Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas : A survey of experimental research

I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues. © 2018, Igitur, Utrecht Publishing and Archiving Services. All rights reserved.

• Fecha de publicación: 2018
• Institución: Universidad del Rosario
• Repositorio: Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/21327
• Acceso en línea: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.857; https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/21327
• Palabra clave: Cambio climático; Fondo común; Cooperación; Coordinación; Riesgo; Economía de la tierra; Climate change; Common pool; Cooperation; Cordination; Risk; Cambio climático; Fondo común; Cooperación; Coordinación
• License: Abierto (Texto Completo)