Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley

Bahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de es...

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Autores:: Castro, Lauren
Ramirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo
Neira Rodado, Dionicio

Tipo de recurso:: Article of journal

Fecha de publicación:: 2020

Institución:: Corporación Universidad de la Costa

Repositorio:: REDICUC - Repositorio CUC

Idioma:: spa

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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
title	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
spellingShingle	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley Mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores Cadena de suministro Fabricante y minorista
title_short	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
title_full	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
title_fullStr	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
title_full_unstemmed	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
title_sort	Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Castro, Lauren Ramirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo Neira Rodado, Dionicio
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv	Castro, Lauren Ramirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo Neira Rodado, Dionicio
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv	Mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores Cadena de suministro Fabricante y minorista
topic	Mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores Cadena de suministro Fabricante y minorista
description	Bahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de eslabones de la Cadena de Suministro. Ahmadi y Hoseinpour (2011) [17] estudian la coordinación de decisiones de publicidad en conjunto de una cadena de suministro conformada por Fabricante y Minorista, utilizando distintos modelos propios de la Teoría de juegos y analizando las posibles acciones de cada jugador dado ciertos escenarios.
publishDate	2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2020-08
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv	Artículo de revista
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dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv	[1] OWEN, Guillermo. "Game Theory". San Diego: Academic Press.1995. 447p. [2] RAY (1989), Credible coalitions and the core, Internat J. Game Theory, 18, 185-187. [3] CHWE M.S.-Y. (1994) , Farsighted Coalitional Stability. J. Economic Theory, 63, 299-325. [4] XUE, L. (1998), Coalitional Stability under perfect foresight. Economic Theory, 11, 603- 627. [5] RAY, D. & VOHRA, R. (1999) A Theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games Econom. Behav. 26, 286-336. [6] DIAMANTOUDI, E. & XUE, L. (2007), Coalitions, agreements and efficiency. J. Economic Theory, 136, 105-125. [7] RAY (2007), A Game Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Lipsey Lectures, Oxford University Press, Oxford. [8] GORADIA, H., & VIDAL, J. (2007). An Equal Excess Negotiation Algorithm for Coalition Formation. AAMAS'07 (p. 3p.). Honolulu: IFAAMAS. [9] SHEHORY, O., & KRAUS, S. Coalition formation among autonomous agents: Strategies and complexity. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University. [10] LEHRER, E & SCARSINI M. (2011), On the core of dynamic cooperative games, 27p. URL: http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~lehrer/Papers/Dynamic-cooperative.pdf [11] SANDHOLM, T. & LESSER, V. R. (1997), Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence 94(1): 99-137. [12] CONITZER, V. & SANDHOLM, T (2004), Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 219-225. [13] BARTHOLDI, John J. and KEMAHLIOGLU-ZIYA, Using Shapley Value to Allocate Savings in a Supply Chain, Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology, June 2004. [14] CACHON, Gerard and LARIVIERE, Martin, Supply Chain Coordination with RevenueSharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 1. (Jan., 2005), pp. 30-44 [15] CACHON, Gerard and NETESSINE, Sergei, Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, Ch2, 46p. [16] Bahinipati et al., Revenue sharing in semiconductor industry supply chain: Cooperative game theoretic approach, "Sadhana" Vol. 34, No. 3, Junio 2009, pp. 501-527. [17] Ahmadi y Hoseinpour, A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Coordinating Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain, "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications" (2011) Vol. 149, pp 138-150. [18] Ang et al., Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer-supplier game in supply chain management, "Journal of Global Optimization" (2013). Vol. 56, pp 1297-1312. [19] Hong y Chen, Game Theory Analysis of Quality Control in Two-Echelon Supply Chain, "Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University" (2013). Vol. 18, No. 4, pp 508-512. [20] S. Alaei et.al., A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising in a singlemanufacturer-two-retailers supply chain, "The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology" Springer London, 2014. [21] Tan, G. y Wang, R. