What can we do? A philosophical analysis of individual self-determination
The principle of self-determination, as commonly established, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community and particularly with the necessity to promote integration between subjects and a relatively stable...
- Autores:
-
Fabio Macioce; Lumsa University - Rome
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad del Norte
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Uninorte
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:manglar.uninorte.edu.co:10584/2820
- Acceso en línea:
- http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/3340
http://hdl.handle.net/10584/2820
- Palabra clave:
- Philosophy of Law; Politics;
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
| Summary: | The principle of self-determination, as commonly established, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community and particularly with the necessity to promote integration between subjects and a relatively stable social order. I propose a different perspective, the one that not only takes into account individuals but also relationships. In particular, what I propose is: 1) that any community is aware of a specific social order, which consists of a set of practices, 2) that these practices express specific values, 3) that these values are the result of historical and cultural circumstances, 4) that they are subject to a permanent public debate, and finally 5) that the individual praxis can lead to recognition of rights only if it is consistent with these values. In this perspective there is no general liberty for self-determination of the subject outside specific relationships. It only could be stated that one has a practical liberty (not a right) to do and behave as one wants, but one’s rights depend on the relationships in which the person is engaged. |
|---|