Is compatible the idea of incommensurability with that of scientific progress? Some reasons in support of its compatibility. [Spanish]

The problem of incommensurability and, particulary, the one of the scientific progress, is associated two names: Kuhn and Feyerabend, whose proposals caused than many put in doubt the apparent evidence of the call scientific progress, relativizing its validity to each school or paradigm. In this wri...

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Autores:
Juan Manuel Jaramillo Uribe; Universidad del Valle. Universidad de Caldas
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2006
Institución:
Universidad del Norte
Repositorio:
Repositorio Uninorte
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2778
Acceso en línea:
http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/1495
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2778
Palabra clave:
Incommensurability; scientific progress; relation of approach; statment view; non-statement view;
Inconmensurabilidad; progreso científico; reducción aproximativa; concepción enunciativista; concepción no-enunciativista;
Rights
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Description
Summary:The problem of incommensurability and, particulary, the one of the scientific progress, is associated two names: Kuhn and Feyerabend, whose proposals caused than many put in doubt the apparent evidence of the call scientific progress, relativizing its validity to each school or paradigm. In this writing we will show that this type of epistemic relativism —just as convergentist theory of the truth— they lack of philosophical validity and historical and how the idea of scientific progress is compatible with the thesis of the incommensurability beyond the ontosemantics difficulties that it implies. This suppose to leave the the call statement view of the scientific theories and adopt a non-statement view where the intertheoretical relation of approach allows to subsink different non trivial incommensurability and to validate in them the notion of scientific progress.