Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of str...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/26993
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993
- Palabra clave:
- Common pool resource games
Experiments
Quantal response equilibrium
Sampling equilibrium
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
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5df7f2f6-7fa8-41ec-ab1e-40051afba4cb1098626684600882c8965-a57b-4f08-9fb0-87a37268e6e72020-08-19T14:40:42Z2020-08-19T14:40:42Z2015-07-23This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. © 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299ISSN: 2073-4336https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993engMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute317No. 3299GamesVol. 6Games, ISSN: 2073-4336, Vol.6, No.3 (2015); pp. 299-317https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/299/htmAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Gamesinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURCommon pool resource gamesExperimentsQuantal response equilibriumSampling equilibriumStable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource gamesEquilibrio de muestreo estable en juegos de recursos comunesarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Cardenas, Juan CamiloMantilla Ribero, César AndrésSethi, Rajiv10336/26993oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/269932022-05-02 07:37:16.751376https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
dc.title.TranslatedTitle.spa.fl_str_mv |
Equilibrio de muestreo estable en juegos de recursos comunes |
title |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
spellingShingle |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games Common pool resource games Experiments Quantal response equilibrium Sampling equilibrium |
title_short |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
title_full |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
title_fullStr |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
title_full_unstemmed |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
title_sort |
Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Common pool resource games Experiments Quantal response equilibrium Sampling equilibrium |
topic |
Common pool resource games Experiments Quantal response equilibrium Sampling equilibrium |
description |
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. © 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2015-07-23 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-08-19T14:40:42Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-08-19T14:40:42Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
ISSN: 2073-4336 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26993 |
identifier_str_mv |
ISSN: 2073-4336 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv |
317 |
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv |
No. 3 |
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv |
299 |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Games |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 6 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Games, ISSN: 2073-4336, Vol.6, No.3 (2015); pp. 299-317 |
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/299/htm |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute |
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv |
Games |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.instname.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.reponame.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio institucional EdocUR |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
edocur@urosario.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814167662572339200 |