True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why
Anti-insurgent militias and states attempt to erode insurgent groups’ capacities and co-opt insurgent fighters by promising and providing benefits. They do so to create a perception that the insurgency is unraveling and to harness inside information to prosecute more effective counterinsurgency camp...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22315
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22315
- Palabra clave:
- Civil wars
Colombia
Defection
Demobilization
Ideology
Insurgency
Internal armed conflict
Militias
Side switching
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
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e0a8ac2d-68b4-472f-bac6-bf00b9514ebde3dd5c07-efbb-4060-b898-d2abb508c8817995022360097274e18-0b8f-47f7-b1ee-10b9c3137a982020-05-25T23:56:05Z2020-05-25T23:56:05Z2015Anti-insurgent militias and states attempt to erode insurgent groups’ capacities and co-opt insurgent fighters by promising and providing benefits. They do so to create a perception that the insurgency is unraveling and to harness inside information to prosecute more effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Why do some insurgents defect to a paramilitary group and others exit the war by demobilizing, while still others remain loyal to their group? This article presents the first empirical analysis of these questions, connecting insurgents’ motivations for joining, wartime experiences, and organizational behavior with decisions to defect. A survey of ex-combatants in Colombia shows that individuals who joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect overall but more likely to side-switch or demobilize when their group deviates from its ideological precepts. Among fighters who joined for economic reasons, political indoctrination works to decrease their chances of demobilization and defection to paramilitaries, while opportunities for looting decrease economically motivated combatants’ odds of defection. © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750220027https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22315engSAGE Publications Inc.823No. 5794Journal of Conflict ResolutionVol. 59Journal of Conflict Resolution, ISSN:220027, Vol.59, No.5 (2015); pp. 794-823https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84937231890&doi=10.1177%2f0022002715576750&partnerID=40&md5=44452d5ea616f10dc4715b40dec5b1efAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURCivil warsColombiaDefectionDemobilizationIdeologyInsurgencyInternal armed conflictMilitiasSide switchingTrue Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and WhyarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Oppenheim, BenSteele, AbbeyVargas Duque, Juan FernandoWeintraub, Michael10336/22315oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/223152022-05-02 07:37:17.585055https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
title |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
spellingShingle |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why Civil wars Colombia Defection Demobilization Ideology Insurgency Internal armed conflict Militias Side switching |
title_short |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
title_full |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
title_fullStr |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
title_full_unstemmed |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
title_sort |
True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Civil wars Colombia Defection Demobilization Ideology Insurgency Internal armed conflict Militias Side switching |
topic |
Civil wars Colombia Defection Demobilization Ideology Insurgency Internal armed conflict Militias Side switching |
description |
Anti-insurgent militias and states attempt to erode insurgent groups’ capacities and co-opt insurgent fighters by promising and providing benefits. They do so to create a perception that the insurgency is unraveling and to harness inside information to prosecute more effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Why do some insurgents defect to a paramilitary group and others exit the war by demobilizing, while still others remain loyal to their group? This article presents the first empirical analysis of these questions, connecting insurgents’ motivations for joining, wartime experiences, and organizational behavior with decisions to defect. A survey of ex-combatants in Colombia shows that individuals who joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect overall but more likely to side-switch or demobilize when their group deviates from its ideological precepts. Among fighters who joined for economic reasons, political indoctrination works to decrease their chances of demobilization and defection to paramilitaries, while opportunities for looting decrease economically motivated combatants’ odds of defection. © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2015 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:05Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:05Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
220027 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22315 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22315 |
identifier_str_mv |
220027 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv |
823 |
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv |
No. 5 |
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv |
794 |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Conflict Resolution |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 59 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Conflict Resolution, ISSN:220027, Vol.59, No.5 (2015); pp. 794-823 |
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84937231890&doi=10.1177%2f0022002715576750&partnerID=40&md5=44452d5ea616f10dc4715b40dec5b1ef |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
SAGE Publications Inc. |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio institucional EdocUR |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
edocur@urosario.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814167610448674816 |