El valor de la ley positiva

The article is a reassertion of the intrinsical worth of the most of rules of positive law, issued in an environment of generalized transgression and in opposition to the views which on account of emphasize the value of judge sentences or principles as sources of law, depress the civil laws authorit...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2004
Institución:
Universidad de Medellín
Repositorio:
Repositorio UDEM
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.udem.edu.co:11407/1705
Acceso en línea:
http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326
http://hdl.handle.net/11407/1705
Palabra clave:
Obediencia de la ley
razonabilidad
funciones del Derecho
ley injusta
Rights
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
id REPOUDEM2_96853092a721581e046c155b5134a04f
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.udem.edu.co:11407/1705
network_acronym_str REPOUDEM2
network_name_str Repositorio UDEM
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv El valor de la ley positiva
title El valor de la ley positiva
spellingShingle El valor de la ley positiva
Obediencia de la ley
razonabilidad
funciones del Derecho
ley injusta
title_short El valor de la ley positiva
title_full El valor de la ley positiva
title_fullStr El valor de la ley positiva
title_full_unstemmed El valor de la ley positiva
title_sort El valor de la ley positiva
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Obediencia de la ley
razonabilidad
funciones del Derecho
ley injusta
topic Obediencia de la ley
razonabilidad
funciones del Derecho
ley injusta
description The article is a reassertion of the intrinsical worth of the most of rules of positive law, issued in an environment of generalized transgression and in opposition to the views which on account of emphasize the value of judge sentences or principles as sources of law, depress the civil laws authority. The classical conception of the rule of law, which not only conceives it as a way for refrain the men, but also affirms its pedagogical function in order to the right behavior and conducive to common good actions is remembered. Respective Aquinas, Holmes, Hart, Raz and Finnis theories about the point are compared. The author deals with the reasonableness in the rules of law contents: There are unreasonable and unjust precepts, and there is a wise and fixed courts of justice doctrine that declares them “inconstitutional” and inapplicable, because of the violation of the “reasonableness principle”; however most of the rules of law are reasonable. Then the author points out two doctrinal causes of the theorical unworthness of the rules of law and its nowadays practical contempt: the idea of the separation between morals and law, and the doctrine that assumes the individual freedom as the greatest human good (as W Goldschmidt taught, among others). Finally, the author dissaproves, under the title “Theories that favourish the judicial disobedience of civil laws”: a) an erroneus thought which in the name of natural law an equity exaggerates the scope of the admissible judge discretion; b) the “judicialist” juridical positivism (Holmes, Ross, Kelsen), which has been the prevailing mode of positivism in the 20th century; c) the abuses of “systemical” interpretation and “constitutionalization” of law, which seek to legitimate the disregarding of the law rules, through pseudo-constitutional interpretations of it; d) the application of false principles instead of the legal precepts.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2004-06-30
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2016-01-27T22:17:20Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2016-01-27T22:17:20Z
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1692-2530
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326
http://hdl.handle.net/11407/1705
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 2248-4078
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellín
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad de Medellín
identifier_str_mv 1692-2530
2248-4078
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellín
instname:Universidad de Medellín
url http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326
http://hdl.handle.net/11407/1705
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.spa.fl_str_mv http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326/1316
http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326/1328
dc.relation.ispartofseries.spa.fl_str_mv Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2004)
dc.relation.haspart.spa.fl_str_mv Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 - enero/junio 2004
dc.relation.citationvolume.spa.fl_str_mv 3
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv 5
dc.relation.citationstartpage.spa.fl_str_mv 87
dc.relation.citationendpage.spa.fl_str_mv 102
dc.relation.ispartofes.spa.fl_str_mv Opinión Jurídica
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv p.87-102
dc.format.medium.spa.fl_str_mv Electrónico
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
text/html
PDF
dc.coverage.spa.fl_str_mv Lat: 06 15 00 N  degrees minutes  Lat: 6.2500  decimal degreesLong: 075 36 00 W  degrees minutes  Long: -75.6000  decimal degrees
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad de Medellín
dc.publisher.faculty.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Derecho
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2004)
2248-4078
1692-2530
institution Universidad de Medellín
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/3/Opinion_Juridica_244.pdf.jpg
http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/1/Articulo.html
http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/2/Opinion_Juridica_244.pdf
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv ff19abacc6971b2b89fd386ee1ba6540
