What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)
In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion....
- Autores:
-
Aikin, Scott F.
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad EAFIT
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EAFIT
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/17648
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10784/17648
- Palabra clave:
- Deep Disagreement
Skepticism
Problem of the Criterion
Argumentation
Desacuerdos profundos
Escepticismo
Problema del criterio
Argumentación
- Rights
- License
- Copyright © 2020 Scott F. Aikin
| Summary: | In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement. |
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