Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach

We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a deci...

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Autores:
Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge Andrés
Sepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra María
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2016
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/11278
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/11278
Palabra clave:
G31
G32
G33
Debt maturity
agency costs
ownership structure
manager reputation
monitoring
Vencimiento de la deuda
costos de agencia
estructura de propiedad
discreción gerencial
monitoreo
Rights
License
Copyright (c) 2016 Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo
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network_acronym_str REPOEAFIT2
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dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv ¿Afecta la discreción de la gerencia al vencimiento de la deuda en las firmas chilenas? Un enfoque al costo de las agencias y a la información asimétrica
title Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
spellingShingle Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
G31
G32
G33
Debt maturity
agency costs
ownership structure
manager reputation
monitoring
Vencimiento de la deuda
costos de agencia
estructura de propiedad
discreción gerencial
monitoreo
title_short Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
title_full Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
title_fullStr Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
title_full_unstemmed Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
title_sort Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge Andrés
Sepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra María
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge Andrés
Sepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra María
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv G31
G32
G33
topic G31
G32
G33
Debt maturity
agency costs
ownership structure
manager reputation
monitoring
Vencimiento de la deuda
costos de agencia
estructura de propiedad
discreción gerencial
monitoreo
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv Debt maturity
agency costs
ownership structure
manager reputation
monitoring
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Vencimiento de la deuda
costos de agencia
estructura de propiedad
discreción gerencial
monitoreo
description We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth opportunities, managerial discretion does not affect debt maturity, while external monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to agency costs and membership in a holding company. These findings are consistent with international studies.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2016-12-02
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2017-04-03T13:37:21Z
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2017-04-03T13:37:21Z
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-12-02
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
article
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dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 2462-8107
1657-4206
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10784/11278
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.17230/ecos.2016.43.4
identifier_str_mv 2462-8107
1657-4206
10.17230/ecos.2016.43.4
url http://hdl.handle.net/10784/11278
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.isversionof.none.fl_str_mv http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/ecos-economia/article/view/3993
dc.relation.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/ecos-economia/article/view/3993
dc.rights.eng.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo
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dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Acceso abierto
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo
Acceso abierto
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.eng.fl_str_mv Universidad EAFIT
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad EAFIT
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
dc.source.eng.fl_str_mv Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics; Vol 20, No 43 (2016)
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics; Vol 20, No 43 (2016)
instname_str Universidad EAFIT
institution Universidad EAFIT
reponame_str Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
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spelling 2016-12-022017-04-03T13:37:21Z2016-12-022017-04-03T13:37:21Z2462-81071657-4206http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1127810.17230/ecos.2016.43.4We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth opportunities, managerial discretion does not affect debt maturity, while external monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to agency costs and membership in a holding company. These findings are consistent with international studies.Abordamos los determinantes de la madurez de la deuda de las empresas chilenas utilizando datos, cuya información se extrajo de la Encuesta Longitudinal de Empresas (ELE). Los resultados de las regresiones agrupadas de Tobit indican que para las empresas con altas oportunidades de crecimiento, la discreciona- lidad gerencial estimulará plazos de deuda más largos, decisión que contribuye a reducir el riesgo de liquidez. Para las empresas con bajas oportunidades de crecimiento, la discrecionalidad gerencial no afecta la madurez de la deuda, mientras que la supervisión externa la reduce. Estos resultados proporcionan nueva evidencia para la literatura internacional. Otras conclusiones sugieren que el vencimiento de la deuda está relacionado positivamente con el tamaño de la empresa, la estructura de capital y la tangibilidad de los activos; y está relacionado negati- vamente con los costos de la agencia y la membresía en una compañía de cartera. Estos hallazgos son consistentes con estudios internacionales.application/pdfengUniversidad EAFIThttp://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/ecos-economia/article/view/3993http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/ecos-economia/article/view/3993Copyright (c) 2016 Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda YelpoAcceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad EAFITreponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITEcos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics; Vol 20, No 43 (2016)Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics; Vol 20, No 43 (2016)G31G32G33Debt maturityagency costsownership structuremanager reputationmonitoringVencimiento de la deudacostos de agenciaestructura de propiedaddiscreción gerencialmonitoreoDoes managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach¿Afecta la discreción de la gerencia al vencimiento de la deuda en las firmas chilenas? Un enfoque al costo de las agencias y a la información asimétricainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionarticlepublishedVersionArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge AndrésSepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra MaríaEcos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics20436587ecos.econ.THUMBNAILminaitura-ecos_Mesa de trabajo 1.jpgminaitura-ecos_Mesa de trabajo 1.jpgimage/jpeg251248https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/b74b7fa0-5b27-48cf-a2c4-a5e27952882e/download9b15d674b076c1793a0bc25cebb1bcefMD51ORIGINALdocument (67).pdfdocument (67).pdfTexto completo PDFapplication/pdf345162https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/5b21fa77-3c80-4a8f-bb23-c4f1f6627302/downloadccd6bc76bc369f90ed4f92b617fd6a35MD52articulo.htmlarticulo.htmlTexto completo HTMLtext/html377https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/bf9ae22a-9fdd-4c27-a1fd-73b1ea055b9f/download74da02743bfd0c9fd960aaab966b4575MD5310784/11278oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/112782020-03-18 12:01:47.119open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co

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