4ad3591e189bd00b32535450947ed1f5
fcb5f4b218aa9cacfac0f41c2e3efb20
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellin
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@udem.edu.co
_version_ 1808481168264265728
spelling 2016-01-27T22:17:20Z2016-01-27T22:17:20Z2004-06-301692-2530http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326http://hdl.handle.net/11407/17052248-4078reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellíninstname:Universidad de MedellínThe article is a reassertion of the intrinsical worth of the most of rules of positive law, issued in an environment of generalized transgression and in opposition to the views which on account of emphasize the value of judge sentences or principles as sources of law, depress the civil laws authority. The classical conception of the rule of law, which not only conceives it as a way for refrain the men, but also affirms its pedagogical function in order to the right behavior and conducive to common good actions is remembered. Respective Aquinas, Holmes, Hart, Raz and Finnis theories about the point are compared. The author deals with the reasonableness in the rules of law contents: There are unreasonable and unjust precepts, and there is a wise and fixed courts of justice doctrine that declares them “inconstitutional” and inapplicable, because of the violation of the “reasonableness principle”; however most of the rules of law are reasonable. Then the author points out two doctrinal causes of the theorical unworthness of the rules of law and its nowadays practical contempt: the idea of the separation between morals and law, and the doctrine that assumes the individual freedom as the greatest human good (as W Goldschmidt taught, among others). Finally, the author dissaproves, under the title “Theories that favourish the judicial disobedience of civil laws”: a) an erroneus thought which in the name of natural law an equity exaggerates the scope of the admissible judge discretion; b) the “judicialist” juridical positivism (Holmes, Ross, Kelsen), which has been the prevailing mode of positivism in the 20th century; c) the abuses of “systemical” interpretation and “constitutionalization” of law, which seek to legitimate the disregarding of the law rules, through pseudo-constitutional interpretations of it; d) the application of false principles instead of the legal precepts.El artículo es una reafirmación del valor intrínseco del contenido de las reglas de la ley positiva en general, elaborado en un ambiente de transgresión generalizada, y frente a concepciones que al acentuar la primacía de la jurisprudencia o de los principios jurídicos como fuentes del Derecho, deprimen la autoridad de las leyes civiles. Se recuerda la concepción clásica que no reduce la ley a su papel represor, sino que también reconoce su función pedagógica de la conducta correcta y de lo conducente al bien común. Se comparan las doctrinas de Tomás de Aquino, Holmes, Hart, Raz y Finnis al respecto. El autor trata de la razonabilidad del contenido de las leyes: Existen preceptos irrazonables e injustos, y hay doctrina tribunalicia acertada y arraigada que las declara “inconstitucionales” e inaplicables por violar el “principio de razonabilidad”; pero la mayoría de las leyes son razonables. Señala luego dos causas doctrinarias de la desvalorización de las leyes y su desprecio práctico en nuestro tiempo: la idea de la separación entre lo moral y lo jurídico, y la doctrina que concibe la libertad individual como el bien máximo del hombre (como enseñara, entre otros, W Goldschmidt). Finalmente, bajo el título “Doctrinas favorables a la desobediencia judicial de las leyes civiles”, el autor desaprueba: a) el iusnaturalismo mal entendido que bajo el nombre de equidad exagera el alcance de la discreción del juez; b) el positivismo jurídico “judicialista” (Holmes, Ross, Kelsen), que ha sido la modalidad de positivismo jurídico predominante en el s. XX; c) el abuso de la interpretación “sistémica” y de la “constitucionalización” del derecho, que ocurre cuando mediante falsas interpretaciones “constitucionales” se pretende legitimar la inobservancia de la ley; y d) la aplicación de falsos principios en sustitución de los preceptos legales.p.87-102Electrónicoapplication/pdftext/htmlPDFspaUniversidad de MedellínFacultad de Derechohttp://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326/1316http://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/opinion/article/view/1326/1328Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2004)Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 - enero/junio 20043587102Opinión Jurídicahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Opinión Jurídica; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2004)2248-40781692-2530Obediencia de la leyrazonabilidadfunciones del Derecholey injustaEl valor de la ley positivaComunidad Universidad de MedellínLat: 06 15 00 N  degrees minutes  Lat: 6.2500  decimal degreesLong: 075 36 00 W  degrees minutes  Long: -75.6000  decimal degreesMedellíninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Tale, CamiloTHUMBNAILOpinion_Juridica_244.pdf.jpgOpinion_Juridica_244.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg8099http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/3/Opinion_Juridica_244.pdf.jpgff19abacc6971b2b89fd386ee1ba6540MD53ORIGINALArticulo.htmltext/html489http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/1/Articulo.html4ad3591e189bd00b32535450947ed1f5MD51Opinion_Juridica_244.pdfOpinion_Juridica_244.pdfapplication/pdf173489http://repository.udem.edu.co/bitstream/11407/1705/2/Opinion_Juridica_244.pdffcb5f4b218aa9cacfac0f41c2e3efb20MD5211407/1705oai:repository.udem.edu.co:11407/17052020-05-27 17:32:51.449Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellinrepositorio@udem.edu.co