Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States

In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S. drug related crime has followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices, instead of increasing, have been dropping or remained stable over time. All this in a context of an increase in these drugs' consumption...

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Autores:
Jacobsson, A.
Naranjo, A
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2009
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/7566
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/7566
Palabra clave:
Conflict
Drug policy
Violent crime
Rights
License
restrictedAccess
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spelling 20092015-11-06T16:37:30Z20092015-11-06T16:37:30Z1435-6104http://hdl.handle.net/10784/756610.1007/s10101-009-0062-2In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S. drug related crime has followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices, instead of increasing, have been dropping or remained stable over time. All this in a context of an increase in these drugs' consumption during the 1980s and a small decrease during the 1990s. This paper provides an explanation to these counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies. We model how drug lords respond to this type of policy within a conflict framework over the control of distribution activities for illegal drugs, which is novel. The model predicts drug distribution activities, drug prices and drug consumption. These predictions appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence in the United States. © Springer-Verlag 2009.engElsevierEconomics of Governance. Vol.10(4), 2009, pp.323-343http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-70350580385&partnerID=40&md5=0cb6e4c50c5a7179e800a794d04fe790http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-70350580385&partnerID=40&md5=0cb6e4c50c5a7179e800a794d04fe790restrictedAccess© Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.Acceso restringidohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecEconomics of Governance. Vol.10(4), 2009, pp.323-343Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United Statesarticleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtículoObra publicadapublishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1ConflictDrug policyViolent crimeEscuela de Economía y FinanzasEconomíaJacobsson, A.Naranjo, AStockholm University, Stockholm, SwedenStockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, EAFIT University, Medellín, Colombia.Estudios en Economía y EmpresaEconomics of Governance104323343ORIGINALs10101-009-0062-2.pdfs10101-009-0062-2.pdfapplication/pdf726792https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/9d28c210-c426-4e66-ad53-0824080847fe/downloadb45e30fbcb9b57abc87bdab90bc64fceMD5110784/7566oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/75662023-03-15 11:39:34.584open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
title Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
spellingShingle Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
Conflict
Drug policy
Violent crime
title_short Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
title_full Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
title_fullStr Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
title_full_unstemmed Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
title_sort Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Jacobsson, A.
Naranjo, A
dc.contributor.department.spa.fl_str_mv Escuela de Economía y Finanzas
Economía
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Jacobsson, A.
Naranjo, A
dc.contributor.affiliation.spa.fl_str_mv Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, EAFIT University, Medellín, Colombia.
dc.contributor.program.spa.fl_str_mv Estudios en Economía y Empresa
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv Conflict
Drug policy
Violent crime
topic Conflict
Drug policy
Violent crime
description In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S. drug related crime has followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices, instead of increasing, have been dropping or remained stable over time. All this in a context of an increase in these drugs' consumption during the 1980s and a small decrease during the 1990s. This paper provides an explanation to these counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies. We model how drug lords respond to this type of policy within a conflict framework over the control of distribution activities for illegal drugs, which is novel. The model predicts drug distribution activities, drug prices and drug consumption. These predictions appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence in the United States. © Springer-Verlag 2009.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2009
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2015-11-06T16:37:30Z
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2015-11-06T16:37:30Z
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.type.hasVersion.spa.fl_str_mv Obra publicada
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv publishedVersion
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1435-6104
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10784/7566
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.1007/s10101-009-0062-2
identifier_str_mv 1435-6104
10.1007/s10101-009-0062-2
url http://hdl.handle.net/10784/7566
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Economics of Governance. Vol.10(4), 2009, pp.323-343
dc.relation.isversionof.none.fl_str_mv http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-70350580385&partnerID=40&md5=0cb6e4c50c5a7179e800a794d04fe790
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dc.rights.eng.fl_str_mv restrictedAccess
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv © Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Acceso restringido
rights_invalid_str_mv restrictedAccess
© Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Acceso restringido
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.publisher.eng.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Economics of Governance. Vol.10(4), 2009, pp.323-343
institution Universidad EAFIT
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@eafit.edu.co
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