Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)

This article uses the game theory, more specifically multiple prisoner’s dilemma game, to analyze why Iranians refused to give up on receiving public subsidies in April 2014, in spite of frequent requests of the government. Sample of study consists of two main groups: the ones who were not dependent...

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Autores:
Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2019
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/13937
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/13937
Palabra clave:
Subsidy reform scheme
Prisoner’s dilemma game
Refusal to give up on subsidy receipt
Lie
Iran
Esquema de reforma del subsidio
juego del dilema del prisionero
Negativa a renunciar al recibo del subsidio
Mentira
Irán
Rights
License
Copyright © 2019 Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
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spelling Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees29/06/20192019-10-04T13:23:50Z29/06/20192019-10-04T13:23:50Z2256-43221692-0279http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1393710.17230/Ad-minister.34.10This article uses the game theory, more specifically multiple prisoner’s dilemma game, to analyze why Iranians refused to give up on receiving public subsidies in April 2014, in spite of frequent requests of the government. Sample of study consists of two main groups: the ones who were not dependent on government subsidy but were applying for it; and the ones who did not depend either but had fraudulently pretended to depend on government subsidy. some suggestions are presented such as to define chicken game and not prisoner’s dilemma game as the main game.Este artículo utiliza la teoría de juegos, más específicamente el juego múltiple del dilema del prisionero, para analizar por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar a recibir subsidios públicos en abril de 2014, a pesar de las frecuentes solicitudes del gobierno. La muestra de estudio consta de dos grupos principales: los que no dependían del subsidio del gobierno, pero que lo solicitaban; y los que tampoco dependían, pero habían fingido fraudulentamente depender del subsidio del gobierno. Se presentan algunas sugerencias, tales como definir el juego de la gallina y no el juego del dilema del prisionero como juego principal.text/htmlengUniversidad EAFITAD-minister: No 34 (2019), pp 195-210http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/administer/article/view/5916http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/administer/article/view/5916Copyright © 2019 Mohammad Reza Javadi YeganehAcceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad EAFITreponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITAD-minister: No 34 (2019)Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)Economía del comportamiento y ayudas públicas del Estado: ¿Por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar al recibo del subsidio gubernamental? (Un juego múltiple del dilema del prisionero)articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlepublishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Subsidy reform schemePrisoner’s dilemma gameRefusal to give up on subsidy receiptLieIranEsquema de reforma del subsidiojuego del dilema del prisioneroNegativa a renunciar al recibo del subsidioMentiraIránMohammad Reza Javadi YeganehDepartment of Sociology, University of TehranAD-minister34195210THUMBNAILminiatura-administer.jpgminiatura-administer.jpgimage/jpeg8755https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/43147556-1c8c-4caf-8f81-8a5cc6954509/download87c28d32b620f3408b1c70a3c505fbd8MD51ORIGINALEconomía del comportamiento y ayudas públicas del Estado ¿Por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar al recibo del subsidio gubernamental (Un juego múltiple del dilema del prisi.pdfEconomía del comportamiento y ayudas públicas del Estado ¿Por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar al recibo del subsidio gubernamental (Un juego múltiple del dilema del prisi.pdfTexto completo PDFapplication/pdf637823https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/03c7b6c9-a899-4e90-968b-2f6364feb32b/download6c897fc99090c8056815c9082115aa84MD52articulo.htmlarticulo.htmlTexto completo HTMLtext/html374https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/4ef0a448-0f17-45ac-99b6-335390ab6c46/download0525db591d6c1cf6236408a455d3616eMD5310784/13937oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/139372019-12-05 10:41:31.364open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Economía del comportamiento y ayudas públicas del Estado: ¿Por qué los iraníes se negaron a renunciar al recibo del subsidio gubernamental? (Un juego múltiple del dilema del prisionero)
title Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
spellingShingle Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
Subsidy reform scheme
Prisoner’s dilemma game
Refusal to give up on subsidy receipt
Lie
Iran
Esquema de reforma del subsidio
juego del dilema del prisionero
Negativa a renunciar al recibo del subsidio
Mentira
Irán
title_short Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
title_full Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
title_fullStr Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
title_full_unstemmed Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
title_sort Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game)
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
dc.contributor.affiliation.spa.fl_str_mv Department of Sociology, University of Tehran
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv Subsidy reform scheme
Prisoner’s dilemma game
Refusal to give up on subsidy receipt
Lie
Iran
topic Subsidy reform scheme
Prisoner’s dilemma game
Refusal to give up on subsidy receipt
Lie
Iran
Esquema de reforma del subsidio
juego del dilema del prisionero
Negativa a renunciar al recibo del subsidio
Mentira
Irán
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Esquema de reforma del subsidio
juego del dilema del prisionero
Negativa a renunciar al recibo del subsidio
Mentira
Irán
description This article uses the game theory, more specifically multiple prisoner’s dilemma game, to analyze why Iranians refused to give up on receiving public subsidies in April 2014, in spite of frequent requests of the government. Sample of study consists of two main groups: the ones who were not dependent on government subsidy but were applying for it; and the ones who did not depend either but had fraudulently pretended to depend on government subsidy. some suggestions are presented such as to define chicken game and not prisoner’s dilemma game as the main game.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2019-10-04T13:23:50Z
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2019-10-04T13:23:50Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 29/06/2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 29/06/2019
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 2256-4322
1692-0279
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10784/13937
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.17230/Ad-minister.34.10
identifier_str_mv 2256-4322
1692-0279
10.17230/Ad-minister.34.10
url http://hdl.handle.net/10784/13937
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartof.none.fl_str_mv AD-minister: No 34 (2019), pp 195-210
dc.relation.isversionof.none.fl_str_mv http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/administer/article/view/5916
dc.relation.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/administer/article/view/5916
dc.rights.eng.fl_str_mv Copyright © 2019 Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Acceso abierto
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright © 2019 Mohammad Reza Javadi Yeganeh
Acceso abierto
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad EAFIT
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad EAFIT
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv AD-minister: No 34 (2019)
instname_str Universidad EAFIT
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