Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach

We address debt maturity determinants for Chilean firms using data whose information was drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of Companies (ELE). Results from pooled Tobit regressions indicate that for firms with high growth opportunities, managerial discretion will encourage longer debt terms, a decision that contributes to reducing liquidity risk. For firms with low growth opportunities, managerial discretion does not affect debt maturity, while external monitoring reduces it. These results provide new evidence for international literature. Other conclusions suggest that debt maturity is positively related to firm size, capital structure, and asset tangibility and negatively related to agency costs and membership in a holding company. These findings are consistent with international studies.

• Autores: Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge Andrés; Sepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra María
• Fecha de publicación: 2016
• Institución: Universidad EAFIT
• Repositorio: Repositorio EAFIT
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/11278
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/10784/11278
• Palabra clave: G31; G32; G33; Debt maturity; agency costs; ownership structure; manager reputation; monitoring; Vencimiento de la deuda; costos de agencia; estructura de propiedad; discreción gerencial; monitoreo
• License: Copyright (c) 2016 Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo