Frankfurt-Counterexamples and the “W-Defense” [Spanish]

A criticism of Frankfurt-counterexamples presented by David Widerker and known as the W-defense has been resilient for years and has been considered one of the strongest challenges these counterexamples have to face. In this paper I intend to offer an explanation of one of the appeals on the W-Defense, mainly, that it allows us to pass over the intricate debate on whether a successful Frankfurt counterexample can be presented or not. I defend this debate, although interesting and fruitful, misses the main point Frankfurt counterexamples intend to make. Next I offer a defense of Frankfurt counterexamples from Widerker’s attack by presenting a dilemma for the Principle of Alternative Expectations, it’s main premise: either on the one hand, this principle rests on the Kantian maxim ought implies can, which makes the principle, and Widerker’s whole argument, redundant and unnecessary; or the principle does not rest on such maxim, but then there is no good reason to accept it a valid.

• Autores: Carlos G. Patarroyo G.; Universidad del Rosario
• Fecha de publicación: 2013
• Institución: Universidad del Norte
• Repositorio: Repositorio Uninorte
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2845
• Acceso en línea: http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/4612; http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2845
• Palabra clave: Filosofía; Filosofía práctica y moral
• License: http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2