How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty f...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2019
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22363
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102223
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22363
- Palabra clave:
- Ethics
Experiment
Genetics
Health insurance
Law enforcement
Theoretical study
Trade-off
Adult
Article
Genetic screening
Genetic susceptibility
Health insurance
Personalized medicine
Welfare
Consent law
Disclosure duty
Personalized medicine
Pooling health insurance contracts
Test take-up rate
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
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e785630d-2f4a-48c9-b8f2-926195deb38c-1d2dd0889-d1b0-45c9-acd3-66b9f017c757-110986266846002020-05-25T23:56:13Z2020-05-25T23:56:13Z2019We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty forces individuals to reveal their test results to insurers, exposing them to a discrimination risk. Consent Law allows them to hide any detrimental information, resulting in adverse selection. The experiment results in much lower genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law, showing that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk. Under Consent Law, take-up rates increase with the adverse selection intensity. A decrease in the test cost, and in adverse selection intensity, both make it more likely that Consent Law is preferred to Disclosure Duty. © 2019 Elsevier B.V.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.1022231676296https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22363engElsevier B.V.Journal of Health EconomicsVol. 68Journal of Health Economics, ISSN:1676296, Vol.68,(2019)https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85072698328&doi=10.1016%2fj.jhealeco.2019.102223&partnerID=40&md5=749aa9fdbfa55ac4a8e4d3cb811093e1Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUREthicsExperimentGeneticsHealth insuranceLaw enforcementTheoretical studyTrade-offAdultArticleGenetic screeningGenetic susceptibilityHealth insurancePersonalized medicineWelfareConsent lawDisclosure dutyPersonalized medicinePooling health insurance contractsTest take-up rateHow is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experimentarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Bardey, DavidDe Donder, PhilippeMantilla Ribero, César Andrés10336/22363oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/223632022-05-02 07:37:20.365749https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
title |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
spellingShingle |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment Ethics Experiment Genetics Health insurance Law enforcement Theoretical study Trade-off Adult Article Genetic screening Genetic susceptibility Health insurance Personalized medicine Welfare Consent law Disclosure duty Personalized medicine Pooling health insurance contracts Test take-up rate |
title_short |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
title_full |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
title_fullStr |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
title_full_unstemmed |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
title_sort |
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Ethics Experiment Genetics Health insurance Law enforcement Theoretical study Trade-off Adult Article Genetic screening Genetic susceptibility Health insurance Personalized medicine Welfare Consent law Disclosure duty Personalized medicine Pooling health insurance contracts Test take-up rate |
topic |
Ethics Experiment Genetics Health insurance Law enforcement Theoretical study Trade-off Adult Article Genetic screening Genetic susceptibility Health insurance Personalized medicine Welfare Consent law Disclosure duty Personalized medicine Pooling health insurance contracts Test take-up rate |
description |
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty forces individuals to reveal their test results to insurers, exposing them to a discrimination risk. Consent Law allows them to hide any detrimental information, resulting in adverse selection. The experiment results in much lower genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law, showing that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk. Under Consent Law, take-up rates increase with the adverse selection intensity. A decrease in the test cost, and in adverse selection intensity, both make it more likely that Consent Law is preferred to Disclosure Duty. © 2019 Elsevier B.V. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2019 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:13Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:13Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102223 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1676296 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22363 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102223 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22363 |
identifier_str_mv |
1676296 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Health Economics |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 68 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Health Economics, ISSN:1676296, Vol.68,(2019) |
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85072698328&doi=10.1016%2fj.jhealeco.2019.102223&partnerID=40&md5=749aa9fdbfa55ac4a8e4d3cb811093e1 |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier B.V. |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio institucional EdocUR |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
edocur@urosario.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814167562087301120 |