The Mind-Body Problem and the Intertwining [Spanish]
We can make very sensitive machines and may arrange for them to distinguish themselves from other objects. The programs that are designed toward specific goals, such as the identification of external objects, can also be imagined as action programs relating to the manipulation of these objects. Thes...
- Autores:
-
James Mensch; Saint Francis Xavier University
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad del Norte
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Uninorte
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2823
- Acceso en línea:
- http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3670
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2823
- Palabra clave:
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
| Summary: | We can make very sensitive machines and may arrange for them to distinguish themselves from other objects. The programs that are designed toward specific goals, such as the identification of external objects, can also be imagined as action programs relating to the manipulation of these objects. These programs can be designed to retain data in order of receipt, picking patterns and anticipated appearance of perspective based on the success of their past performances. In this way, could be designed to allow the machine to identify their own “here” and “now”, but would It has a self a machine capable of doing this? If so, where would it be? The purpose of this article is to address philosophical questions, revising extensively the question of the self in artificial intelligence. |
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