Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure
This paper examines the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of capital structure and finds that for the case of equity the usual TCE logic is not fully worked out. In particular, an analysis of the key issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders is absent. To fill this ga...
- Autores:
-
Saravia, Jimmy A.
Saravia, Silvia
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2014
- Institución:
- Universidad EAFIT
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EAFIT
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/2429
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10784/2429
- Palabra clave:
- Corporate Governance
Transaction Cost Economics
Free Cash flows
Firm Valuation
- Rights
- License
- Acceso abierto
id |
REPOEAFIT2_11e3551aa5164845f7101bde0720b05e |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/2429 |
network_acronym_str |
REPOEAFIT2 |
network_name_str |
Repositorio EAFIT |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees2014-05-29T19:18:15Z2014-05-122014-05-29T19:18:15Zhttp://hdl.handle.net/10784/2429D23G31G32G34This paper examines the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of capital structure and finds that for the case of equity the usual TCE logic is not fully worked out. In particular, an analysis of the key issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders is absent. To fill this gap in the literature, the paper further develops the theory of the equity governance structure by taking account of the concept of bilateral dependency over the lifecycle of the firm. The paper finds that, both theoretically and empirically, contractual hazards are indeed mitigated for the case of fast growing young firms which are dependent on shareholders to finance future growth. In contrast, for the case of mature firms, which in virtue of their large free cash flows are independent from shareholders, contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and consequently managerial discretion costs increase.engUniversidad EAFITEscuela de Economía y FinanzasCorporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structureworkingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperDocumento de trabajo de investigacióndrafthttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bccehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042Acceso abiertohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Corporate GovernanceTransaction Cost EconomicsFree Cash flowsFirm Valuationjsaravia@eafit.edu.coSilvia.SARAVIA@cepal.orgSaravia, Jimmy A.acc6d813-786e-46f8-86f2-f198370c7e4c-1Saravia, Silvia57797aca-49ea-409c-915e-4484b9c7ea1b-1LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81145https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/c4fee460-4ee3-4cea-b08a-bfa157f3b6c0/downloada4a15015cc3b57a4390e89906678ba6eMD52ORIGINAL2014_11_Jimmy_Saravia.pdf2014_11_Jimmy_Saravia.pdfDocumento de trabajo de investigaciónapplication/pdf1287483https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/9924c944-ce0d-4d3d-8143-83d6b7c3f6b1/download839857a4a593f5c5462e4278f9b0ff8cMD5310784/2429oai:repository.eafit.edu.co:10784/24292024-12-04 11:50:20.656open.accesshttps://repository.eafit.edu.coRepositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITrepositorio@eafit.edu.co |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
title |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
spellingShingle |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure Corporate Governance Transaction Cost Economics Free Cash flows Firm Valuation |
title_short |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
title_full |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
title_fullStr |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
title_sort |
Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Saravia, Jimmy A. Saravia, Silvia |
dc.contributor.eafitauthor.none.fl_str_mv |
jsaravia@eafit.edu.co Silvia.SARAVIA@cepal.org |
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Saravia, Jimmy A. Saravia, Silvia |
dc.subject.keyword.eng.fl_str_mv |
Corporate Governance Transaction Cost Economics Free Cash flows Firm Valuation |
topic |
Corporate Governance Transaction Cost Economics Free Cash flows Firm Valuation |
description |
This paper examines the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of capital structure and finds that for the case of equity the usual TCE logic is not fully worked out. In particular, an analysis of the key issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders is absent. To fill this gap in the literature, the paper further develops the theory of the equity governance structure by taking account of the concept of bilateral dependency over the lifecycle of the firm. The paper finds that, both theoretically and empirically, contractual hazards are indeed mitigated for the case of fast growing young firms which are dependent on shareholders to finance future growth. In contrast, for the case of mature firms, which in virtue of their large free cash flows are independent from shareholders, contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and consequently managerial discretion costs increase. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-05-29T19:18:15Z |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-05-12 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-05-29T19:18:15Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_b1a7d7d4d402bcce |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Documento de trabajo de investigación |
dc.type.hasVersion.eng.fl_str_mv |
draft |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/2429 |
dc.identifier.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
D23 G31 G32 G34 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10784/2429 |
identifier_str_mv |
D23 G31 G32 G34 |
dc.language.iso.eng.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Acceso abierto |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Acceso abierto http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.coverage.spatial.eng.fl_str_mv |
Medellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Universidad EAFIT |
dc.publisher.department.spa.fl_str_mv |
Escuela de Economía y Finanzas |
institution |
Universidad EAFIT |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/c4fee460-4ee3-4cea-b08a-bfa157f3b6c0/download https://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstreams/9924c944-ce0d-4d3d-8143-83d6b7c3f6b1/download |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
a4a15015cc3b57a4390e89906678ba6e 839857a4a593f5c5462e4278f9b0ff8c |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
repositorio@eafit.edu.co |
_version_ |
1818102438026018816 |