Inflation before and after central bank independence: The case of Colombia

In this paper we model the Colombian inflation rate in terms of excess demand effects from asset, goods and factor markets. In contrast to previous results for a group of industrial economies, we find that domestic factors are a far more powerful influence on inflation than are external factors. The paper pays particular attention to the potential effects of the Constitutional Reform of 1991, which created a Central Bank independent from other parts of government. We find that the creation of an independent Central Bank did change some of the parameters of the model, as the disequilibria in goods and monetary markets were found to have a smaller effect on inflation after Central Bank independence was granted. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

• Fecha de publicación: 2006
• Institución: Universidad del Rosario
• Repositorio: Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22323
• Acceso en línea: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.12.005; https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22323
• Palabra clave: Banking; Independence; Inflation; Investment; Colombia; South america; Central bank independence; Cointegration; Colombia; Inflation; Market disequilibria
• License: Abierto (Texto Completo)