Innovación e incumbent failure: Una ilustración usando la industria de las telecomunicaciones en Colombia
This paper provides an analysis of the determinants of the Incumbent failure arising from the interdependence competitive. It is used tools provided by game theory (backward induction and analysis of joint strategies in games of signaling) for determining the incentives to invest in innovation for a...
- Autores:
-
Herrera, Hernán
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2008
- Institución:
- Universidad EAFIT
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EAFIT
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/2691
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10784/2691
- Palabra clave:
- Innovation
incumbent failure
Game theory
Signaling
Innovación
incumbent failure
Teoría de juegos
Señalización
- Rights
- License
- Acceso abierto
| Summary: | This paper provides an analysis of the determinants of the Incumbent failure arising from the interdependence competitive. It is used tools provided by game theory (backward induction and analysis of joint strategies in games of signaling) for determining the incentives to invest in innovation for an incumbent firm. For illustration purposes, the case of Telecom and the entry of mobile cellular in Colombia is used. We conclude that participation in the existing market and the expected magnitude of demand that will remain old technology, are barriers to set a firm decides to invest in innovation. The probability of an incumbent firm to invest in innovation is inverse to the likelihood of success of the entrant, the amount of such investment and the magnitude of the benefits that would accrue from the firm established its current product, if the entrant is successful. |
|---|