Restrictions without refutations of physical theories. Some elements for the debate realism-instrumentalism. [Spanish]

The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory...

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Autores:
Andrés Rivadulla; Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2007
Institución:
Universidad del Norte
Repositorio:
Repositorio Uninorte
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2773
Acceso en línea:
http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/1486
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2773
Palabra clave:
Extension and restriction of theory domains; realism; instrumetalism; philosophy of physics;
Extensión; revision; dominios; realismo; instrumentalismo; teoría de la física; Extension and restriction of theory domains; realism; instrumetalism; philosophy of physics
Extensión y revisión de dominios; realismo; instrumentalismo; teoría de la física;
Rights
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Description
Summary:The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory of physics. The existence of both extensions and restrictions of the application domain of theoretical models and the theoretical incompatibility between successive theories provide respectively with minor and major arguments for instrumentalism in physics