Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution)
La explicación de la verdad que Wilfrid Sellars ofrece en su artículo "Verdad y 'correspondencia'", nos presenta una aparente tensión interna entre dos aspectos supuestamente incompatibles con sus puntos de vista sobre la verdad. Para resolver plenamente esta...
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- Universidad de Caldas
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- Palabra clave:
- Deflacionismo
ficcionalismo
pretensión
atribución del significado
habla proposicional
habla sobre la verdad
deflationism
fictionalism
meaning attribution
pretense
proposition-talk
truth-talk
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- Discusiones Filosóficas - 2012
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) Sellars y la pretensión en “verdad y ‘correspondencia’” (con un desvío a través de la atribución del significado) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) Deflacionismo ficcionalismo pretensión atribución del significado habla proposicional habla sobre la verdad deflationism fictionalism meaning attribution pretense proposition-talk truth-talk - |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution) |
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Deflacionismo ficcionalismo pretensión atribución del significado habla proposicional habla sobre la verdad deflationism fictionalism meaning attribution pretense proposition-talk truth-talk - |
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Deflacionismo ficcionalismo pretensión atribución del significado habla proposicional habla sobre la verdad deflationism fictionalism meaning attribution pretense proposition-talk truth-talk - |
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La explicación de la verdad que Wilfrid Sellars ofrece en su artículo "Verdad y 'correspondencia'", nos presenta una aparente tensión interna entre dos aspectos supuestamente incompatibles con sus puntos de vista sobre la verdad. Para resolver plenamente esta tensión, es necesario tener en cuenta una explicación de la atribución de significado. Creemos que la explicación que Sellars ofrece, sobre todo en "El significado como clasificación funcional", incluye los elementos básicos necesarios para resolver la tensión interna en su explicación de la verdad, sin embargo, sus puntos de vista sufren de una aparente tensión externa, con respecto a un supuesto conflicto entre su explicación y nuestras prácticas lingüísticas e inferenciales con la expresión 'significa'.  En este artículo, mostramos cómo la tensión interna en la comprensión de Sellars de la verdad, así como la tensión externa en su explicación de la atribución de significado se puede resolver sin perder de vista el espíritu sellarsiano, apelando a las particulares explicaciones ficcionalistas de habla sobre la verdad y habla proposicional (incluida la atribución de significado) que hemos desarrollado en otro lugar. |
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2012 |
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2012-07-01T00:00:00Z 2012-07-01T00:00:00Z 2012-07-01 |
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eng |
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63 21 33 13 Discusiones Filosóficas Armour-Garb, B. “Deflationism (about theories of truth)”. Philosophical Compass. Apr. 2012: 267-277. Print. Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge. “Why deflationists should be pretense theorists (and perhaps already are)”. Pedersen, N. and C. Wright (eds.). New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print. ---. “The story about propositions”. Noûs. Dec. 2012: 635-674. Print. ---. “From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming. ---. Pretense and pathology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Forthcoming. Crimmins, M. “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, pretense, and reference”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 1998: 1-48. Print. Devitt, M. “The metaphysics of truth”. M. Lynch (ed.). The nature of truth. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 579-611. Print. Egan, A. “Pretense for the complete idiom”. Noûs. Sep. 2008: 381-409. Print. Evans, G. “Existential statements”. J. McDowell (ed.). Varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 343-369. Print. Field, H. “Critical notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth”. Philosophy of Science. Jun. 1992: 321-330. Print. ---. “Deflationist views of meaning and content”. Mind. Jul. 1994: 249-285. Print. Glymour, Clark. “Conceptual scheming or confessions of a metaphysical realist”. Synthese. May. 1982: 169-180. Print. Horwich, P. Truth. First edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Print. ---. Truth. Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Print. Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Print. Kroon, F. “Characterizing non-existents”. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Jan. 1996: 163-193. Print. ---. “Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity”. Philosophical Studies. Dec. 2001: 197-225. Print. ---. “Descriptivism, pretense, and the Frege-Russell problems”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 2004: 1-30. Print. ---. “Existence in the theory of definite descriptions”. Journal of Philosophy. Jul. 2009: 365-389. Print. Leeds, S. “Truth, correspondence, and success”. Philosophical Studies. Jul. 1995: 1-36. Print. Lewis, D. “Putnam’s paradox”. Australian Journal of Philosophy. Oct. 1984: 221-236. Print. O’Shea, J. Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a normative turn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Print. Putnam, H. Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Print. ---. “Models and reality”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Sep. 1980: 464-482. Print. Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Print. Richard, M. “Semantic pretense”. Everett, A. and T. Hofweber (eds.). Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000. Print. Schiffer, S. “Language-created, language-independent entities”. Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1996: 149-167. Print. ---. “Pleonastic fregeanism”. A. Kanamori (ed.). Analytical Philosophy and Logic: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6. Ohio: Bowling Green Documentation Center, 2000. 1-15. Print. Sellars, W. “Truth and ‘Correspondence’”. Journal of Philosophy. Jan. 1962: 29-56. Reprinted in Sellars (1963). 197-224. Print. ---. Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Print. ---. “Language as thought and as communication”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 1969: 506-527. Print. ---. “Meaning as functional classification”. Synthese. Jul. 1974: 417-437. Print. ---. Naturalism and ontology. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1979. Print. Stanley, J. “Hermeneutic fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy Figurative Language. Dec. 2002: 36-71. Print. Tarski, A. “The semantic conception of truth”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1944: 341-376. Print. van Fraassen, B. “Putnam’s paradox: Metaphysical realism revamped and evaded”. Noûs. Jun. 1997: 17-42. Print. Walton, K. Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print. Williams, M. “Do We (Epistemologists) need a theory of truth?” Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1986: 223-242. Print. Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. Print. ---. Philosophical investigations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Print. Woodbridge, J. “Truth as a pretense”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. ---. “Propositions as semantic pretense”. Language & Communication. Jul. 2006: 343-355. Print. Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. “Linguistic puzzles and semantic pretense”. S. Sawyer (ed.). New waves in Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print. Yablo, S. “How in the world?” Philosophical Topics. Apr. 1996: 255-286. Print. ---. “Go figure: A path through fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXV: Figurative Language. Dec. 2001: 72-102. Print. ---. “The myth of the seven”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. Núm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembre https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/671/594 |
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Sellars and pretense on “truth & ‘correspondence’“ (with a detour through meaning attribution)Sellars y la pretensión en “verdad y ‘correspondencia’” (con un desvío a través de la atribución del significado)Deflacionismoficcionalismopretensiónatribución del significadohabla proposicionalhabla sobre la verdaddeflationismfictionalismmeaning attributionpretenseproposition-talktruth-talk-La explicación de la verdad que Wilfrid Sellars ofrece en su artículo "Verdad y 'correspondencia'", nos presenta una aparente tensión interna entre dos aspectos supuestamente incompatibles con sus puntos de vista sobre la verdad. Para resolver plenamente esta tensión, es necesario tener en cuenta una explicación de la atribución de significado. Creemos que la explicación que Sellars ofrece, sobre todo en "El significado como clasificación funcional", incluye los elementos básicos necesarios para resolver la tensión interna en su explicación de la verdad, sin embargo, sus puntos de vista sufren de una aparente tensión externa, con respecto a un supuesto conflicto entre su explicación y nuestras prácticas lingüísticas e inferenciales con la expresión 'significa'.  En este artículo, mostramos cómo la tensión interna en la comprensión de Sellars de la verdad, así como la tensión externa en su explicación de la atribución de significado se puede resolver sin perder de vista el espíritu sellarsiano, apelando a las particulares explicaciones ficcionalistas de habla sobre la verdad y habla proposicional (incluida la atribución de significado) que hemos desarrollado en otro lugar.The account of truth that Wilfrid Sellars offers in his paper, "Truth and 'Correspondence'", presents us with an apparent internal tension between two seemingly incompatible aspects of his views on truth. To fully resolve this tension, it is necessary to factor in an account of meaning attribution. We think that the account Sellars offers, most centrally in "Meaning as Functional Classification", includes the basic elements required for resolving the internal tension in his account of truth, but here his views suffer from an apparent external tension, regarding an apparent conflict between his account and our actual linguistic and inferential practices with the expression 'means'.  In this paper, we show how the internal tension in Sellars's understanding of truth, as well as the external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk (including meaning-attribution) that we have developed elsewhere.Universidad de Caldas2012-07-01T00:00:00Z2012-07-01T00:00:00Z2012-07-01Artículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1application/pdf0124-61272462-9596https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/671https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/671eng63213313Discusiones FilosóficasArmour-Garb, B. “Deflationism (about theories of truth)”. Philosophical Compass. Apr. 2012: 267-277. Print.Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge. “Why deflationists should be pretense theorists (and perhaps already are)”. Pedersen, N. and C. Wright (eds.). New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print.---. “The story about propositions”. Noûs. Dec. 2012: 635-674. Print.---. “From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming.---. Pretense and pathology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Forthcoming.Crimmins, M. “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, pretense, and reference”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 1998: 1-48. Print.Devitt, M. “The metaphysics of truth”. M. Lynch (ed.). The nature of truth. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 579-611. Print.Egan, A. “Pretense for the complete idiom”. Noûs. Sep. 2008: 381-409. Print.Evans, G. “Existential statements”. J. McDowell (ed.). Varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 343-369. Print.Field, H. “Critical notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth”. Philosophy of Science. Jun. 1992: 321-330. Print.---. “Deflationist views of meaning and content”. Mind. Jul. 1994: 249-285. Print.Glymour, Clark. “Conceptual scheming or confessions of a metaphysical realist”. Synthese. May. 1982: 169-180. Print.Horwich, P. Truth. First edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Print.---. Truth. Second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Print.Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Print.Kroon, F. “Characterizing non-existents”. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Jan. 1996: 163-193. Print.---. “Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity”. Philosophical Studies. Dec. 2001: 197-225. Print.---. “Descriptivism, pretense, and the Frege-Russell problems”. Philosophical Review. Jan. 2004: 1-30. Print.---. “Existence in the theory of definite descriptions”. Journal of Philosophy. Jul. 2009: 365-389. Print.Leeds, S. “Truth, correspondence, and success”. Philosophical Studies. Jul. 1995: 1-36. Print.Lewis, D. “Putnam’s paradox”. Australian Journal of Philosophy. Oct. 1984: 221-236. Print.O’Shea, J. Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a normative turn. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Print.Putnam, H. Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. Print.---. “Models and reality”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Sep. 1980: 464-482. Print.Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Print.Richard, M. “Semantic pretense”. Everett, A. and T. Hofweber (eds.). Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000. Print.Schiffer, S. “Language-created, language-independent entities”. Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1996: 149-167. Print.---. “Pleonastic fregeanism”. A. Kanamori (ed.). Analytical Philosophy and Logic: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6. Ohio: Bowling Green Documentation Center, 2000. 1-15. Print.Sellars, W. “Truth and ‘Correspondence’”. Journal of Philosophy. Jan. 1962: 29-56. Reprinted in Sellars (1963). 197-224. Print.---. Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Print.---. “Language as thought and as communication”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 1969: 506-527. Print.---. “Meaning as functional classification”. Synthese. Jul. 1974: 417-437. Print.---. Naturalism and ontology. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1979. Print.Stanley, J. “Hermeneutic fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy Figurative Language. Dec. 2002: 36-71. Print.Tarski, A. “The semantic conception of truth”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1944: 341-376. Print.van Fraassen, B. “Putnam’s paradox: Metaphysical realism revamped and evaded”. Noûs. Jun. 1997: 17-42. Print.Walton, K. Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print.Williams, M. “Do We (Epistemologists) need a theory of truth?” Philosophical Topics. Jan. 1986: 223-242. Print.Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. Print.---. Philosophical investigations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Print.Woodbridge, J. “Truth as a pretense”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.---. “Propositions as semantic pretense”. Language & Communication. Jul. 2006: 343-355. Print.Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. “Linguistic puzzles and semantic pretense”. S. Sawyer (ed.). New waves in Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.Yablo, S. “How in the world?” Philosophical Topics. Apr. 1996: 255-286. Print.---. “Go figure: A path through fictionalism”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXV: Figurative Language. Dec. 2001: 72-102. Print.---. “The myth of the seven”. M. Kalderon (ed.). Fictionalism in metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.Núm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembrehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/671/594Discusiones Filosóficas - 2012https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Armour Garb, BradleyWoodbridge, James A.oai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/149842025-10-08T21:20:13Z |