¿Es conveniente una autoridad monetaria “blanda”?

Within the framework of the so-called “inflation targeting” strategy there is a discussion about the convenience for a society as to the degree of “hardness” of a monetary authority looking to defend its inflation target, and the credibility that this authority enjoys between the private agents about it. In this paper we use a neo-Keynesian stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with both rational and adaptive expectations to answer this question. Our results suggest that the social problem that can be derived from a “soft” authority is that it risks losing credibility in its effort to reach a certain inflation target. In addition, we present and use a solution of the rational expectations version of the model simple enough to allow its simulations to be performed using a spreadsheet.

• Autores: Posada, Carlos E.; Villca, Alfredo
• Fecha de publicación: 2017
• Institución: Universidad EAFIT
• Repositorio: Repositorio EAFIT
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/11590
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/10784/11590
• Palabra clave: Inflation; inflation goal; monetary authority; general dynamic and static equilibrium; Taylor's rule; credibility; Inflación; meta de inflación; autoridad monetaria; equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico; regla de Taylor; credibilidad
• License: Acceso abierto