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict" International Journal of Game Theory (2010), Vol. 39 , pp 273-279. Springer-Verlag 2009. [22] Wood, P. "Climate change and Game theory", Annals of the New York Academy of sciences (2012) Vol. 1219, pp 153-170. Springer-Verlag 2011. [23] Bolton, G. y Brosig, J. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication" International Journal of Game Theory (2012). Vol. 41, pp 623-649. [24] Elomri, et al. "Coalition Formation and Cost allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems" Production and Operation Management. Vol. 21 No. 6, pp 1015-1027, ISSN 1059-1478, EISSN 1937-5956. Production and Operation Managemen Society, 2012. [25]Boongasame, L. y Daneshgar, F. "A collaborative platform for a buyer coalition: Introducing the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system". Information Systems Frontier (2013). Vol 15, pp 89-98. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011. [26] Buchbinder et al., Non-Cooperative Cost Sharing Games via Subsidies, "Theory of Computing Systems" (2010). Vol. 47, pp 15-37 Springer [27] Jafar et al., The non-cooperative game theory for trades in B2B electronic market, "International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology"(2012). Vol. 48, pp 823- 828. [28] Facchinei, et al., Non-cooperative games with minmax objectives, " Computational Optimization and Applications" Springer Science+Business Media. New York, 2014. [29] Okaie, Y. y Nakano, T., Non-cooperative optimization games in market-oriented overlay networks: an integrated model of resource pricing and network formation, "Frontiers of Computer Science" (2011). Vol. 5, pp 496-505. [30] Facchinei et al., Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games, "IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control". Vol. 57, No. 5, pp 1192-1207. [31] Driessen, T. , Associated consistency and values for TU games. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2010). Vol 39, pp 467-482. [32] Rêgo, L. y Halpern, J., Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41, pp 131-155. [33] Béal, et al. Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games, "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41 pp 157-178. Springer-Verlag 2011. [34] Rhoads y Bartholdi . Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy. "Games 2012" Vol. 3, pp 150-156. ISSN 2073-4336 [35] Manuel et al. Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, "Mathematical Methods of Operation Research" (2013). Vol. 77, pp 1-14 Springer. [36] Ramirez-Rios, D. G., Rodriguez Pinto, C., Visbal Martinez, J., Monroy Silvera, F., De la Cruz Hernández, J., Donoso Meisel, Y., & Paternina Arboleda, C. D. (2016). A bi-criteria optimization model for parallel machine scheduling: game theoretic vs genetic algorithms. IJMSOR: International Journal of Management Science & Operation Research, 1(1), 20-30. Retrieved from http://ijmsoridi.com/index.php/ijmsor/article/view/73 [37] Landinez-Lamadrid, D. C., Ramirez-Ríos, D. G., Neira Rodado, D., Parra Negrete, K., & Combita Niño, J. P. (2017). Shapley Value: its algorithms and application to supply chains. INGE CUC, 13(1), 61-69. https://doi.org/10.17981/ingecuc.13.1.2017.06
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spelling	Castro, LaurenRamirez-Polo, Luis EduardoNeira Rodado, Dionicio2020-08-16T20:06:53Z2020-08-16T20:06:53Z2020-08https://hdl.handle.net/11323/6934Corporación Universidad de la CostaREDICUC - Repositorio CUChttps://repositorio.cuc.edu.co/Bahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de eslabones de la Cadena de Suministro. Ahmadi y Hoseinpour (2011) [17] estudian la coordinación de decisiones de publicidad en conjunto de una cadena de suministro conformada por Fabricante y Minorista, utilizando distintos modelos propios de la Teoría de juegos y analizando las posibles acciones de cada jugador dado ciertos escenarios.Castro, Lauren-will be generated-orcid-0000-0001-5201-5659-600Ramirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo-will be generated-orcid-0000-0002-1274-6593-600Neira Rodado, Dionicio-will be generated-orcid-0000-0003-0837-7083-600spaCorporación Universidad de la CostaCC0 1.0 Universalhttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Universidad de la CostaMercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductoresCadena de suministroFabricante y minoristaEstado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapleyArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion[1] OWEN, Guillermo. "Game Theory". San Diego: Academic Press.1995. 447p.[2] RAY (1989), Credible coalitions and the core, Internat J. Game Theory, 18, 185-187.[3] CHWE M.S.-Y. (1994) , Farsighted Coalitional Stability. J. Economic Theory, 63, 299-325.[4] XUE, L. (1998), Coalitional Stability under perfect foresight. Economic Theory, 11, 603- 627.[5] RAY, D. & VOHRA, R. (1999) A Theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games Econom. Behav. 26, 286-336.[6] DIAMANTOUDI, E. & XUE, L. (2007), Coalitions, agreements and efficiency. J. Economic Theory, 136, 105-125.[7] RAY (2007), A Game Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Lipsey Lectures, Oxford University Press, Oxford.[8] GORADIA, H., & VIDAL, J. (2007). An Equal Excess Negotiation Algorithm for Coalition Formation. AAMAS'07 (p. 3p.). Honolulu: IFAAMAS.