European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value

The deregulation process in the EU electricity sector triggered strategic decisions that led to industry restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the impact of this process on investors, using event studies and estimation techniques such as least squares and GARCH. Our findings sug...

Full description

Autores:
García, John J.
Trillas, Francesc
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2013
Institución:
Universidad EAFIT
Repositorio:
Repositorio EAFIT
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/1215
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1215
Palabra clave:
Deregulation
Mergers and acquisitions
Event study
Energy
Rights
License
Acceso abierto
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spelling Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees2013-11-12T21:49:10Z2013-11-122013-11-12T21:49:10Zhttp://hdl.handle.net/10784/1215L94G14G34G38The deregulation process in the EU electricity sector triggered strategic decisions that led to industry restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the impact of this process on investors, using event studies and estimation techniques such as least squares and GARCH. Our findings suggest three stylized facts: 1) regulatory reform in Europe was certainly accompanied by a takeover wave, as predicted by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); 2) mergers and acquisitions had a positive impact on the stock price of target firms, and a much lower and sometimes even a negative impact for the bidding firms; 3) the effect of takeover announcements on the returns of competitors of the merging firms depends on the degree of market power. In countries with high market power (like Spain) competitors significantly increase share returns upon takeover announcements, whereas in countries with lower market power (like England and Wales) returns do not change significantly.engUniversidad EAFITEscuela de Economía y FinanzasEuropean energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's valueworkingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperDocumento de trabajo de investigacióndrafthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042Acceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2DeregulationMergers and acquisitionsEvent studyEnergyGarcía, John J.Trillas, Francescjgarcia@eafit.edu.cofrancesc.trillas@uab.esORIGINAL2013_29_Jhon_Jairo_Garcia.pdf2013_29_Jhon_Jairo_Garcia.pdfapplication/pdf1451014https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/d344a6f5-25e9-4ca5-92cf-ccb75b4e08cf/download7e19a7cb298947c037bda68c6c488f5dMD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-8968https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/daf1228d-421a-4b71-938e-1d06d9410e65/download4cc960a42e07fca3808fbd6b90ab2a1fMD5210784/1215oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/12152024-03-05 14:06:36.428open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.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
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
title European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
spellingShingle European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
Deregulation
Mergers and acquisitions
Event study
Energy
title_short European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
title_full European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
title_fullStr European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
title_full_unstemmed European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
title_sort European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firm's value
dc.creator.fl_str_mv García, John J.
Trillas, Francesc
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv García, John J.
Trillas, Francesc
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv Deregulation
Mergers and acquisitions
Event study
Energy
topic Deregulation
Mergers and acquisitions
Event study
Energy
description The deregulation process in the EU electricity sector triggered strategic decisions that led to industry restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the impact of this process on investors, using event studies and estimation techniques such as least squares and GARCH. Our findings suggest three stylized facts: 1) regulatory reform in Europe was certainly accompanied by a takeover wave, as predicted by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); 2) mergers and acquisitions had a positive impact on the stock price of target firms, and a much lower and sometimes even a negative impact for the bidding firms; 3) the effect of takeover announcements on the returns of competitors of the merging firms depends on the degree of market power. In countries with high market power (like Spain) competitors significantly increase share returns upon takeover announcements, whereas in countries with lower market power (like England and Wales) returns do not change significantly.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2013-11-12T21:49:10Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2013-11-12
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2013-11-12T21:49:10Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv workingPaper
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo de investigación
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv draft
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1215
dc.identifier.jel.none.fl_str_mv L94
G14
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G38
url http://hdl.handle.net/10784/1215
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G14
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dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv eng
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad EAFIT
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv Escuela de Economía y Finanzas
institution Universidad EAFIT
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