The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime

During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a criminal procedural revolution (LACPR) when approximately 70% of its countries abandoned their inquisitorial system and adopted the U.S. adversarial model. Following the LACPR, the region experienced a dramatic increase in crime, consolidating it as one...

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Autores:
Zorro Medina, Angela
Acosta, Camilo
Mejía, Daniel
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/17722
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/17722
Palabra clave:
criminal procedural revolution
plea bargaining
certainty
severity
celerity
Rights
License
Acceso abierto
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spelling Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees2020-09-10T16:32:58Z2020-09-102020-09-10T16:32:58Zhttp://hdl.handle.net/10784/17722K14K40K42During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a criminal procedural revolution (LACPR) when approximately 70% of its countries abandoned their inquisitorial system and adopted the U.S. adversarial model. Following the LACPR, the region experienced a dramatic increase in crime, consolidating it as one of the most violent areas in the world. Despite previous empirical evidence indicating that procedural law affects criminal behavior, the effects of the LACPR continue highly unexplored. In this paper, we use the Latin American case to evaluate the impact of an adversarial reform on crime rates. Exploiting the quasi-experimental implementation of the reform in Colombia, we use an event study approach combined with differences-in-differences to estimate the reform’s effects on criminal activity. Despite the opposite incentives the reform created, we find an increase associated with the procedural transformation in overall crime rates (22%), violent crime (15%), and property crime (8%). We also observe a dramatic decrease in drug offenses associated with lower arrest rates. Our findings contribute to the literature on Latin American crime and the link between procedural law and criminal behavior.spaUniversidad EAFITEscuela de Economía y FinanzasThe Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American CrimeworkingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperDocumento de trabajo de investigacióndrafthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042Acceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2criminal procedural revolutionplea bargainingcertaintyseverityceleritycacosta7@eafit.edu.coZorro Medina, AngelaAcosta, CamiloMejía, DanielUniversidad de ChicagoUniversidad EAFITUniversidad de los AndesLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82556https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/e106fe53-c50a-4d0b-9769-428001ce3603/download76025f86b095439b7ac65b367055d40cMD51ORIGINALWP-2020-19-Camilo Mejía.pdfWP-2020-19-Camilo Mejía.pdfapplication/pdf2614290https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/9a71dd2d-6ca9-47fc-b082-11a3e3fbc4a8/download5435818119fcf8db9833613a33fc7235MD5210784/17722oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/177222024-03-05 14:06:33.268open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
title The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
spellingShingle The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
criminal procedural revolution
plea bargaining
certainty
severity
celerity
title_short The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
title_full The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
title_fullStr The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
title_full_unstemmed The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
title_sort The Unintended Consequences of the U.S. Adversarial Model in Latin American Crime
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Zorro Medina, Angela
Acosta, Camilo
Mejía, Daniel
dc.contributor.eafitauthor.none.fl_str_mv cacosta7@eafit.edu.co
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Zorro Medina, Angela
Acosta, Camilo
Mejía, Daniel
dc.contributor.affiliation.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad de Chicago
Universidad EAFIT
Universidad de los Andes
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv criminal procedural revolution
plea bargaining
certainty
severity
celerity
topic criminal procedural revolution
plea bargaining
certainty
severity
celerity
description During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a criminal procedural revolution (LACPR) when approximately 70% of its countries abandoned their inquisitorial system and adopted the U.S. adversarial model. Following the LACPR, the region experienced a dramatic increase in crime, consolidating it as one of the most violent areas in the world. Despite previous empirical evidence indicating that procedural law affects criminal behavior, the effects of the LACPR continue highly unexplored. In this paper, we use the Latin American case to evaluate the impact of an adversarial reform on crime rates. Exploiting the quasi-experimental implementation of the reform in Colombia, we use an event study approach combined with differences-in-differences to estimate the reform’s effects on criminal activity. Despite the opposite incentives the reform created, we find an increase associated with the procedural transformation in overall crime rates (22%), violent crime (15%), and property crime (8%). We also observe a dramatic decrease in drug offenses associated with lower arrest rates. Our findings contribute to the literature on Latin American crime and the link between procedural law and criminal behavior.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-10T16:32:58Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-10
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-10T16:32:58Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv workingPaper
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dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo de investigación
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv draft
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dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad EAFIT
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Escuela de Economía y Finanzas
institution Universidad EAFIT
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
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