Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments

This paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing th...

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Fecha de publicación:: 2019

Institución:: Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:: Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:: eng

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spelling	7159706002d4eb3e0-67d4-45c9-a24f-15c6d1a76a152020-05-26T00:07:42Z2020-05-26T00:07:42Z2019This paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry. © 2019application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.07.0011762680https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24023engElsevier B.V.European Journal of Political EconomyVol. 60European Journal of Political Economy, ISSN:1762680, Vol.60,(2019)https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85069601383&doi=10.1016%2fj.ejpoleco.2019.07.001&partnerID=40&md5=0535ea64802a5ec8f74c4b8bde476082Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURContestsEndogenous entryExperimentsEntry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experimentsarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Aycinena Abascal, DiegoRentschler L.10336/24023oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/240232022-05-02 07:37:13.832401https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
title	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
spellingShingle	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments Contests Endogenous entry Experiments
title_short	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
title_full	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
title_fullStr	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
title_full_unstemmed	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
title_sort	Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv	Contests Endogenous entry Experiments
topic	Contests Endogenous entry Experiments
description	This paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry. © 2019
publishDate	2019
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv	2019
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2020-05-26T00:07:42Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2020-05-26T00:07:42Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv	article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv	Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.07.001
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv	1762680
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24023
url	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.07.001 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24023
identifier_str_mv	1762680
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv	eng
language	eng
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv	European Journal of Political Economy
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv	Vol. 60
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv	European Journal of Political Economy, ISSN:1762680, Vol.60,(2019)
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv	https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85069601383&doi=10.1016%2fj.ejpoleco.2019.07.001&partnerID=40&md5=0535ea64802a5ec8f74c4b8bde476082
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv	Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv	Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv	application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv	Elsevier B.V.
institution	Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv	instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv	reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv	Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv	edocur@urosario.edu.co
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Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments

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