Finding dependencies between cyber-physical domains for security testing of industrial control systems

In modern societies, critical services such as transportation, power supply, water treatment and distribution are strongly dependent on Industrial Control Systems (ICS). As technology moves along, new features improve services provided by such ICS. On the other hand, this progress also introduces ne...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22899
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274745
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22899
Palabra clave:
Control systems
Cyber Physical System
Data flow analysis
Data flow graphs
Embedded systems
Graphic methods
Industrial water treatment
Information dissemination
Network security
Programmable logic controllers
Risk analysis
Risk assessment
Critical service
Data and information
Domain-specific knowledge
Industrial control systems
Information ow
Physical components
Security testing
System under test
Intelligent control
Cyber-Physical Systems
ICS Security
Information ow
Rights
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Description
Summary:In modern societies, critical services such as transportation, power supply, water treatment and distribution are strongly dependent on Industrial Control Systems (ICS). As technology moves along, new features improve services provided by such ICS. On the other hand, this progress also introduces new risks of cyber attacks due to the multiple direct and indirect dependencies between cyber and physical components of such systems. Performing rigorous security tests and risk analysis in these critical systems is thus a challenging task, because of the non-trivial interactions between digital and physical assets and the domain-specific knowledge necessary to analyse a particular system. In this work, we propose a methodology to model and analyse a System Under Test (SUT) as a data flow graph that highlights interactions among internal entities throughout the SUT. This model is automatically extracted from production code available in Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). We also propose a reachability algorithm and an attack diagram that will emphasize the dependencies between cyber and physical domains, thus enabling a human analyst to gauge various attack vectors that arise from subtle dependencies in data and information propagation. We test our methodology in a functional water treatment testbed and demonstrate how an analyst could make use of our designed attack diagrams to reason on possible threats to various targets of the SUT. © 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.