Kant's Theory of Definition [Spanish]
In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition (it limits sentences of complete and precise definition to th...
- Autores:
-
Lewis White Beck; Universidad de Buenos Aires
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad del Norte
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Uninorte
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2887
- Acceso en línea:
- http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/4569
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2887
- Palabra clave:
- Filosofía Moderna
Filosofía, Epistemología, Criticismo, Teoría de la definición
Epistemología
filosofía, epistemología, criticismo, teoría de la definición
Epistemología
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
| Summary: | In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition (it limits sentences of complete and precise definition to this kind of judgments). However, for Kant –first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions–many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn’t believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge. |
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