Restrictions without refutations of physical theories. Some elements for the debate realism-instrumentalism. [Spanish]
The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory...
- Autores:
-
Andrés Rivadulla; Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2007
- Institución:
- Universidad del Norte
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Uninorte
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2773
- Acceso en línea:
- http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/1486
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2773
- Palabra clave:
- Extension and restriction of theory domains; realism; instrumetalism; philosophy of physics;
Extensión; revision; dominios; realismo; instrumentalismo; teoría de la física; Extension and restriction of theory domains; realism; instrumetalism; philosophy of physics
Extensión y revisión de dominios; realismo; instrumentalismo; teoría de la física;
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Summary: | The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory of physics. The existence of both extensions and restrictions of the application domain of theoretical models and the theoretical incompatibility between successive theories provide respectively with minor and major arguments for instrumentalism in physics |
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