnighan, J. K., & Schoumaker, F. (1988). The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence. The American Economic Review, 78(4), 806-823. Roth, A., Malouf, M., & Murnighan, J. (1981). Sociological Versus Strategic Variables in Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2(2), 153-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(81)90003-2 Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, 50(1), 97-109. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531 Salazar, B. (2007). Thomas Schelling: la paradoja de un economista errante. Revista de Economía Institucional, 9, 131-152. Schelling, T. (1956). An Essay on Bargaining. American Economic Review, 46(3), 281-306. Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict (p. 309). Harvard University Press. Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1), 25-55. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766400 Sheremeta, R. (2010). Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 731-747. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 Steinel, W., & Dreu, C. (2004). Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(3), 419-434. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.3.419 Valley, K., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M. (1998). 'A Matter of Trust': Effects of Communication on the Efficiency and Distribution of Outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(2), 211-238. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00054-1 Wilson, R., & Sell, J. (1997). "Liar, Liar...": Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Public Good Settings. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 695-717. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041005005 |
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Palacio Garcia, Luis AlejandroDíaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider2022-02-22 00:00:002026-04-16T17:10:32Z2022-02-22 00:00:002022-02-220120-3053https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/1863010.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.134962256-5779https://doi.org/10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496application/pdftext/htmltext/xmlUniversidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de ColombiaLuis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez - 2022http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociaciónteoría de la confrontaciónamenazaspoder de negociaciónresolución de conflictoscompromiso creíbleGame Theory and Bargaining TheoryMatching Theorythreatsbargaining powerconflict resolutioncredible commitmentComunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimentalArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1info:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTexthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Aumann, R. 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Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis. Experimental Economics, 1(3), 257-281. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009911411418 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009951108693Bornstein, G., Budescu, D., & Zamir, S. (1997). Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 384-406. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041003003Bosman, R., & Van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment. The Economic Journal, 112(476), 147-169. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j677Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Experimental Economics, 2(3), 227-238. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009962612354Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2003). Truth or Consequences: An Experiment. Management Science, 49(1), 116-130. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.116.12755Cabrales, A., Charness, G., & Villeval, M. C. (2011). 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Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 695-717. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200279704100500542731741Apuntes del Ceneshttps://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/download/13496/11456https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/download/13496/15257https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/download/13496/13355Núm. 73 , Año 2022 : Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022)PublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2661https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/bitstreams/33fd2813-a52e-4c9d-a5d4-b6be02b7508b/download7e5728dcaf5f9c4877e769a0732c1cdaMD51falseAnonymousREAD001/18630oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/186302026-10-30 06:53:40.491http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0metadata.onlyhttps://repositorio.uptc.edu.coRepositorio Institucional UPTCbdigital@metabiblioteca.com |
