Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro

In urban peripheries worldwide, and especially in Latin America, criminal groups use coercive power to impose rules on and provide order to civilians. The reasons why gangs govern in particular ways, or at all, are poorly understood. Many charge taxes in exchange for governance provision—suggesting...

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Autores:
Lessing, Benjamin
Monteiro, Joana
Tobón, Santiago
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2024
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/34022
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/10784/34022
Palabra clave:
crime
organized crime
criminal governance
COVID-19
Brazil
Rights
License
Acceso abierto
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spelling Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees2024-06-25T13:14:02Z2024-012024-06-25T13:14:02Zhttps://hdl.handle.net/10784/34022In urban peripheries worldwide, and especially in Latin America, criminal groups use coercive power to impose rules on and provide order to civilians. The reasons why gangs govern in particular ways, or at all, are poorly understood. Many charge taxes in exchange for governance provision—suggesting they act as stationary bandits— but some do not. Many control retail drug markets, but some also earn rents from licit goods and services like cooking gas and internet. During the COVID-19 crisis, anecdotes of gangs enforcing lockdowns and providing health-related public goods suggested they seized opportunities to consolidate their authority and perceived legitimacy. We present novel, systematic data on criminal governance practices in Rio de Janeiro, whose gangs are notoriously militarized, persistent, and—usefully, from our perspective—diverse. While many belong to prison-based drug syndicates, others are police-linked groups known as mil´ıcias. We surveyed residents from almost 200 favelas about local gangs’ type, economic and governance activities, taxation, and pandemic response. Contrary to expectations, we find that drug gangs and mil´ıcias alike earn rents from a range of licit products and services, enjoy similarly high levels of perceived legitimacy, and largely avoided involvement in pandemic response. Yet milicias are far more likely to tax, and seldom sell drugs. Our findings suggest that gangs’ core motives are economic rather than political, that they strategically distinguish between direct taxation and extracting monopoly rents from control over utilities.engUniversidad EAFITEscuela de Economía y Finanzas. Centro Valor PúblicoCriminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de JaneiroGobernanza criminal en tiempos de crisis: evidencia del brote de COVID-19 en Río de JaneiroworkingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperDocumento de trabajo de investigacióndraftVersión publicadahttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042Acceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2crimeorganized crimecriminal governanceCOVID-19BrazilLessing, Benjaminf08fc523-375c-45ec-a0c8-5005f2a9ea11-1Monteiro, Joanafe985f9c-92de-40b5-9300-d9109d1101ef-1Tobón, Santiago8020814a-cbc3-4af9-a83d-6b2c8e4cfcd0-1blessing@uchicago.edujoana.monteiro@fgv.brstobonz@eafit.edu.coUniversity of ChicagoFundacao Getulio VargasUniversidad EAFITORIGINALWP_2024_04_Santiago_Tobon.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf757404https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/7a5abea6-2bf6-401e-9bfd-c7f80e4e37aa/download6be0b49643417af39b0120b08e558300MD5110784/34022oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/340222024-12-04 11:49:03.996open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Gobernanza criminal en tiempos de crisis: evidencia del brote de COVID-19 en Río de Janeiro
title Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
spellingShingle Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
crime
organized crime
criminal governance
COVID-19
Brazil
title_short Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
title_full Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
title_fullStr Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
title_full_unstemmed Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
title_sort Criminal governance in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 outbreak in Rio de Janeiro
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Lessing, Benjamin
Monteiro, Joana
Tobón, Santiago
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Lessing, Benjamin
Monteiro, Joana
Tobón, Santiago
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv University of Chicago
Fundacao Getulio Vargas
Universidad EAFIT
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv crime
organized crime
criminal governance
COVID-19
Brazil
topic crime
organized crime
criminal governance
COVID-19
Brazil
description In urban peripheries worldwide, and especially in Latin America, criminal groups use coercive power to impose rules on and provide order to civilians. The reasons why gangs govern in particular ways, or at all, are poorly understood. Many charge taxes in exchange for governance provision—suggesting they act as stationary bandits— but some do not. Many control retail drug markets, but some also earn rents from licit goods and services like cooking gas and internet. During the COVID-19 crisis, anecdotes of gangs enforcing lockdowns and providing health-related public goods suggested they seized opportunities to consolidate their authority and perceived legitimacy. We present novel, systematic data on criminal governance practices in Rio de Janeiro, whose gangs are notoriously militarized, persistent, and—usefully, from our perspective—diverse. While many belong to prison-based drug syndicates, others are police-linked groups known as mil´ıcias. We surveyed residents from almost 200 favelas about local gangs’ type, economic and governance activities, taxation, and pandemic response. Contrary to expectations, we find that drug gangs and mil´ıcias alike earn rents from a range of licit products and services, enjoy similarly high levels of perceived legitimacy, and largely avoided involvement in pandemic response. Yet milicias are far more likely to tax, and seldom sell drugs. Our findings suggest that gangs’ core motives are economic rather than political, that they strategically distinguish between direct taxation and extracting monopoly rents from control over utilities.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-06-25T13:14:02Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-06-25T13:14:02Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv workingPaper
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bcce
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo de investigación
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv draft
dc.type.hasVersion.spa.fl_str_mv Versión publicada
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10784/34022
url https://hdl.handle.net/10784/34022
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Acceso abierto
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dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad EAFIT
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Escuela de Economía y Finanzas. Centro Valor Público
institution Universidad EAFIT
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/7a5abea6-2bf6-401e-9bfd-c7f80e4e37aa/download
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@eafit.edu.co
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