[9] SHEHORY, O., & KRAUS, S. Coalition formation among autonomous agents: Strategies and complexity. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University.[10] LEHRER, E & SCARSINI M. (2011), On the core of dynamic cooperative games, 27p. URL: http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~lehrer/Papers/Dynamic-cooperative.pdf[11] SANDHOLM, T. & LESSER, V. R. (1997), Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence 94(1): 99-137.[12] CONITZER, V. & SANDHOLM, T (2004), Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 219-225.[13] BARTHOLDI, John J. and KEMAHLIOGLU-ZIYA, Using Shapley Value to Allocate Savings in a Supply Chain, Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology, June 2004.[14] CACHON, Gerard and LARIVIERE, Martin, Supply Chain Coordination with RevenueSharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 1. (Jan., 2005), pp. 30-44[15] CACHON, Gerard and NETESSINE, Sergei, Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, Ch2, 46p.[16] Bahinipati et al., Revenue sharing in semiconductor industry supply chain: Cooperative game theoretic approach, "Sadhana" Vol. 34, No. 3, Junio 2009, pp. 501-527.[17] Ahmadi y Hoseinpour, A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Coordinating Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain, "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications" (2011) Vol. 149, pp 138-150.[18] Ang et al., Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer-supplier game in supply chain management, "Journal of Global Optimization" (2013). Vol. 56, pp 1297-1312.[19] Hong y Chen, Game Theory Analysis of Quality Control in Two-Echelon Supply Chain, "Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University" (2013). Vol. 18, No. 4, pp 508-512.[20] S. Alaei et.al., A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising in a singlemanufacturer-two-retailers supply chain, "The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology" Springer London, 2014.[21] Tan, G. y Wang, R. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict" International Journal of Game Theory (2010), Vol. 39 , pp 273-279. Springer-Verlag 2009.[22] Wood, P. "Climate change and Game theory", Annals of the New York Academy of sciences (2012) Vol. 1219, pp 153-170. Springer-Verlag 2011.[23] Bolton, G. y Brosig, J. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication" International Journal of Game Theory (2012). Vol. 41, pp 623-649.[24] Elomri, et al. "Coalition Formation and Cost allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems" Production and Operation Management. Vol. 21 No. 6, pp 1015-1027, ISSN 1059-1478, EISSN 1937-5956. Production and Operation Managemen Society, 2012.[25]Boongasame, L. y Daneshgar, F. "A collaborative platform for a buyer coalition: Introducing the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system". Information Systems Frontier (2013). Vol 15, pp 89-98. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011.[26] Buchbinder et al., Non-Cooperative Cost Sharing Games via Subsidies, "Theory of Computing Systems" (2010). Vol. 47, pp 15-37 Springer[27] Jafar et al., The non-cooperative game theory for trades in B2B electronic market, "International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology"(2012). Vol. 48, pp 823- 828.[28] Facchinei, et al., Non-cooperative games with minmax objectives, " Computational Optimization and Applications" Springer Science+Business Media. New York, 2014.[29] Okaie, Y. y Nakano, T., Non-cooperative optimization games in market-oriented overlay networks: an integrated model of resource pricing and network formation, "Frontiers of Computer Science" (2011). Vol. 5, pp 496-505.[30] Facchinei et al., Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games, "IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control". Vol. 57, No. 5, pp 1192-1207.[31] Driessen, T. , Associated consistency and values for TU games. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2010). Vol 39, pp 467-482.[32] Rêgo, L. y Halpern, J., Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41, pp 131-155.[33] Béal, et al. Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games, "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41 pp 157-178. Springer-Verlag 2011.[34] Rhoads y Bartholdi . Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy. "Games 2012" Vol. 3, pp 150-156. ISSN 2073-4336[35] Manuel et al. Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, "Mathematical Methods of Operation Research" (2013). Vol. 77, pp 1-14 Springer.[36] Ramirez-Rios, D. G., Rodriguez Pinto, C., Visbal Martinez, J., Monroy Silvera, F., De la Cruz Hernández, J., Donoso Meisel, Y., & Paternina Arboleda, C. D. (2016). A bi-criteria optimization model for parallel machine scheduling: game theoretic vs genetic algorithms. IJMSOR: International Journal of Management Science & Operation Research, 1(1), 20-30. Retrieved from http://ijmsoridi.com/index.php/ijmsor/article/view/73[37] Landinez-Lamadrid, D. C., Ramirez-Ríos, D. G., Neira Rodado, D., Parra Negrete, K., & Combita Niño, J. P. (2017). Shapley Value: its algorithms and application to supply chains. 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Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley

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