Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797)
Kant’s strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics. Some of Kant’s statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming...
- Autores:
-
Allen Wood; Stanford University
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad del Norte
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Uninorte
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2824
- Acceso en línea:
- http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3671
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2824
- Palabra clave:
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) Kant y el derecho a mentir. Ensayo de revisión: sobre un supuesto derecho a mentir por filantropía, por Inmanuel Kant (1797) [Inglés] |
| title |
Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
| spellingShingle |
Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
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Kant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Allen Wood; Stanford University |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Allen Wood; Stanford University |
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Kant’s strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics. Some of Kant’s statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own principles. In this chapter, I will do a little of that, partly by questioning whether the famous example of the “murderer at the door” really fits the principles Kant applies to it. By and large, however, I will argue Kant’s views about veracity are reasonable or at least defensible, if not selfevident. This is mainly because I also think some of them –especially his position in the brief, late and famous (or notorious) essay On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy (1797)– have been badly misunderstood. My principal aim here will be to correct that misunderstanding. |
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2012 |
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2012-06-15 |
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2013-08-31T23:00:15Z |
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2013-08-31T23:00:15Z |
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article |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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publishedVersion |
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http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3671 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2824 |
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http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3671 http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2824 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
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eng |
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Eidos; No 15: Jul-Dec, 2011; 96-117 |
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
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application/pdf |
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Colombia |
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Universidad del Norte |
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Universidad del Norte |
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instname:Universidad del Norte reponame:Repositorio Digital de la Universidad del Norte |
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Repositorio Digital de la Universidad del Norte |
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mauribe@uninorte.edu.co |
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1808401296238051328 |
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Allen Wood; Stanford UniversityColombia2013-08-31T23:00:15Z2013-08-31T23:00:15Z2012-06-15http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3671http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2824Kant’s strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics. Some of Kant’s statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own principles. In this chapter, I will do a little of that, partly by questioning whether the famous example of the “murderer at the door” really fits the principles Kant applies to it. By and large, however, I will argue Kant’s views about veracity are reasonable or at least defensible, if not selfevident. This is mainly because I also think some of them –especially his position in the brief, late and famous (or notorious) essay On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy (1797)– have been badly misunderstood. My principal aim here will be to correct that misunderstanding. Los estrictos puntos de vista de Kant sobre la mentira han sido regularmente citados como una razón para pensar que hay algo fundamentalmente equivocado en la ética kantiana. Algunas de las afirmaciones de Kant parecen tan desmedidas que la mayoría de los kantianos que se han ocupado del tema han tratado de distanciarse de ellos, generalmente argumentando que no necesariamente siguen los principios de Kant. En este trabajo voy a hacer un poco de eso en parte, al cuestionar si el famoso ejemplo del “asesino en la puerta” “realmente se ajusta a los principios con los que Kant se refiere a éste. Discutiré si los argumentos de Kant sobre la veracidad son razonables o justificables al menos; si no lo es evidente por sí mismo. Esto es principalmente porque también creo que algunos de ellos, especialmente su posición en el tardío y, famoso ensayo sobre Un supuesto derecho a la mentira de la Filantropía (1797), ha sido mal interpretado. Mi principal objetivo aquí será el de corregir este malentendido.application/pdfengUniversidad del NorteEidos; No 15: Jul-Dec, 2011; 96-117Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:1. The Author retains copyright in the Work, where the term "Work" shall include all digital objects that may result in subsequent electronic publication or distribution.2. Upon acceptance of the Work, the author shall grant to the Publisher the right of first publication of the Work.The Author shall grant to the Publisher a nonexclusive perpetual right and license to publish, archive, and make accessible the Work in whole or in part in all forms of media now or hereafter known under a Creative Commons 3.0 License Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported CC BY-NC 3.0, or its equivalent, which, for the avoidance of doubt, allows others to copy, distribute, and transmit the Work under the following conditions: (a) Attribution: Other users must attribute the Work in the manner specified by the author as indicated on the journal Web site;(b) Noncommercial: Other users (including Publisher) may not use this Work for commercial purposes;4. The Author is able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the nonexclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the Work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), as long as there is provided in the document an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.5. Authors are permitted, and Eidos promotes, to post online the preprint manuscript of the Work in institutional repositories or on their Websites prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (see The Effect of Open Access). Any such posting made before acceptance and publication of the Work is expected be updated upon publication to include a reference to the Eidos's assigned URL to the Article and its final published version in Eidos.Los autores que publican en Eidos acuerdan los siguientes términos:1. 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Atribución-NoComercial 3.0 Unported CC BY-NC 3.0 o su equivalente que para efectos de eliminar toda duda, le permite a otros copiar, distribuir, y transmitir el Artículo bajo las siguientes condiciones: (a) Atribución: Se deben reconocer los créditos de la obra de la manera especificada por el Autor a Eidos, pero no de una manera que sugiera que tiene su apoyo o que apoyan el uso que hace de su obra. (b) No Comercial: No se puede utilizar el Artículo para fines comerciales.4. El Autor puede realizar otros acuerdos contractuales no comerciales para la distribución no exclusiva de la versión publicada del Artículo (v. gr. ponerlo en un repositorio institucional o publicarlo en un libro) con la condición de que haga el debido reconocimiento de su publicación original en Eidos.5. A los Autores se les permite y Eidos promueve publicar en línea (online) la versión pre-impresa del Artículo en repositorios institucionales o en sus páginas web, antes y durante la publicación, por cuanto que puede producir intercambios académicos productivos, así como una mayor citación del Artículo publicado (ver The Effect of Open Access). Dicha publicación durante el proceso de producción y en la publicación del Artículo se espera que se actualice al momento de salir la versión final, incluyendo una referencia a la URL de Eidos.http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Nortereponame:Repositorio Digital de la Universidad del NorteKant and the Right to Lie. Reviewed Essay: on a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797)Kant y el derecho a mentir. Ensayo de revisión: sobre un supuesto derecho a mentir por filantropía, por Inmanuel Kant (1797) [Inglés]articlepublishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_650110584/2824oai:172.16.14.36:10584/28242015-10-07 01:48:42.327Repositorio Digital de la Universidad del Nortemauribe@uninorte.edu.co |