Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results?
This paper reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance and firm performance and finds that it has yielded mixed results. The paper argues that a primary reason for this situation is that the relevant theories have not been applied to the class of phenomena they were designed to explain....
- Autores:
-
Saravia, Jimmy A.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2014
- Institución:
- Universidad EAFIT
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EAFIT
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/1360
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1360
- Palabra clave:
- Corporate Governance
Firm Performance
Agency Theory
Firm lifecycle
- Rights
- License
- Acceso abierto
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|
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
title |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
spellingShingle |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? Corporate Governance Firm Performance Agency Theory Firm lifecycle |
title_short |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
title_full |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
title_fullStr |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
title_sort |
Why has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results? |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Saravia, Jimmy A. |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Saravia, Jimmy A. |
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv |
Corporate Governance Firm Performance Agency Theory Firm lifecycle |
topic |
Corporate Governance Firm Performance Agency Theory Firm lifecycle |
description |
This paper reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance and firm performance and finds that it has yielded mixed results. The paper argues that a primary reason for this situation is that the relevant theories have not been applied to the class of phenomena they were designed to explain. In particular, the literature that focuses on ownership structure and firm performance employs entrepreneurial agency theories of the firm but applies them to managerial firms where ownership is separated from control. This is evidenced by the fact that firms in which managerial ownership is close to zero percent are included in the samples. Conversely, empirical work centered on the relationship between board composition and firm performance (which relies on managerial agency theories of the firm) not only does not make sure that the firms in their samples are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, but it also ignores the alternative managerial agency theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows. Additionally, the paper maintains that other approaches, such as that which studies the relationship between indices of anti-takeover provisions and firm performance, do not rely on any particular theory and for this reason are beset by problems of interpretation. The paper concludes with recommendations for avoiding the drawbacks and achieving future progress. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-03-06T18:41:40Z |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-01-01 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-03-06T18:41:40Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bcce |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo de investigación |
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv |
draft |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1360 |
dc.identifier.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
G31 G34 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1360 |
identifier_str_mv |
G31 G34 |
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Acceso abierto |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Acceso abierto http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv |
Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Universidad EAFIT |
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv |
Escuela de Economía y Finanzas |
institution |
Universidad EAFIT |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/8df0bfd1-65e0-4144-9e9f-a838254e6e9a/download https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/c6710e46-7f7e-4ceb-8a64-911e308150ed/download |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
24bc1f3f7d0c4bd87b159dc9b2b30e4c 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
repositorio@eafit.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814110220524191744 |
spelling |
Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees2014-03-06T18:41:40Z2014-01-012014-03-06T18:41:40Zhttp://hdl.handle.net/10784/1360G31G34This paper reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance and firm performance and finds that it has yielded mixed results. The paper argues that a primary reason for this situation is that the relevant theories have not been applied to the class of phenomena they were designed to explain. In particular, the literature that focuses on ownership structure and firm performance employs entrepreneurial agency theories of the firm but applies them to managerial firms where ownership is separated from control. This is evidenced by the fact that firms in which managerial ownership is close to zero percent are included in the samples. Conversely, empirical work centered on the relationship between board composition and firm performance (which relies on managerial agency theories of the firm) not only does not make sure that the firms in their samples are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, but it also ignores the alternative managerial agency theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows. Additionally, the paper maintains that other approaches, such as that which studies the relationship between indices of anti-takeover provisions and firm performance, do not rely on any particular theory and for this reason are beset by problems of interpretation. The paper concludes with recommendations for avoiding the drawbacks and achieving future progress.engUniversidad EAFITEscuela de Economía y FinanzasWhy has the literature on corporate governance and firm performance yielded mixed results?workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperDocumento de trabajo de investigacióndrafthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042Acceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Corporate GovernanceFirm PerformanceAgency TheoryFirm lifecycleSaravia, Jimmy A.jsaravia@eafit.edu.coORIGINAL2014_05_Jimmy_Saravia.pdf2014_05_Jimmy_Saravia.pdfapplication/pdf1159182https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/8df0bfd1-65e0-4144-9e9f-a838254e6e9a/download24bc1f3f7d0c4bd87b159dc9b2b30e4cMD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/c6710e46-7f7e-4ceb-8a64-911e308150ed/download8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD5210784/1360oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/13602024-03-05 14:06:06.683open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.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 |