Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of str...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2015
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/26993
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993
Palabra clave:
Common pool resource games
Experiments
Quantal response equilibrium
Sampling equilibrium
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Abierto (Texto Completo)
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/26993
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling 5df7f2f6-7fa8-41ec-ab1e-40051afba4cb1098626684600882c8965-a57b-4f08-9fb0-87a37268e6e72020-08-19T14:40:42Z2020-08-19T14:40:42Z2015-07-23This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. © 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299ISSN: 2073-4336https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993engMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute317No. 3299GamesVol. 6Games, ISSN: 2073-4336, Vol.6, No.3 (2015); pp. 299-317https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/299/htmAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Gamesinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURCommon pool resource gamesExperimentsQuantal response equilibriumSampling equilibriumStable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource gamesEquilibrio de muestreo estable en juegos de recursos comunesarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Cardenas, Juan CamiloMantilla Ribero, César AndrésSethi, Rajiv10336/26993oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/269932022-05-02 07:37:16.751376https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv Equilibrio de muestreo estable en juegos de recursos comunes
title Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
spellingShingle Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
Common pool resource games
Experiments
Quantal response equilibrium
Sampling equilibrium
title_short Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
title_full Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
title_fullStr Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
title_full_unstemmed Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
title_sort Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Common pool resource games
Experiments
Quantal response equilibrium
Sampling equilibrium
topic Common pool resource games
Experiments
Quantal response equilibrium
Sampling equilibrium
description This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. © 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2015-07-23
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-19T14:40:42Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-19T14:40:42Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv ISSN: 2073-4336
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993
url https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993
identifier_str_mv ISSN: 2073-4336
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 317
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 3
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 299
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Games
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 6
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Games, ISSN: 2073-4336, Vol.6, No.3 (2015); pp. 299-317
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/299/htm
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Games
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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